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THE COMPLETENESS REQUIREMENT  
IN PATENT LAW 
DMITRY KARSHTEDT* 
Abstract: This Article argues that courts have created a de facto extra-statutory 
condition of patentability, herein termed the “completeness” requirement. This 
requirement bars patents on certain inventions whose chief value lies in their 
function as inputs into downstream research. The Article contends that the no-
tion of completeness explains doctrinal innovations that are difficult to rational-
ize any other way. Although it reflects an important policy of limiting unduly 
preemptive patent claims on foundational, building-block inventions, the com-
pleteness requirement in its current form fails to implement this policy in a way 
that is coherent and consistent with patent law’s utilitarian goals. In addition, 
courts’ attempts to develop the completeness requirement based on existing 
statutory provisions have resulted in controversial interpretations of the Patent 
Act, generating legitimacy costs. The Article argues that these problems are best 
addressed by explicitly recognizing completeness as a separate requirement of 
patentability and modifying the doctrinal tools used to enforce this requirement. 
To determine whether a patent claim passes completeness, the Article proposes a 
new test that focuses on the generality and unpredictability of a claimed inven-
tion’s applications. Further, it argues that an amendment to the Patent Act codi-
fying the requirement of completeness is the most effective way to implement 
the proposal. Finally, the Article explores the possibility of awarding a limited 
patent right, which it terms “Research Patent,” to claims that satisfy existing re-
quirements of patentability, but fail completeness. This right would provide the 
intellectual property incentives that are likely needed to develop and commer-
cialize foundational inventions, and also help decrease the potential for stifling 
downstream innovation created by granting full patent protection to such inven-
tions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that, after several years of laboratory work, a researcher dis-
covers a novel way to make a certain type of chemical bond faster and with 
higher efficiency.1 This invention adds to other chemists’ toolkits and paves 
the way for making an entirely new class of molecules, opening up possibil-
ities of discovery of new drugs, useful materials, and so on. The inventor 
assembles a kit based on the new method and commercializes the invention, 
making it available to other scientists who wish to take advantage of the 
method. Worried that potential infringers can easily design around patent 
claims directed merely to a specific kit, the inventor attempts to patent the 
general method of making the chemical bond. 
Or, consider a case where biomedical investigators discover that inter-
fering with the function of a certain receptor in the human body can reduce 
“inflammation associated with diseases such as arthritis.”2 In contrast to 
earlier work, which had proceeded without the knowledge of this receptor’s 
role, this approach treats the inflammation while avoiding “undesirable side 
effects such as stomach upset [sic], irritation, ulcers, and bleeding.”3 The 
discovery is highly valuable; as one commentator noted, “there is little 
question that the pioneering . . . work paved the way for a new generation of 
painkillers that would be easy on the stomach,” including Celebrex.4 Real-
izing that a patent to a method of finding a drug might be of little value, the 
inventors attempt to claim a method of treating the inflammation based on 
the discovery of the receptor function and a roadmap for finding drugs that 
would interfere with it. 
Finally, consider a discovery that enables doctors to optimize dosages 
of a certain drug based on the concentration of a particular chemical com-
pound (called a “probe molecule”) in a blood sample taken from a patient.5 
The inventors license the technology to a company, which designs and sells 
kits for optimizing the drug dosages.6 Experts hail the invention as a signif-
                                                                                                                           
 1 This is a stylized example describing an invention that would be held unpatentable in view 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Brenner v. Manson. See 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
 2 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 917, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 3 See id. at 918. 
 4 See Seth Shulman, A Painful IP Ruling, MIT TECH. REV., June 2003, at 75, 75 (“[W]e need 
a patent system that distinguishes between those who would ‘preempt’ the future and those who 
actually help create it.”). 
 5 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012). 
 6 See Prometheus Thiopurine Metabolites, PROMETHEUS THERAPEUTICS & DIAGNOSTICS, 
http://www.prometheuslabs.com/Resources/PTM/Thiopurine_Metabolites_Product_Detail.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/P85C-F5KF (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).  
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icant development in the treatment of inflammatory bowel disease,7 and 
researchers and doctors use the kit to make further discoveries.8 Again, un-
satisfied to claim merely a kit, the inventors attempt to claim a general 
method of optimizing drug dosage based on the measured concentration of 
the probe molecule. 
Because all of these inventions required significant investments, con-
stituted important scientific advances, and promoted further research and 
development, it is difficult to fault the inventors for seeking valuable patent 
claims to protect them.9 But courts held that none of them could be patented 
in view of what the inventors claimed and what they disclosed (or, rather, 
failed to disclose) in their patent applications.10 As to the first invention, the 
patent applicant did not show that the chemicals made with the novel pro-
cess would be useful to ordinary consumers (as drugs, for example) rather 
than to other researchers.11 The Supreme Court therefore ruled that the pro-
cess was not “useful” within the meaning of Section 101 of the Patent Act.12 
As to the second, because the inventors did not yet know what specific 
drugs would reduce the inflammation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit held that the patent failed to provide adequate “written de-
scription” under Section 112.13 And as to the third, the Supreme Court de-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Can We Personalize Therapy for IBD?, CANADIAN ASS’N OF GASTROENTEROLOGY 
(Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.cag-acg.org/uploads/syllabus_ibd_symposium.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/GMS3-BUQQ. 
 8 See Troy D. Jaskowski et al., Analysis of Serum Antibodies in Patients Suspected of Having 
Inflammatory Bowel Disease, 13 CLINICAL & VACCINE IMMUNOLOGY 655, 656 (2006). 
 9 See Elizabeth A. Doherty, Biomarker and Personalized Medicine Patent Claims One Year 
After Mayo v. Prometheus, FULL DISCLOSURE (Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett, & Dun-
ner, LLP, Washington, D.C.), June 2013, at 3, 4, available at http://www.finnegan.com/files/
upload/Newsletters/Full_Disclosure/2013/June/FullDisclosure_Jun13_Print.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/MWB6-JPQ2 (“From [a patent] applicant’s point of view . . . narrower claims may be 
very easy for a competitor to design around and thus of little commercial value.”); see also Peter 
W. Huber, Who Owns the Code of Life?, CITY J., Autumn 2013, at 10, 13 (“[P]atents that cover 
biological know-how only insofar as it is incorporated into an innovative drug or a diagnostic 
device provide little, if any, practical protection for what is often a large component of the ingenu-
ity and cost of the invention. . . . [T]he pioneer can easily be the only player that fails to profit 
from its own pathbreaking work.”). 
 10 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305; Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534; Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 
929. In Mayo, although it is probable that no amount of disclosure would have rescued the assert-
ed claims, the statements in the specification still mattered in that they counted against the validity 
of the claims. See 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98 (taking note of the patent’s statements indicating that 
“methods for determining [probe molecule] levels were well known in the art” and using these 
statements against the patentability of the claims). 
 11 See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534. 
 12 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534. 
 13 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 929. The Federal Circuit is a feder-
al appellate court charged with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
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termined that the patent claims did not “confine their reach to particular 
applications of” the correlation that the inventors discovered.14 Thus, the 
Court concluded, the claims could not be patented because they were di-
rected to a law of nature—one of the judicially recognized exceptions to 
patent eligibility.15 
This Article posits that the doctrines represented by these three cases 
are best understood as products of courts’ attempts to test the patent claims 
at issue against the same unwritten requirement of patentability, herein 
termed “completeness.”16 In general, the completeness requirement is con-
cerned with whether, given the scope of the claim at issue and the disclo-
sures in the patent’s specification,17 the invention is too foundational to 
qualify for a patent. Completeness is critically important because patents on 
artifacts of basic research are thought to disserve utilitarian goals of patent 
law.18 Commentators contend that the need to avoid the harmful effects of 
such patents on downstream innovation outweighs the need to incentivize 
creation and commercialization of basic research and induce its disclosure 
using patent-based mechanisms.19 The unwritten completeness requirement 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302. 
 15 See id. at 1305. 
 16 The label “completeness” as used in this Article is not to be confused with the notion of a 
completely conceived invention for the purpose of the on-sale bar. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 
525 U.S. 55, 66 (1998) (“The word ‘invention’ must refer to a concept that is complete, rather 
than merely one that is ‘substantially complete.’”). In contrast, “completeness” as used here con-
notes inventions that are artifacts of basic research. I thank Janice Mueller for pointing out this 
area of potential confusion. 
 17 The term “specification” encompasses everything but the patent’s claims. The claims de-
fine the scope of the patent right, and the specification provides the supporting disclosure. Alt-
hough the proper term for this part of the patent is “written description,” I use “specification” to be 
consistent with common usage. 
 18 See infra notes 96–125 and accompanying text. As we will see throughout the Article, 
however, the outcomes of completeness cases sometimes belie courts’ utilitarian rhetoric. See, 
e.g., infra note 20 and accompanying text. This disjunction is probably due in part to the difficulty 
of defining “basic research,” an issue that is addressed extensively in the Article. See infra notes 
273–282 and accompanying text. 
 19 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 306–08 (2003); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 165 (2004) (arguing against property rights in basic research because 
grants and other forms of “[s]tate support” create a “reward system”); Alan Devlin, Patent Law’s 
Parsimony Principle, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1693, 1717 (2010) (arguing that laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are excluded from patentability because “[t]hese fields of 
discovery bear unique potential for overcompensation, given their upstream nature and the con-
comitant proclivity for ubiquitous downstream application”); see also Michael Risch, Reinventing 
Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1220–21 (discussing patent law’s “bias against basic sci-
ence,” and the justifications for that bias, in the context of the utility and patentable subject matter 
requirements). See generally David Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: 
The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181 (2009) (arguing that 
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accordingly aims to bar patents on these so-called “upstream” inventions 
because such patents would likely become “bottlenecks” capable of chilling 
further inventive activity.20 Specifically, some courts and scholars highlight, 
as a policy concern, the need to prevent “undue preemption” of downstream 
research through upstream patenting.21 But because it is sometimes difficult 
to measure preemption directly and determine how much preemption is due, 
courts apply three doctrines—utility, written description, and patentable 
subject matter22—to eliminate classes of upstream patents that appear to be 
particularly likely to raise problems of undue preemption.23 
This Article argues that conceiving of the three separate doctrines as 
facets of an unwritten, underlying requirement of patentability might aid in 
the development of a framework of patent rights and remedies that is more 
rational than that which patent law currently offers. The concept of com-
pleteness would help bring into sharp focus the policy goal of limiting pa-
tents on early-stage inventions that serve as foundational research inputs, 
and would direct decisionmakers to examine whether the outcomes of cer-
tain utility, written description, and patentable subject matter cases actually 
                                                                                                                           
“the sensible basis for determining patentable subject matter is to determine whether innovation is 
unlikely in the absence of patents”). 
 20 But see Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1858, 1873–85 (2014) (suggesting that there is a strong non-utilitarian streak behind pa-
tentable subject matter exclusions, which manifests itself with particular salience in recent Su-
preme Court cases). To the extent courts have begun to depart from patent law’s utilitarian moor-
ings in completeness cases, this Article proposes a path for correcting this trend.  
 21 See, e.g., Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534 (reasoning that patents on upstream inventions “may 
confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development”); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scien-
tific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 124 
(1999) (warning that upstream patents are “likely to inhibit creativity and thus progress”); Richard 
H. Stern, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Busi-
ness, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 145 (1999) (“[E]very claim ‘preempts’ 
whatever is the subject matter of that claim. The task of applying a doctrine against undue 
preemption is to limit the preemptiveness of allowed claims to an extent as will allow others to 
operate within the applicable business genre . . . .”). 
 22 The utility test asks whether an invention is “useful.” See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 528–29. The 
written description test asks whether the inventor “actually invented” (or “possessed”) the claimed 
subject matter. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc). And patentable subject matter tests ask whether the invention is “markedly dif-
ferent” from a natural product, or “an inventive application” of a law of nature or abstract idea. 
See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014) (explaining the “inventive appli-
cation” test); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 
(2013) (outlining the “markedly different” test). 
 23 For examples of cases where courts made this policy reasoning clear, see Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1294 (“[Precedent] warn[s] us against upholding patents that claim processes that too broadly 
preempt the use of a natural law.”); Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535 (“[T]here is insufficient justification 
for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.”); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 
1353 (“[C]laims to research plans . . . impose costs on downstream research, discouraging later 
invention.”). 
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reflect this policy.24 If the ultimate goal of barring unduly preemptive pa-
tents is kept firmly in mind, courts and patent examiners could identify oth-
er problematic patents of this sort that decisionmakers have nonetheless 
allowed, and also determine which patents they have invalidated in error. 
Indeed, the completeness lens might help address the concern that, although 
courts sometimes reject patent claims to certain early-stage biotechnological 
and chemical inventions, they routinely permit claims to other types of 
foundational inventions that might preempt many research and development 
applications in various areas of technology.25 For example, applying the 
concept of completeness may help decisionmakers deal in a coherent way 
with the problem of broad, functionally drafted software and business 
method claims that are thought to threaten downstream development path-
ways.26 Such claims have generally escaped judicial scrutiny,27 although 
this appears to be changing as courts have begun to apply the patentable 
subject matter requirement against software and business method patents 
with increasing rigor.28  
                                                                                                                           
 24 Recent developments in patent law suggest that courts in patentable subject matter cases, in 
particular, may have strayed from this policy. See Chiang, supra note 20, at 1873–85; infra notes 
371–372 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 320–350 and accompanying text (analyzing 
the outcomes courts would likely have reached had those courts applied the completeness test 
proposed in this Article to patents at issue in various utility, written description, and patentable 
subject matter cases).  
 25 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 
581 (2006) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s attempts to distinguish unpatentable biochemical 
research tools from other, patentable research tools, such as scientific instruments, are not persua-
sive); see also infra notes 201–227 and accompanying text (addressing related arguments in great-
er detail). 
 26 See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. 
L. REV. 905, 908 (explaining that “broad functional claiming of software inventions” has enabled 
patentees to “effectively capture[] ownership not of what they built, but of anything that achieves 
the same goal, no matter how different it is”). To be sure, courts have also allowed some upstream 
patents in the biomedical fields. See infra notes 253, 341 and accompanying text. 
 27 In particular, it has been argued that courts have not applied the written description re-
quirement in a rigorous way to software-type inventions. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 26, at 925 
n.86.  
 28 See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2351–52 (holding unpatentable “a computer-implemented 
scheme” for managing financial risk); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 712 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (holding unpatentable “a method for distributing copyrighted media products over the 
Internet”); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (holding unpatentable “a method for creating a device profile within a digital image pro-
cessing system”); Walker Digital, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 11-318-LPS, 2014 WL 4365245, at 
*2, *11–12 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (holding unpatentable a software method and system for 
matching potential employees with employers). The fact that courts have invalidated functionally 
drafted biotechnology claims under the written description requirement, but have recently invali-
dated software and business method claims exhibiting similar flaws under a different requirement, 
further points to the ad hoc, siloed nature of the completeness case law. Cf. Kevin Emerson Col-
lins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of Patent Protection for 
 
2015] The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law 955 
To be sure, technology-specific standards in patent law are sometimes 
justifiable.29 And patents on research inputs may crop up with greater fre-
quency, or may be particularly pernicious, in some areas of technology rela-
tive to others. It may also be the case that, in certain fields, it is easier to tell 
when a patent claim is directed to a “bottleneck” invention, and should 
therefore be a target for invalidation or rejection.30 Nevertheless, utilitarian 
concerns about undue preemption of downstream research should apply to 
all foundational inventions,31 no matter the field.32 In line with this goal, the 
                                                                                                                           
After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 60, 62, available at http://patentlyo.
com/media/docs/2010/04/collins.ariad.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5YV9-6DA5 (“[W]ritten 
description may impose restrictions on claims in biotechnology to which claims in other techno-
logical sectors are already subject under a different patent doctrine.”). A further complicating 
factor in this area is that the scope (rather than validity) of functionally drafted software claims 
might be limited if they are treated as so-called means-plus-function claims. See Collins, supra, at 
68–71; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012) (defining means-plus-function claims). In practice, 
however, courts rarely apply the means-plus-function doctrine. See Lemley, supra note 26, at 
907–08 (“Both because of the nature of computer programming and because of the way the 
means-plus-function claim rules have been interpreted by the Federal Circuit, those patentees have 
been able to write those broad functional claims without being subject to the limitations of Section 
112(f).”). 
 29 See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 95 (2009) (encouraging courts to “build industry-sensitive policy analysis into their 
decisions” and “take account of the technology-specific nature of the patent system”). See gener-
ally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1155 (2002) (exploring how patent law is often technology-specific in application and propos-
ing reforms to optimize rules for particular industries). 
 30 The difference in the treatment of chemistry and biotechnology versus software inventions 
has sometimes been justified on the basis that the former are “unpredictable arts,” but that doctrine 
seems to provide only a partial answer. See infra notes 156–157 and accompanying text; cf. Sean 
B. Seymore, Foresight Bias in Patent Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1105, 1111–14 (2015) (argu-
ing that decisionmakers sometimes deny patent protection to meritorious inventions in the chemi-
cal field based on false assumptions or generalizations).  
 31 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 19, at 306–08; SHAVELL, supra note 19, at 165; Devlin, 
supra note 19, at 1717; see also Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myri-
ad Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 535 (2014) (discussing “the policy of maintaining 
fundamental access”). But cf. Chiang, supra note 20, at 1873–85 (maintaining that moral consid-
erations play a significant role in patentable subject matter cases and challenging the view that 
courts in these cases focus exclusively on utilitarian concerns). 
 32 Cf. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, 
J., concurring in the order denying rehearing en banc) (“In my view we have yet to articulate satis-
factory standards [for enforcing the written description requirement] that can be applied to all 
technologies.”); id. (Linn, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc) (“The burden 
of [the Federal Circuit’s written description cases] has fallen on the biotech industry dispropor-
tionately . . . .”); Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Compre-
hensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 1, 4 (2007) (describing the written description requirement as “a ‘super-enablement’ 
requirement specifically targeting biotechnology and substantially restricting the patentability of 
biotechnology-related inventions”); Seymore, supra note 30, at 1112 (arguing that the utility re-
quirement reflects a bias against chemical inventions). 
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completeness framework might encourage broad scrutiny of attempts to 
patent upstream inventions and, at the same time, help courts establish lim-
iting principles to avoid sweeping into the bin of invalidity patents that pose 
no threat to downstream research.33 
Additionally, recognizing that completeness concerns underlie three 
seemingly disparate lines of doctrine can pave the way to increased judicial 
legitimacy and transparency.34 The cases that I have placed under the com-
pleteness rubric have all been quite controversial, and have drawn a fire-
storm of academic (and judicial) criticism.35 Indeed, scholars have argued 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Even Burk and Lemley, who support the idea of technology specificity, argue that courts 
have the tests wrong. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Princi-
ple, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 735 (2004) (presented at Symposium, The Past, Present and 
Future of the Federal Circuit, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 669 (2004)) (arguing that the Federal 
Circuit’s approach is “not optimal from the perspective of economic policy”). Cf. generally R. 
Polk Wagner, Exactly Backwards: Exceptionalism and the Federal Circuit, 54 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 749 (2004) (criticizing the Burk-Lemley thesis); R. Polk Wagner, Of Patents and Path De-
pendency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341 (2003) (same). 
 34 Cf. Kevin Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1279, 1348 (2014) (arguing that “conceptual coherence and doctrinal transparency—that is, 
having the PTO and the courts mean what they say and say what they mean—create social val-
ue”). 
 35 For some scholarly critiques of the utility requirement, see Seymore, supra note 30, at 
1124–26; Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1077 (2014); Saman-
tha A. Jameson, Note, The Problems of the Utility Analysis in Fisher and Its Associated Policy 
Implications and Flaws, 56 DUKE L.J. 311, 322–33 (2006); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christo-
pher M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting the Enforcement, Procurement, and Licensing of 
Research Tool Patents, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1299, 1339–40 (2008) (describing the role of the 
utility standard). For some scholarly critiques of the written description requirement, see Timothy 
R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 161–63 (2006); Holman, supra 
note 32, at 17–20; Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written De-
scription” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 55, 62–88 (2000); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description 
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 633–49 (1998); Harris 
A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 209, 222–26 (1998). For some scholarly critiques of the patentable subject matter require-
ment, see Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 426–27, 433–36 (2012); 
Joshua Kresh, Patent Eligibility After Mayo: How Did We Get Here and Where Do We Go?, 22 
FED. CIR. B.J. 521, 522 (2013); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 
1322–25, 1338–39 (2011); Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. 
REV. 563, 566–67 (2012); Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility—A Disease and a Cure, 
84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387, 417–26 (2011). For judicial critiques of the utility requirement, see In re 
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting); In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 957 
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting). For written description, see Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361 (Rader, 
J., dissenting); Univ. of Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1307, 1315–21 (Rader, J., dissenting from the order 
denying rehearing en banc) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s written description requirement and 
collecting articles critical of the requirement). For patentable subject matter, see CLS Bank Int’l v. 
Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1297, 1303–05 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Rader, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 977–78 (Fed. 
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that some utility, written description, and patentable subject matter cases 
reflect judicial subjectivity36—or even bias.37 Moreover, certain complete-
ness cases have been described not merely as wrong—itself a serious charge 
given that the cases are intended to serve an important policy—but as un-
principled.38 Understanding the rationales underlying these cases and, 
where necessary, adjusting the legal rules to better reflect the rationales 
might help answer these critiques and provide more satisfactory solutions to 
the problem of patenting of basic research. 
Indeed, recognizing completeness as a unified requirement of patenta-
bility might point to needed reforms in patent law. For example, deci-
sionmakers can codify the completeness requirement to help bring it into 
line with the core policy aim of limiting undue preemption of downstream 
research. Codification would replace and streamline the multiplicity of 
problematic tests that courts have developed under the completeness re-
quirement’s doctrinally siloed enforcement.39 Although courts can, in prin-
ciple, improve the functioning of the completeness requirement under the 
existing conditions of patentability, a statutory fix may be needed because 
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 
561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 36 See, e.g., Kresh, supra note 35, at 540 (“Throughout the decades, courts have struggled 
with handling patent claims that they disliked. Many times they have looked to the exceptions to 
§ 101, in particular ‘abstract ideas’ and ‘products of nature,’ to eliminate claims of which they 
disapproved.”); Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject Matter and Separation 
of Powers, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 5 (2012) (noting the “lack of a consistent judicial theo-
ry supporting [courts’] exceptions” to categories of patentable subject matter under § 101); Pitlick, 
supra note 35, at 222–26 (criticizing the Federal Circuit for taking written description “jurispru-
dence in an unjustifiably new and reckless direction”); Seymore, supra note 35, at 1077 (arguing 
that the utility requirement is arbitrary); Allen K. Yu, The En Banc Federal Circuit’s Written 
Description Requirement: Time for the Supreme Court to Reverse Again?, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
895, 913 (2012) (arguing that the written description doctrine allows courts “to strike down ad 
hoc, without standard, and as a matter of law claims [they] do not like”). 
 37 See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 961 
(1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s holding “that mathematical algorithms could not be 
patented[] was poorly reasoned and stemmed from . . . judicial bias”); Seymore, supra note 30, at 
1133 (arguing that foresight bias drives courts to apply heightened patentability requirements to 
chemical inventions). 
 38 See, e.g., Pitlick, supra note 35, at 223 (arguing that in its written description cases, the 
Federal Circuit took its “jurisprudence in an unjustifiably new and reckless direction, freed of any 
constraints of stare decisis”); see also supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (observing that 
some critics have argued that completeness cases reflect judicial subjectivity or bias).  
 39 See infra notes 197–266 and accompanying text (surveying the inconsistencies and other 
problems associated with the three disparate completeness doctrines); cf. Collins, supra note 28, at 
71 (arguing that it is “clearly impossible to understand the written description doctrine without 
understanding the baseline of protection for after-arising technology provided by other patent 
doctrines”); Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 43, 60 (2012) (discussing the problems with “perceiv[ing] each of the statutory 
requirements as a distinct silo”). 
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the historical and doctrinal baggage that comes with established provisions 
could make this difficult.40 Much like the requirement of nonobviousness—
initially a judge-made doctrine that underwent codification and a course 
correction in the Patent Act of 1952—completeness could benefit from cod-
ification and course correction today after years of judicial experimenta-
tion.41 Although imminent congressional intervention of this sort might 
seem unlikely in today’s political climate, the state of affairs might change 
if recent judicial developments in this area of patent law lead to widespread 
dissatisfaction.42 
One possible statutory solution is a rule barring all patent claims di-
rected to objects of basic research.43 Although basic research has proven 
difficult to define, work in the field of science studies provides one possible 
framework.44 For example, one scholar characterizes the generality of an 
invention’s applications and the unpredictability associated with down-
stream research directions that an invention might open up as hallmarks of 
basic research.45 Guided by these considerations, a test for implementing 
the completeness requirement might ask whether the claim at issue is di-
rected primarily to an invention that sets the foundation for future research 
and development, and whether the claim has the potential to cover many 
unforeseeable, transformative applications. Although this test would add 
administrative costs associated with these factual inquiries, it would also 
yield significant benefits.46 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See infra notes 351–378 and accompanying text. Scholars have proposed other improve-
ments to some doctrines underlying completeness—particularly patentable subject matter—short 
of a statutory solution. See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 35, at 1337–46; Yu, supra note 35, at 
427–40. 
 41 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3–4, 12–13 (1966) (discussing the judicial 
origins of the nonobviousness requirement). For example, the language “[p]atentability shall not 
be negated by the manner in which the invention was made” contained in § 103—the nonobvious-
ness requirement as codified in the 1952 Patent Act—was intended to abrogate “the flash of crea-
tive genius” (also known simply as “flash of genius”) test set forth in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. 
Automatic Devices Corp. and other similar tests. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); 314 U.S. 84, 91 
(1941); Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 181, 188 (2004). 
But see Graham, 383 U.S. at 15 n.7 (stating that the “flash of creative genius” statement was only 
“a rhetorical embellishment”). I thank Rochelle Dreyfuss for drawing this analogy to my attention. 
 42 See infra notes 371–372 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 375–378 and accompanying text (setting forth the proposed statutory 
framework). 
 44 See Jane Calvert, What’s Special About Basic Research?, 31 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VAL-
UES 199, 203–05 (2006). 
 45 See id. at 204 (“The most common epistemological features [scientists and policymakers] 
associate[] with basic research [are] unpredictability . . . and generality.”). 
 46 These benefits include withholding patents only from inventions that harm downstream 
innovation, and improving transparency and legitimacy of the completeness requirement relative 
to its current implementation. See supra notes 24–38 and accompanying text; cf. Donald S. Chi-
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Another, more ambitious proposal for reform stemming from the 
recognition of the completeness requirement involves the establishment of a 
partial or intermediate patent right for inventions that satisfy the extant re-
quirements of patentability, but fail completeness.47 Instead of barring intel-
lectual property protection for such inventions entirely, this secondary pro-
posal would provide for a narrower set of rights—for example, a limited 
patent that comes only with the remedy of a compulsory license. Indeed, if 
the concern is that owners of upstream patents wield an undue amount of 
preemption, then the logical solution is to weaken the available remedy un-
til the patentee receives the preemption that is due—or, at the very least, 
obtains something less that the amount of preemption that comes with a full 
patent right.48 Thus, even if utilitarian considerations suggest that upstream 
inventions should not be given full patent protection,49 partial patent protec-
tion might be justifiable on these grounds.  
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), however, currently 
lacks the power to grant patents that come with a limited remedy. For a giv-
en claim, the PTO has only two choices: grant the full patent right, or no 
right at all.50 But a statutory fix could enable the PTO to confer an interme-
diate patent right on certain inventions. A partial patent solution to protect 
inventions that meet the standard conditions of patentability, but fail the 
requirement of completeness, would thus mitigate the patent system’s “uni-
formity costs” with regard to upstream patents.51 This Article explores pos-
                                                                                                                           
sum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court’s Business Method Patents Decision: New Directions 
for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 11, 11–12, 14–15 (2011) (proposing that 
the Court replace its “Section 101 abstract idea preemption” test with two fact-intensive inquiries 
into patentable subject matter in order to achieve more consistent, predictable outcomes). 
 47 See infra notes 418–436 and accompanying text (describing the features of the proposed 
limited patent right). 
 48 Complete absence of patent protection for upstream inventions may deter investment in 
important technologies and reduce the volume of valuable disclosures. See infra notes 382–400 
and accompanying text. In other words, the right amount of patent preemption for upstream inven-
tions is unlikely to be zero in most circumstances. 
 49 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. 53, 106–24 (2011); supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 50 Although courts have the power to tailor remedies by granting or denying injunctions and 
by modulating the amount of damages, courts have less flexibility with respect to patent validity 
because they can only uphold or invalidate patent claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012) 
(providing that patent invalidity is a defense to a suit for patent infringement); id. §§ 283–284 
(authorizing courts to award injunctions and damages in patent infringement cases). And the costs 
associated with a court determining the extent of the infringer’s liability ex post are high. See infra 
notes 409–414 and accompanying text. 
 51 The lack of intermediate solutions in patent law gives rise to so-called “uniformity costs.” 
See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property 
Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 871–74 (2006). The uniformity costs this Article focuses on are the 
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sible forms that a limited patent right might take so as to provide the intel-
lectual property incentives that are likely needed to develop and commer-
cialize upstream inventions, while helping decrease the potential for stifling 
downstream innovation associated with full patent protection. 
Part I of this Article defines upstream inventions and sets forth judicial 
and scholarly concerns with allowing patents on such inventions.52 Part II 
then explains how the law currently deals with some of these inventions.53 
This Part shows that certain cases invoking utility, written description, and 
patentable subject matter requirements work together to create a de facto 
requirement of completeness. Part III canvasses critiques of the complete-
ness cases and explains that these cases do not consistently implement the 
policy that motivates the requirement.54 Part IV proposes and justifies a test 
that addresses these critiques, and discusses the mechanics of putting the 
proposed form of the completeness requirement into effect, including its 
possible codification.55 This Part also puts the new form of the complete-
ness requirement into practice, testing how actual and hypothetical patent 
claims might fare under the proposed test. Finally, Part V explores whether 
patent protection is needed to incentivize the creation of inventions that 
would be unpatentable for failure to comply with the proposed form of the 
completeness requirement.56 This Part provides suggestions for the structure 
of a partial patent right to protect such inventions, and discusses advantages 
and disadvantages of the proposal.57 
I. UPSTREAM INVENTIONS: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHY THEIR  
PATENTING IS PROBLEMATIC 
Section A of this Part defines upstream inventions and categorizes 
them into three groups: research aids, so-called “research-plan” inventions, 
and inventions directed to laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract 
ideas.58 Section B explains that allowing patents on all three types of inven-
tions has the potential to impose intolerable costs on downstream research-
ers and stifle future innovation.59 Abandoning existing doctrinal barriers 
                                                                                                                           
costs arising from the fact that patent law lacks ex ante mechanisms for modulating remedies for 
successful enforcement of a patent claim based on the nature of the underlying invention. 
 52 See infra notes 58–125 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 126–196 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 197–266 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 267–378 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 379–400 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 402–460 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 60–95 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 96–125 and accompanying text. 
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and replacing them with a unified completeness requirement would help 
bring into focus the policy aim of limiting potentially harmful upstream pa-
tents. 
A. Categories of Upstream Inventions 
“Upstreamness,” for lack of a better word, has eluded a clear defini-
tion.60 Nevertheless, several themes emerge from the cases and literature. 
The three examples discussed in the Introduction represent three forms of 
inventions that courts have held to be too upstream to be patentable.61 They 
can be loosely categorized as research aids, research-plan inventions, and 
inventions belonging to the categories of laws of nature, natural phenome-
na, or abstract ideas. Patent claims to all three types of inventions have en-
gendered undue preemption concerns because they threaten to block too 
many downstream research pathways. All three types of inventions are po-
tential targets of the completeness requirement. 
Inventions in the first category include materials, objects, and methods 
whose main function is to promote further research.62 Courts and commen-
tators have termed these inventions “research tools”63 or “research interme-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Chris Holman, Clearing a Path Through the Patent Thicket, 125 CELL 629, 629 (2006) 
(defining upstream patents as “patents that claim technologies associated with basic and early 
stage research and development, as opposed to patents covering ‘downstream’ commercial prod-
ucts”); David B. Resnik, A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 3 J. 
PHIL. SCI. & LAW, Jan. 2003, at n.22, available at http://jpsl.org/archives/biotechnology-patent-
pool-idea-whose-time-has-come, archived at http://perma.cc/8UMR-2WY8 (“A patent is an up-
stream patent if it is vital to the development of many other inventions. For example, a type of 
miniaturized transistor would be an upstream invention and a computer chip would be a down-
stream product, if the transistor plays a vital role in the computer chip. However, the same com-
puter chip might be an upstream invention relative to a device that uses the chip, such as cellular 
phone.”). 
 61 See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text. 
 62 See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent 
Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 123 (“[A] research tool is an invention the primary function of 
which is to facilitate scientific or technological progress.”). 
 63 See Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception 
to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 10–17 (2001) (at-
tempting to define “research tools”); Sarnoff & Holman, supra note 35, at 1302–03 (same); 
Strandburg, supra note 62, at 123 (same). But see F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and 
Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream 
Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 409–10 (2006) (“[A]ll players in the market realize over time that 
terms like ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ are so relative that they simply may be synonyms for 
‘things to be bought’ and ‘things to be sold’ by any private party able to gain the agency’s atten-
tion.”); Mueller, supra, at 10 (“‘Research tools’ is a phrase of many meanings depending on per-
spective.”). Judges also disagree on the meaning of “research tools.” See, e.g., Integra Lifesciences 
I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“My colleagues on this panel appear to view the [patents-in-suit] as for a ‘re-
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diates.”64 Chemical compounds not having a known consumer end use, and 
methods of making such compounds, fall into this general category.65 Even 
though these chemicals have no use to the ordinary consumer, they often 
draw the interest of researchers—for example, as potential drug candidates 
or as building blocks for making larger molecules. Isolated human embry-
onic stem cells exemplify another research tool invention known for its 
broad applicability.66 
Still another group of inventions commonly thought of as belonging to 
the research tool category relates to methods of manipulating genetic mate-
rial.67 One such technique, called the polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”), 
enables the preparation of a large quantity of DNA—a molecule that en-
codes genetic information—from a small sample.68 This technique has nu-
merous applications ranging from paternity testing to the diagnosis of can-
cers and detection of viruses. 
It is important to note, however, that the universe of research tools and 
intermediates is not limited to biological and chemical materials and meth-
ods of making such materials. Consider, for example, the atomic force mi-
croscope, which is a device that enables the observation of very small ob-
jects at high resolutions.69 The atomic force microscope is viewed as a 
building-block technology that can serve as an input into many areas of 
downstream research, such as nanotechnology.70 
The second category of upstream inventions has been variously char-
acterized as a “wish,” a “research plan,” or “a hypothesis.”71 Like research 
                                                                                                                           
search tool.’ That is a misdefinition. The [patented molecules] are not a ‘tool’ used in research, but 
simply new compositions having certain biological properties.”), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
 64 See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373 (classifying as “research intermediates” a group of 
chemical compounds made from the same building blocks as DNA); see also infra notes 209–217 
and accompanying text (exploring the differences between research intermediates and research 
tools). 
 65 See supra notes 1, 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 66 See Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common 
Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 
19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 82, 106–08 (2005); Mueller, supra note 63, at 13–14. 
 67 See Mueller, supra note 63, at 13. 
 68 See id. at 13 nn.56–57 (describing the PCR process and patents on PCR methods). 
 69 See G. Binnig et al., Atomic Force Microscope, 56 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 930, 930–33 
(1986). 
 70 See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 613–14 (2005) 
(describing atomic force microscopes as “basic building blocks in nanotechnology”); cf. In re 
Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that microscopes generally are research 
tools that “take a researcher one step closer to identifying and understanding a previously un-
known and invisible structure”). 
 71 See Michael P. Sandonato & Feng Xu, Describing Written Description: The Implications of 
Ariad, CHINA IP MAG., June 2010, at 73, 75 (“[T]he patent law is directed to the ‘useful Arts,’ not 
to research hypothesis, [sic] academic theories or scientific principles.”). 
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tools and intermediates, research-plan inventions often fail to offer an end 
product from which a non-researcher end user can derive a direct benefit.72 
One upstream invention of this sort is a method of treating a health condi-
tion based on a newly identified biological target of drug action.73 Although 
the discoverers of the target developed and described search methods for 
drugs that would treat the condition, they did not provide any examples of 
drugs having the capacity to do so.74 Hence, it might be said that the inven-
tors hypothesized a method of treatment, but never completed the invention. 
Like research tools, research-plan inventions are not limited to the 
fields of chemistry and biochemistry because fundamental research must 
logically occur in some form in all areas of technology. Consider, for exam-
ple, the Wright brothers’ famous invention. The Wrights’ key insight was 
that one could achieve controlled flight by modulating motion along all 
three axes of rotation about a flying machine’s center of mass.75 Had the 
Wrights not described how to build a plane, and instead only provided a 
roadmap for doing so using so-called “three-axis control,” one could argue 
that they had at best come up with a research plan, or put forth a hypothesis, 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Joseph Jakas, Comment, Encouraging Further Innovation: Ariad v. Eli Lilly and the 
Written Description Requirement, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1287, 1325 (2012). In some cases, 
broad patent claims containing functional language can fail the written description requirement 
even when applicants disclose some (but not enough) examples of chemical structures. See Bos. 
Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1364–67 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 73 See supra notes 2–4, 13 and accompanying text. Some courts and commentators argue that 
the subject matter covered by this claim should not even be considered an “invention” in view of 
the absence of disclosures of chemical structures in the specification. See Univ. of Rochester, 358 
F.3d at 930 n.10; Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (arguing that “the invention is not simply a shorthand reference for the 
claimed subject matter,” but rather “the set of embodiments conceived and disclosed by the inven-
tor in enough detail that they can be reduced to practice”). 
 74 See Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 929. Instead of patenting the method of treatment, the 
inventor could have patented only the search method for finding drugs that act on the target. But 
because researchers could easily design around that sort of a patent claim, it would likely not be 
valuable. Although the knowledge of the drug target is extremely important for future research, 
that invention is difficult to monetize unless the patent actually covers drug products. See Michael 
Delmas Plimier, Case Note, Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk & University of California v. Eli 
Lilly and Co., 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 149, 161 (1998); see also infra note 387 and accompany-
ing text (discussing why narrow patent claims often have little commercial value).  
 75 See What Did the Wright Brothers Invent?, WRIGHT BROS. AEROPLANE CO. 2, http://www.
wrightbrothers.org/Information_Desk/Help_with_Homework/Help_with_Homework_Intro/What
%20did%20the%20Wright%20brothers%20invent.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VPP3-6Z95 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2015) (“The Wrights never claimed to have invented the airplane, or even 
the first airplane to fly. In their own words, they made the first sustained, powered, controlled 
flights.”). Nevertheless, the Wright brothers’ patent was titled “Flying-Machine” and some of the 
claims were directed to “[a] flying-machine.” See U.S. Patent No. 821,393 claims 14–15 (filed 
Mar. 23, 1903). 
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for achieving controlled flight using this method.76 A more modern version 
of what could be described as a hypothesis-type invention is a functionally 
claimed software or business method patent. The concern is related: some 
software and business method claims appear only to identify (and appropri-
ate) the problem to be solved rather than propose any specific way of im-
plementing a solution.77 
The third category of upstream inventions relates to the workings of 
the natural world and other fundamental principles. Commentators and courts 
have denominated such inventions “law[s]”78 or “product[s]”79 of nature, 
“natural phenomena,”80 “scientific truth[s],”81 “concept[s],”82 “abstract ide-
as,”83 “formula[s],”84 or by some other similar label.85 This facet of up-
streamness has a rich historical pedigree, harkening back to the distinction 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Assuming the 1903 Wright Flyer was the embodiment of the ’393 Patent, there is evidence 
that the Wright brothers’ patent, rather than describe an actual flying machine, only provided a 
roadmap for how to build one because the Wrights’ own implementation of the three-axis princi-
ple did not operate well. See MALCOLM J. ABZUG & E. EUGENE LARRABEE, AIRPLANE STABILITY 
AND CONTROL: A HISTORY OF THE TECHNOLOGIES THAT MADE AVIATION POSSIBLE 3 (2d ed. 
2002) (“Modern analysis . . . has demonstrated that the 1903 Wright Flyer was so unstable as to be 
almost unmanageable by anyone but the Wrights . . . .”). But unlike the method of treatment patent 
at issue in University of Rochester, which did not describe a specific drug, the Wright brothers’ 
patent at least provided a proof of principle that some kind of a flying machine could be built 
using three-axis control. Compare Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 929 (“[T]he ’850 patent does 
not provide any guidance that would steer the skilled practitioner toward compounds that can be 
used to carry out the claimed methods . . . .”), with ’393 Patent p. 3 col. 2 ll. 108–09 (providing the 
means for “restor[ing] the lateral balance of the machine”). 
 77 See Lemley, supra note 26, at 923 (“[T]he patentee claims the end it accomplishes, not the 
means of getting there. The presence of a nominal hardware limitation serves to obscure the fact that 
the real structure doing the work—the computer program—is absent.”); see also Letter from Michael 
Risch, Professor, Villanova Law Sch., to the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Mar. 12, 2013) (avail-
able at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sw-f_risch_20130312.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/SBZ3-4ABP) (noting that § 112 “allows patentees to own the solution” to an algorithm 
without “disclos[ing] how they actually solved [the] problem” (emphasis added)). See generally 
Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and the Problem of Overbroad, 
Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1399 (2013) (identifying root causes behind pa-
tent law’s failure to curtail software-patent overbreadth and proposing software-specific solutions). 
For one example of such a claim, see infra note 336. 
 78 See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117. 
 79 See id. at 2111. 
 80 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. 
 81 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 
306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)). 
 82 See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609. 
 83 See id. at 608. 
 84 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981). 
 85 See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) (“[A] principle is not patentable. 
A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be 
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”); Sarnoff & Holman, supra 
note 35, at 1340–43; Yu, supra note 35, at 423–24. 
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between patentable “industrial property” and unpatentable “scientific prop-
erty” in the early international patent regimes.86 In this vein, the Supreme 
Court described as directed to laws of nature patent claims “tell[ing] doctors 
to gather data” about the concentration of a probe molecule present in the 
patient’s blood “from which they may draw an inference” of a need to in-
crease the dosage of a drug.87 Assuming the Court’s analysis was correct, it 
is difficult to think of a stronger example of a claim to a discovery at “the 
beginning of the development chain” than a claim to a law of nature.88 Oth-
er examples in this general category include inventions as diverse as isolat-
ed human genetic material,89 a method of communicating at a distance us-
ing electromagnetism,90 a method of data processing,91 and the concept of 
risk hedging.92 Upstream inventions of the “fundamental principle” kind, 
like upstream inventions of the research tool and research plan variety, can 
come from many areas of technology. 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive, and boundaries between the 
categories are not sharp. Perhaps, some inventions in the second category 
really belong in the third category—or in both. For example, one scholar 
argues that a patent adjudged by the Federal Circuit to be directed to a re-
search-plan invention in fact “ties up a natural phenomenon,” which fairly 
places it into the third category as well.93 And it could also be that at least 
some inventions in the first category belong in the third category.94 As Sec-
                                                                                                                           
 86 See Thomas R. Ilosvay, Scientific Property, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 178, 178–80 (1953); Robert 
P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, 13 SOC. 
PHIL. & POL’Y 145, 152–57 (1996). See generally C.J. HAMSON, PATENT RIGHTS FOR SCIENTIFIC 
DISCOVERIES (1930) (detailing European proposals for limited patents on “scientific property,” 
which eventually failed). 
 87 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298; see also supra notes 5–8, 14–15 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Court’s reasoning in Mayo). 
 88 See Lee, supra note 66, at 81. 
 89 See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117. 
 90 See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–13 (1853). 
 91 See Benson, 409 U.S. at 64. 
 92 See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611–12. 
 93 ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 100 (2012); see id. at 122 (“[B]y trying to 
control anything related to a pathway in the human body, the invention [at issue in Ariad] 
preempts a broad area of human genetics and essentially tries to occupy that entire phenome-
non.”). 
 94 Peter Lee describes isolated human embryonic stem cells as “research tools,” yet Allen Yu 
argues that they are also like natural phenomena because they “faithfully preserve the pluripotent 
properties of stem cells as found in nature.” See Lee, supra note 66, at 82; Yu, supra note 35, at 
433. And, at least in Yu’s own proposals for limiting the patentability of stem cells, the categori-
zation does not end up mattering. See Yu, supra note 35, at 428–33. If they are to be classified as 
“research tools,” they would probably be unpatentable under his framework as “basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.” See id. at 428 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67). And if they 
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tion B further explains, however, the issues with patents on all basic re-
search-type inventions—whatever category they fall into—are more or less 
the same.95 
B. Overarching Problems with Patents on Upstream Inventions 
Patenting of inventions described in Section A of this Part can be so-
cially harmful because of the underlying inventions’ foundational roles in 
enabling further research.96 Indeed, scholars have maintained that certain 
upstream patents have the potential to impose intolerable costs on down-
stream inventors.97 For example, the concern behind allowing a patent on a 
chemical compound without an identified consumer utility is that subse-
quent researchers who discover such a use—for example, biological activity 
against cancer cells—will be beholden to the owner of the patent on the 
compounds.98 The patentee might threaten litigation to enjoin downstream 
research, charge an unreasonable royalty, or tie up the follow-on researcher 
in extensive, costly negotiations over the patent right.99 Faced with this pro-
spect, the follow-on researcher might forgo investigating a certain chemical 
structure during the life of the patent, and society would then lose out on 
                                                                                                                           
are viewed as “natural phenomena,” they would probably be unpatentable (again, under one of 
Yu’s proposals) as “discoveries” rather than “inventions.” See id. at 431–33. 
 95 See infra notes 96–116 and accompanying text. 
 96 In other words, such patents are harmful because they protect artifacts of basic research. 
 97 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1046–66 (1989); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary 
Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 217–26 (1987) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights]; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Pa-
tents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–700 
(1998); Rai, supra note 21, at 116–20; Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and 
Scientific Research: The Case for Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 251, 258–61 (2008); Yu, supra note 35, at 428 (discussing the “cost side of 
patenting”). 
 98 See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 253–56 (6th ed. 2013) (explaining that patents on inventions “with large-
ly unknown uses may trigger precisely the sort of inefficient ‘gold rush’ that we want to avoid”); 
Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and Gene Frag-
ments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735, 778–83 
(2000) (“[L]arge pharmaceutical and genomics firms are likely to use all of the EST patents they 
have to extract as high a price as possible from licensees.”). 
 99 For a general articulation of this argument (beyond upstream patents), see Robert P. Merges 
& Richard R. Nelson, On Limiting or Encouraging Rivalry in Technical Progress: The Effect of 
Patent Scope Decisions, 25 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 18–20 (1994); Robert P. Merges & Rich-
ard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908 (1990) 
[hereinafter Merges & Nelson, Patent Scope]; Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross 
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 
122–29 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). 
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promising drug candidates.100 Scholars have made similar arguments about 
other research tool patents, like patents claiming human embryonic stem 
cells.101 The upshot of the critiques is that “whereas most patents cover 
the outputs of scientific investigation, patents on research tools cover 
the inputs of that investigation.”102 This is problematic because “[a]llowing 
strict property rights over such research tools permits propertization near 
the beginning of the development chain and threatens to establish individual 
control over broad areas of scientific research.”103 
Analogous critiques have been leveled against research-plan patents in 
biotechnology,104 functionally claimed software patents,105 and patents on 
inventions that are characterized as fundamental principles.106 In contrast 
with criticisms of patents on research tools and intermediates, concerns over 
patents on research plans and fundamental principles have often been ar-
ticulated in terms of overbroad claim scope rather than in terms of the need 
for access.107 But at a higher level of generality, the perceived problem with 
these types of upstream patents is fundamentally the same as that with patents 
on research tools—courts and scholars describe them as “bottlenecks” that are 
thought to stifle further innovation.108 To prevent such unduly preemptive 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 29, at 111 (“[D]eveloping a new molecule without any 
particular use is not a completed innovation, but merely the opening stage of a long and complex 
research process. Permitting broad upstream patenting of such chemicals might discourage the 
downstream research necessary to find a market for those chemicals.”). 
 101 See Lee, supra note 66, at 82 (arguing that patents on isolated embryonic stem cells “dis-
rupt the balance between freely available basic knowledge and privatized applied knowledge that 
is crucial to driving innovation”). 
 102 See id. at 81; see also Mueller, supra note 63, at 4 (“[T]he dispute stems from the broad 
rights conferred by the patents covering [PCR] tools.”).  
 103 See Lee, supra note 66, at 81. 
 104 See, e.g., Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written 
Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1233, 1273 (2000). 
 105 See Lemley, supra note 26, at 964 (arguing that allowing functional claims in the software 
field ignores the principle that “patents spur competition by preventing direct imitation while 
leaving open avenues for alternative development”). 
 106 See Devlin, supra note 19, at 1717 (“These fields of discovery bear unique potential for 
overcompensation, given their upstream nature and the concomitant proclivity for ubiquitous 
downstream application.”). 
 107 See Collins, supra note 77, at 1455–60 (describing cases in which courts used the written 
description doctrine to invalidate overbroad software claims); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of 
the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re 
Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 56–61 (2012) (describing the scope-policing 
role of the patentable subject matter requirement); Sampson, supra note 104, at 1261–65 (explain-
ing that the written description doctrine plays a scope-policing function in the biotechnological 
arts). 
 108 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (addressing “a danger that the grant of patents that tie up [the 
use of basic tools of scientific and technological work] will inhibit future innovation premised 
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patents, commentators have either exhorted courts to apply the rules that 
prohibit them more stringently or praised them for already doing so.109 
Although it is sometimes unclear what sorts of downstream applica-
tions a foundational invention might have, some critics of patents on such 
inventions find the uncertainty to be highly problematic in itself.110 Consid-
                                                                                                                           
upon them”); see also, e.g., Burk, supra note 31, at 535 (discussing “the policy of maintaining 
fundamental access”); Sarnoff, supra note 49, at 106 (endorsing categorical exclusions under the 
patentable subject matter requirement and arguing that the doctrine “direct[s] . . . innovation to 
activities that most need patent-system incentives while better protecting . . . ideas from en-
croachment” by the patent system); Jakas, supra note 72, at 1328 (arguing that by prohibiting 
biotechnology patents that do not describe “specific products that will actually have practical use 
when released to the public,” patent law clears the path for “further research . . . without concerns 
about infringement”); Sampson, supra note 104, at 1269 (arguing that if the PTO allowed inven-
tors to claim “genes, cDNAs, or mRNAs without fully disclosing the claimed nucleotide sequenc-
es,” then inventors would “claim more then [sic] the inventions they possess”). But cf. Eisenberg, 
supra note 107, at 61–64 (arguing that “the ‘basic tools’ concept . . . fails to explain distinctions 
between patentable and excluded subject matter”); Yu, supra note 35, at 428–30 (arguing that 
prohibitions against patents on nature and abstract ideas fail to distinguish between patents that 
impede innovation and those that do not). 
 109 For arguments regarding the role of the utility requirement in achieving this goal, see Cyn-
thia D. Lopez-Beverage, Should Congress Do Something About Upstream Clogging Caused by the 
Deficient Utility of Expressed Sequence Tag Patents?, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 35, 87–90 (2005) 
(proposing a heightened utility requirement for patents on ESTs); Michael S. Mireles, An Exami-
nation of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnol-
ogy Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 200 (2004) (arguing that “[h]eightening the utility 
requirement may make sense for ESTs with a minimal disclosed utility”); Teresa M. Summers, 
Note, The Scope of Utility in the Twenty-First Century: New Guidelines for Gene-Related Patents, 
91 GEO. L.J. 475, 495 (2003) (“One cannot substitute or design around basic biotech research 
tools. . . . A broad utility requirement exasperates [sic] the tragedy of the anticommons because it 
grants rights to exclude basic research tools, which are the building blocks of a wide array of 
downstream innovation.”). For arguments regarding the role of the written description requirement 
in achieving this goal, see Jakas, supra note 72, at 1325 (“[T]he [written description] requirement 
encourages inventors to finalize their inventions and pursue an end product before seeking patent 
protection . . . . [The] requirement seems to be a positive step towards limiting the problems asso-
ciated with patents in the biotechnology industry.”); Sampson, supra note 104, at 1268–71 (urging 
the PTO and courts to “continue to utilize a heightened written description requirement”). For 
arguments regarding the role of the patentable subject matter requirement in achieving this goal, 
see Yu, supra note 35, at 417–27; Note, Diagnostic Method Patents and Harms to Follow-on 
Innovation, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1370, 1371 (2013) (suggesting that “granting strong, early patent 
rights will result in the underdevelopment of technology”). 
 110 See, e.g., Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 130, 135 (2000) 
(statement of Dr. Harold Varmus, President and Chief Executive Officer, Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Center) (“[O]ver-valuing inventions, especially research tools, often engenders 
licensing policies that are unduly restrictive. . . . [O]nerous licensing provisions contain so-called 
reach-through provisions that would provide royalties from any downstream commercial products 
to those who own property in very early stages of development that may now be of uncertain val-
ue. . . . [P]otential licensees are frequently confronted with so-called ‘reach-through’ provisions 
that would provide royalties from any downstream commercial products to those who own proper-
ty that may now be of uncertain value and vague utility.” (emphasis added)); cf. Oskar Liivak, 
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er, for example, a patent on a research tool. If such a tool turns out to be 
highly valuable, the patentees might reap enormous benefits—likely out of 
proportion to their contribution—if they enter into so-called “reach-through” 
royalty agreements with downstream users.111 Commentators fear that such 
licenses might permit the patent owner “to leverage its proprietary position 
in upstream research tools into a broad veto right over downstream research 
and product development.”112 Overbreadth and uncertainty concerns are 
closely related; indeed, some claims to inventions having uncertain applica-
tions are thought to be problematic mainly because of their potential to have 
overbroad coverage.113 Thus, patents on upstream inventions might domi-
nate and preempt entire fields of research,114 cover unpredictable, trans-
formative applications,115 and massively over-reward their owners.116 
                                                                                                                           
Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1372 (2013) (“Without know-
ing the ultimate inventions that will flow from the intermediate result, the valuation of those in-
termediate results remains highly uncertain.”). 
 111 See infra note 405 and accompanying text. Such arrangements base the royalty on prod-
ucts that are made with the aid of the research tool, but are themselves outside the scope of the 
claims of the research tool patent. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis 
for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 441 (2003) (“[S]ome patent holders have charged royal-
ties measured as a percentage of the final product created through a process which included using 
the research tool. . . . [S]uch payments provide revenues from any downstream commercial prod-
ucts to those who own intellectual property that may now be of uncertain value or utility.”). 
 112 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 97, at 698–99; see also Strandburg, supra note 62, at 
125 (“Patents on research tools for which no close substitutes are available are ‘broad’ in the sense 
that they give the patent holder exclusive control over the development of the research they facili-
tate and ‘early’ in the sense that they are granted before the research, which will presumably lead 
to some kind of commercially useful result, is performed.”). 
 113 But this is not always the case—the utility and patentable subject matter requirements can 
bar claims that are relatively narrow in scope. The problem with claims barred by the utility doc-
trine is not their breadth but the fact that the patent is directed to a research input having unknown 
end-use utility. See infra notes 129–147 and accompanying text. And it is not clear why, from a 
policy perspective, patentable subject matter cases sometimes bar narrow claims. See infra notes 
243–258 and accompanying text. 
 114 See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (reasoning that precedent “warn[s] us against upholding 
patents that claim processes that too broadly preempt the use of a natural law”); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 
1353 (“[C]laims to research plans . . . impose costs on downstream research, discouraging later 
invention.”). 
 115 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 68 (“Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and sweeping as 
to cover both known and unknown uses of the [underlying algorithm].”). 
 116 See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353–54 (“[T]he purpose of the written description require-
ment is to ‘ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not over-
reach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specifi-
cation.’” (quoting Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000))). As argued 
by one commentator, upstream patents “would reward patentees excessively and would fail to 
keep their property rights commensurate with their real contribution to the society.” Wang, supra 
note 97, at 267. A related argument about the costs of upstream patents entails the application of 
the anticommons theory to biotechnology. Generally, an anticommons problem arises when “mul-
tiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one 
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* * * 
Although certain critiques are common to patents on all categories of 
upstream inventions, it does not necessarily follow that all such inventions 
should be subject to the same patentability requirements. For one thing, pa-
tent claims on research tools, research plans, and fundamental principles 
might look different from one another. A research tool claim might be 
drawn to a building-block chemical compound of a well-defined structure. 
A research-plan claim might be drawn to a method that can be implemented 
in a variety of different ways. And a fundamental principle claim might be 
drawn to a widely applicable natural law or a very general concept. These 
distinctions suggest that it is reasonable to apply different tests to the three 
types of upstream inventions. In fact, courts already appear to follow this 
approach; the doctrinal routes they use to invalidate the three types of 
claims loosely track the distinctions between research tool patents, so-called 
“hypothesis” patents, and patents on fundamental principles.117 Nonethe-
less, in spite of the multiplicity of tests that courts use to probe patent valid-
ity when they apply the utility, written description, and patentable subject 
matter requirements, these cases can also be viewed as facets of the over-
arching requirement against the patenting of artifacts of basic research.118 
There are substantial benefits to unifying the three lines of doctrine 
under the principle of completeness and adopting completeness as a 
standalone requirement of patentability. First, this approach may direct de-
cisionmakers to reexamine the distinctions made within each line and im-
prove upon the extant tests so as to focus on the core policy aim of limiting 
harmful upstream patents. Indeed, the fact that courts have invalidated pa-
tents on some upstream inventions discussed in the previous section (for 
example, chemical intermediates and methods of treatment based on a new-
ly identified drug target) but not others (for example, stem cells and many 
software patents) suggests that the current approach may be inconsistent, 
and the tests inadequate.119 The holistic completeness framework might 
                                                                                                                           
has an effective privilege of use.” Michael A. Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in 
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). In a seminal article, 
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg posit that this problem occurs in the biomedical field 
“when a user needs access to multiple patented inputs to create a single useful product.” See Hel-
ler & Eisenberg, supra note 97, at 699. Heller and Eisenberg explain that granting patents on up-
stream inventions results in “too many concurrent fragments of intellectual property rights in po-
tential future products.” Id. They conclude that such patents might impose significant transaction 
costs on downstream innovation and product development in the biomedical field. See id. at 700–
01. 
 117 See infra notes 129–181 and accompanying text. 
 118 See infra notes 182–196 and accompanying text. 
 119 See Yu, supra note 36, at 911–17; Yu, supra note 35, at 401 (explaining that when courts 
distinguish between different types of upstream inventions, they often rely on “ungrounded legal-
 
2015] The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law 971 
help decisionmakers determine whether or not there is a principled distinc-
tion between patents that failed and those that did not, leading to more con-
sistent outcomes.120 
Second, a standalone completeness requirement might have the benefi-
cial effect of breaking down the doctrinal barriers that courts have erected 
for dealing with different kinds of upstream patents. In similar contexts, 
commentators have criticized the Federal Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence 
for maintaining formalistic distinctions between different doctrines and 
sidestepping larger policy questions,121 and this criticism may be particular-
ly apt in the context of upstream patents. Although patent claims may be 
unacceptably upstream in different ways, a different set of doctrinal tools 
for each form of incompleteness might cause decisionmakers to lose sight 
of the common policy concerns behind denying such claims. In contrast, 
placing them all under the completeness umbrella might point the way to 
more coherent case law and help courts develop sound limiting principles 
for determining which patents to invalidate.122 
Third, as suggested in the Introduction, explicit recognition of the 
completeness requirement might help quell the controversies and diminish 
legitimacy costs that the utility, written description, and patentable subject 
matter cases have generated.123 The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. 
Parts II and III discuss the three lines of completeness cases, explain the 
policy concerns that unite them, and critique these cases,124 and Parts IV 
and V offer suggestions for changes in patent law that may lead to a better 
implementation of the policy behind the completeness cases.125  
II. THE CONTOURS OF PATENT LAW’S COMPLETENESS REQUIREMENT 
This Part examines the three lines of doctrine that underlie the unwrit-
ten requirement of completeness.126 Section A explains how courts have 
                                                                                                                           
istic and semantics-based arguments” rather than on an “understanding of basic science and tech-
nology”); infra notes 197–266 and accompanying text. 
 120 Of course, this state of affairs could partly be a consequence of litigation strategy; some 
patent claims that would be incomplete under the proposal outlined in this Article may not have 
been invalidated under completeness doctrines because they were never challenged in this manner. 
 121 See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. In similar contexts, scholars have criticized 
certain doctrinal distinctions in patent law as essentialist and overly formalistic. See, e.g., Laak-
mann, supra note 39, at 60–65; see also John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 
AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774 (2003) (maintaining that the Federal Circuit has “embraced an increas-
ingly formal jurisprudence”). 
 122 See infra note 371–375 and accompanying text. 
 123 See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 124 See infra notes 126–266 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 267–460 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 127–196 and accompanying text. 
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applied the tests underlying the utility, written description, and patentable 
subject matter requirements to patents on upstream inventions.127 Section B 
notes that, although these doctrines operate in different ways, courts employ 
them to address the same policy concern: that patenting of foundational re-
search artifacts is problematic.128 
A. Completeness Doctrines 
1. Utility 
One way that patent law polices completeness is through the utility re-
quirement.129 The modern utility doctrine took shape in 1966, when the Su-
preme Court in Brenner v. Manson held that a novel process for making 
certain chemical compounds was not patentable.130 The compounds at issue 
fell within a larger class of molecules called steroids.131 Anticipating the 
Court’s hostility to an older doctrine holding that all chemical compounds 
had “inherent” utility,132 the patent applicant asserted that the chemicals 
made by the claimed process were of interest as drug candidates because 
they were structurally similar to other steroid compounds used to treat can-
cer.133 The Court, however, concluded that the asserted utility was not 
enough, upholding the PTO’s finding that the patent applicant failed to 
demonstrate “a sufficient likelihood that the steroid yielded by his process 
would have similar tumor-inhibiting characteristics” to that of other ster-
oids.134 
The Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of the patent application be-
cause the claimed process was not “refined and developed to . . . where spe-
                                                                                                                           
 127 See infra notes 129–181 and accompanying text. 
 128 See infra notes 182–196 and accompanying text. 
 129 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor . . . .” (emphases added)); supra notes 1, 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 130 See 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
 131 Id. at 520–22. 
 132 The inherent utility doctrine derives from the intuition that most chemical compounds are 
good for something, such as making other chemicals. See, e.g., In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 179 
(C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled by In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Potter v. Tone, 36 App. 
D.C. 181, 184–85 (D.C. Cir. 1911); see also Note, The Utility Requirement in the Patent Law, 53 
GEO. L.J. 154, 190 (1964) (“To possess ‘utility,’ it has been shown that an invention must be capa-
ble of producing some beneficial result as distinguished from being frivolous.”). But see Petrocar-
bon Ltd. v. Watson, 247 F.2d 800, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (adopting the contrary view and holding 
that the claimed process for the production of new polymers was not patentable because, even 
though the polymers had “useful properties,” the specification failed to “explain [their] use to one 
skilled in the art”). 
 133 See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 530–31. 
 134 Id. at 532 (emphasis added). 
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cific benefit exists in currently available form.”135 Having failed to do this 
additional work, the applicant could not patent an invention that, in the 
Court’s view, could only serve as a genesis for another research project.136 
The reason was that such a patent could “block off whole areas of scientific 
development, without compensating benefit to the public.”137 Although a 
chemical compound that is an “object of scientific inquiry” or “an object of 
use-testing” can be useful to a research chemist, such an application is not 
sufficient for patentability.138 
Despite claims that the utility requirement became “minimal” under 
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of Brenner,139 recent cases show that 
courts have not abandoned the basic rule that the inventor must demonstrate 
a chemical compound’s potential benefit to an end user. Applying Brenner, 
the Federal Circuit held in In re Fisher that claims to so-called “expressed 
sequence tags” (“ESTs”) were not patentable.140 ESTs are a class of chemi-
cal compounds made from the same building blocks as DNA and are of in-
terest to researchers as tools for identifying and studying genes.141 The court 
held that ESTs lack utility because they are “no more than research inter-
mediates.”142 It explained that to satisfy the requirement, the utility must be 
“specific”—in other words, not widely shared by all chemical com-
pounds—and “substantial”—such that “an asserted use must show that the 
claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the 
public.”143 As in Brenner, research utility did not render the inventions 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See id. 534–35. 
 136 See id. 
 137 Id. at 534 (citation omitted). 
 138 See id. at 529, 535. As one commentator aptly noted, Brenner “seem[ed] effectively to 
exclude research chemists from the class of people for whom an invention may be useful.” Brent 
Nelson Rushforth, Comment, The Patentability of Chemical Intermediates, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 
497, 513 (1968); see Lawrence R. Velvel, A Critique of Brenner v. Manson, 49 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 10 (1967) (criticizing the Court’s decision to “deny patents to products use-
ful in research”). 
 139 See Lopez-Beverage, supra note 109, at 64 (“[I]t has been the [Federal Circuit’s] position 
that minimal utility is all that is required to obtain a patent.”); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 
1562 n.3, 1566–67 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that experiments establishing a biological effect of 
the claimed chemicals on an animal model can be sufficient to establish utility); Cross v. Iizuka, 
753 F.2d 1040, 1050–51 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that testing in vitro, i.e., in a test tube, can es-
tablish utility). 
 140 See 421 F.3d 1365, 1367, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 141 See id. at 1367–69; id. at 1379–80 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 142 Id. at 1373 (majority opinion). 
 143 See id. at 1371. The utility requirement also mandates that an invention have so-called 
operable and credible utility; that is, the applicant must provide a credible explanation that the 
invention works for its intended purpose. See Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 1491, 1493–94 & n.10 (2011) (describing the test for operable utility). This aspect of the 
utility requirement—which rules out patents on perpetual motion, cold fusion, and the like—is not 
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complete enough to be patentable.144 Thus, courts continue to rely on utility 
as a “policy lever”145 to prohibit “premature [patent] filing[s]”146 on chemi-
cal and biotechnological inventions.147 
2. Written Description 
The written description doctrine provides another line of attack, of more 
recent vintage than utility, against patents on upstream inventions.148 Modern 
developments in the law of written description have fashioned this require-
ment into a mirror image of utility. While utility bars patents on structurally 
well-defined chemical compounds having no demonstrated benefit to the pub-
lic, courts have applied written description in certain cases to deny patents 
that claim chemical compounds in terms of their beneficial functions, but fail 
to provide any actual chemical structures.149 
                                                                                                                           
at issue in this Article, which focuses on the “specific and substantial” prong of the utility doc-
trine. 
 144 See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1377–78. Nonetheless, the PTO has made it clear that the utility 
doctrine does not work as a general prohibition against the patenting of research tools. See U.S. PA-
TENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107.01(I)(C) (9th 
ed. 2014); cf. id. § 2107.01(I)(B) (“Office personnel must be careful not to interpret the phrase ‘im-
mediate benefit to the public’ or similar formulations in other cases to mean that products or services 
based on the claimed invention must be ‘currently available’ to the public in order to satisfy the utili-
ty requirement.” (quoting Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534–35)). 
 145 See Burk, supra note 31, at 535 (defining a “policy lever” as “a type of flexible doctrine 
that courts can use to modulate an otherwise uniform patent statute to the innovation needs of 
particular technologies”). 
 146 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of 
Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 
1, 18 (1995).  
 147 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 29, at 109 (“[T]he utility rule announced in Brenner v. 
Manson is applied only in biotechnology and chemical cases. [This lever] may require courts to 
differentiate between industries, defining certain inventions as ‘biotechnological,’ for example, in 
order to invoke a particular rule.”); see also In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Allowing ideas, research proposals, or objects only of research to be pa-
tented has the potential to give priority to the wrong party and to ‘confer power to block off whole 
areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public.’” (quoting Brenner, 
383 U.S. at 534)); CreAgri, Inc. v. Pinnaclife, Inc., No. 11-CV-6635-LHK, 2013 WL 6673676, at 
*16–21 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013) (invalidating claims to a chemical compound “whose sole ‘utili-
ty’ consists of its potential role as an object of use-testing’” (quoting Brenner, 383 U.S. at 535)), 
aff’d, 579 F. App’x 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 148 The statutory source of the written description requirement is § 112(a)’s statement that 
“[t]he [patent’s] specification shall contain a written description of the invention.” See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112(a) (2012). 
 149 See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); 
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In some cases, broad 
patent claims containing functional language can fail the written description requirement even 
when applicants disclose some (but not enough) examples of chemical structures. See Bos. Sci. 
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1364–67 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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For example, in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., the Fed-
eral Circuit held that a method of reducing inflammation using “a non-
steroidal compound that selectively inhibits activity” of a certain gene was 
unpatentable.150 The inventor discovered the phenomenon of selective inhi-
bition of the gene, which enabled the downstream discovery of pain reliev-
ers that lack undesirable side effects like ulceration,151 and disclosed exper-
iments for finding chemical compounds that would perform the claimed 
inhibiting function.152 Nonetheless, the patent did not provide any examples 
of compounds that would have this effect.153 Based on the absence of dis-
closure of chemical structures, the Federal Circuit opined that the patent 
was only “a research plan for trying to find” the non-steroidal compound 
having the claimed activity, and invalidated the claims for lack of written 
description.154 For the invention to be complete, the court required a chemi-
cal structure, not merely a “search method.”155 In doing so, the court reject-
ed the patentee’s argument that identifying a biological target and providing 
a roadmap for finding drugs that would act on that target entitles the inven-
tors to reap a benefit once another researcher discovers such drugs.156 Citing 
Brenner—a utility case—the court even suggested that the patentees did not 
invent the claimed methods at all.157 
In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Federal Circuit 
sitting en banc invalidated claims to a method of inhibiting the binding of a 
certain important gene-regulating protein to recognition sites in cells for 
lack of written description.158 Interference with the activity of this protein, a 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See 358 F.3d at 918, 929 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,048,850 col. 71 ll. 36–39 (filed June 
7, 1995)). 
 151 See supra notes 2–4, 13 and accompanying text. 
 152 See Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 927 (explaining that the patent disclosed “assays for 
screening compounds, including peptides, polynucleotides, and small organic molecules to identi-
fy those that [perform the claimed function]” (quoting ’850 Patent col. 8 ll. 2–7)). 
 153 See id. at 926–27. 
 154 See id. at 926–27, 929. 
 155 See id. at 930 n.10. 
 156 See id.; cf. Robert A. Hodges, Note, Black Box Biotech Inventions: When a “Mere Wish or 
Plan” Should Be Considered an Adequate Description of the Invention, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
831, 855 (2001) (“[A] function coupled with basic knowledge of structure and a workable method 
of production allow those in the art to produce the invention.”); infra note 453 and accompanying 
text (describing true hypotheses and conjectures that lack a credible scientific basis, which are 
different from the claimed methods in University of Rochester). 
 157 See Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 930 n.10 (citing Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536); cf. In re 
’318 Pat. Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d at 1324 (relying in part on the policy against the patenting 
of “research proposals” in a utility case); CreAgri, 2013 WL 6673676, at *21 (citing Ariad, 598 
F.3d at 1353) (holding that the claimed invention lacked utility because it was directed to “a re-
search hypothesis”). 
 158 598 F.3d at 1340. 
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so-called “transcription factor,” underlies the treatment of a large number of 
conditions, including cancer, AIDS, and sepsis.159 In denying a patent on 
this invention, the court further clarified why claims to “research hypothe-
ses do not qualify for patent protection.”160 The court explained that “[s]uch 
claims merely recite a description of the problem to be solved while claim-
ing all solutions to it and . . . cover any compound later actually invented 
and determined to fall within the claim’s functional boundaries—leaving it 
to the pharmaceutical industry to complete an unfinished invention.”161 The 
court further stated that patent law is directed to inventions “with a practical 
use” rather than to “basic research.”162 To reinforce the court’s point, Judge 
Pauline Newman wrote separately that “[b]asic scientific principles are not 
the subject matter of patents,” and that “the threshold in all cases requires a 
transition from theory to practice, from basic science to its application, from 
research plan to demonstrated utility.”163 The familiar policy concern behind 
this outcome is that patents on research plans stifle later inventive activity.164 
Thus, although drawn from a different statutory provision, the written 
description requirement as applied to research-plan claims has remarkably 
similar underpinnings as utility. Courts use both to police completeness of 
the claimed invention, requiring applicants to make their inventions more 
downstream before they can qualify for a patent. Although the two require-
ments address different facets of completeness—lack of a specific benefit to 
an end user under utility and inadequate structural disclosure under written 
description—courts have used both to prevent inventors from laying claim 
to basic research and blocking downstream users from enjoying its fruits. 
3. Patentable Subject Matter 
In addition to mandating the requirement of utility, Section 101 of the 
Patent Act imposes “an important implicit exception” that places certain 
claims outside the category of patentable subject matter, barring patents on 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2007), rev’d in part, 
aff’d in part, 598 F.3d 1336. 
 160 See 598 F.3d at 1353.  
 161 Id. 
 162 See id. (citing Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532–36). Interestingly, while the Federal Circuit in 
Ariad cited a utility case in support of the outcome in a written description case, the district court 
also analyzed the problems with the asserted patent in terms of the patentable subject matter re-
quirement of § 101. See id. at 1358 (Newman, J., additional views). Thus, the Ariad case impli-
cates, in some way, all three completeness doctrines. 
 163 See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1359 (Newman, J., additional views). 
 164 See id. at 1353 (majority opinion) (reasoning that “claims to research plans . . . impose 
costs on downstream research, discouraging later invention” by “attempt[ing] to preempt the fu-
ture before it has arrived” (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993))). 
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natural phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract ideas.165 As the Supreme 
Court explained in Gottschalk v. Benson, “[p]henomena of nature . . . and 
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools 
of scientific and technological work.”166 In Benson, the Court held that the 
claimed method of converting so-called “binary-coded numbers” into pure 
binary numbers was unpatentable because it was drawn to “an idea.”167 The 
Court found it important that “[t]he mathematical formula involved here has 
no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital 
computer, which means that . . . the patent would wholly pre-empt the 
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algo-
rithm itself.”168 As in the utility and written description cases discussed in 
the previous two Sections,169 the argument that the applicant’s claims were 
drawn to an artifact of basic research—here, an algorithm or “an idea”—
appeared to persuade the Court to find the claimed method unpatentable.170 
Once again, preemption of downstream research and development associat-
ed with the patentee’s control of an important upstream input was the policy 
driver behind this result.171 
A more recent case further demonstrates how the patentable subject 
matter doctrine functions to bar patents on inventions that are thought by 
courts to be too upstream. In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that “the cases have en-
dorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature, mathemat-
ical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more easily admin-
                                                                                                                           
 165 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
 166 See 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 167 See id. at 64, 71. 
 168 See id. at 71–72 (emphasis added). For an argument contesting the reasoning in Benson, 
see generally Chisum, supra note 37. 
 169 Cf. Chisum, supra note 46, at 20–21 (noting this similarity between the abstract ideas 
exception and the University of Rochester and Ariad form of the written description requirement, 
but highlighting “an important difference”: written description, unlike patentable subject matter, 
“takes into account facts concerning the disclosed invention, including, importantly, whether the 
inventor disclosed one or more examples of the invention and not just the abstract breadth of the 
claim in question”). 
 170 In contrast with the utility and written description requirements—where specification 
disclosures of end uses or of examples of chemical compounds, respectively, might save the 
claims—the material in the specification probably cannot save the claims at issue in patentable 
subject matter cases, presumably because of their overbreadth. See supra notes 139, 153–155 and 
accompanying text (explaining how patent claims can satisfy the utility and written description 
requirements if there is adequate disclosure). 
 171 See Benson, 63 U.S. at 68 (discussing the varied end uses covered by the claims at issue). 
But see Strandburg, supra note 35, at 564 (arguing that, in Benson and similar cases, “[p]reemp-
tion rhetoric is a distraction from important questions that must be answered to give patentable 
subject matter doctrine a firm theoretical grounding”). 
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istered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern”—the concern 
over the patenting of basic research inputs.172 Applying this policy, the 
Court invalidated claims to methods of “optimizing therapeutic efficacy” 
that were based on a correlation between the concentration of a certain 
chemical in a patient’s blood and the effectiveness of a drug used to treat 
gastrointestinal disorders.173 The Court explained that, “to transform an un-
patentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, [a 
claim] must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the 
words ‘apply it,’”174 and held that the claims at issue were not sufficiently 
limited. Echoing the rhetoric of other decisions discussed in this Section, 
the Court heavily relied on the preemption rationale for prohibiting patent 
claims that are upstream in the development chain.175 The Court reasoned: 
[T]here is a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their use 
will inhibit future innovation premised upon them, a danger that 
becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no more than 
an instruction to “apply the natural law,” or otherwise forecloses 
more future invention than the underlying discovery could rea-
sonably justify.176 
In another recent pronouncement on patentable subject matter, Associ-
ation for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Supreme Court 
explained how the prohibition against basic research functions in a “product 
of nature” case.177 In held that claims to isolated genetic material failed the 
patentable subject matter requirement because they were effectively drawn 
to the upstream discovery of “the precise location and genetic sequence of 
[particular] genes” rather than to “new applications of knowledge about” 
                                                                                                                           
 172 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 173 See id. at 1295, 1305 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999)). At this 
stage of the Article, I am reserving judgment on whether the Court in Mayo was correct in holding 
the Prometheus patent to be unacceptably upstream. As I explain later, though, Mayo relied on the 
right policy, but used a questionable test to effectuate it and reached the wrong outcome. See infra 
notes 345–350 and accompanying text (explaining how the proposed test for completeness could 
be applied to the claims at issue in Mayo). 
 174 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
 175 See id. at 1301–02. 
 176 Id. at 1301; accord Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“We 
have described the concern that drives [the] exclusionary principle [rendering unpatentable ab-
stract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature] as one of pre-emption.”); see supra notes 
114–116 and accompanying text (explaining why patents on upstream inventions are problematic). 
But see Chiang, supra note 20, at 1865–68 (arguing that the Court’s rejection in Mayo of Prome-
theus’s argument—that the claim at issue was narrow and unlikely to preempt much of anything—
suggests that the Court was not really driven by the utilitarian concern regarding preemption). 
 177 See 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
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these genes.178 The Court, furthermore, found it important that the “claim is 
concerned primarily with the information contained in the genetic sequence, 
not with the specific chemical composition of a particular molecule.”179 Thus, 
one way to understand (and, perhaps, cabin) the result in Myriad is that the 
Court invalidated the claims because the patentee essentially claimed genetic 
information, which is akin to a foundational research tool or a basic con-
cept.180 As in other completeness cases, the Court discussed balancing the 
need to incentivize new research against the danger of hindering downstream 
innovation.181 
B. A De Facto Single Requirement 
There are, of course, important differences in the ways the three doc-
trines operate.182 Utility is seemingly concerned only with disclosure and 
would invalidate even narrow claims if a downstream use is not shown in 
the patent’s specification; written description is concerned with both disclo-
sure and claim scope; and patentable subject matter addresses only the na-
ture and scope of what is claimed. But the similarities across utility, written 
description, and patentable subject matter doctrines are notable.183 The in-
ventors in all of these cases have discovered something that is valuable and 
was previously unknown—a chemical compound, a biological target of 
drug action, and a correlation between the concentration of a probe mole-
cule and a patient’s condition.184 Nevertheless, these inventors were not al-
lowed to capture the value from their respective inventions’ downstream 
applications due to certain deficiencies of the patents. In the utility cases, 
the patents did not demonstrate a downstream benefit of the claimed com-
                                                                                                                           
 178 See id. at 2116, 2120. 
 179 See id. at 2118. 
 180 See Arti K. Rai & Robert Cook-Deegan, Moving Beyond “Isolated” Gene Patents, 341 
SCI. 137, 138 (2013) (suggesting that Myriad would likely “have only a modest effect” outside the 
realm of human genomic DNA patents); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 161–71, Myriad, 
133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398) (Counsel for the petitioner: “Because the isolated gene is the same 
as the gene in your body, I can tell you that there’s a mutation in your body.” Justice Sotomayor: 
“That’s a failure of the patent law. It doesn’t patent ideas.” Counsel for the petitioner: “And it 
shouldn’t patent ideas, and—but it also makes the point that isolated gene and the gene in the 
body are the same.” (emphases added)). For a different interpretation, see Chiang, supra note 20, 
at 1873–76 (arguing that moral concerns were at play in Myriad). 
 181 See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116. 
 182 See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text. 
 183 Cf. Chisum, supra note 46, at 22 (“Like the written description requirement, the utility 
requirement is a response to the concerns underlying decisions such as Benson and Bilski, that is, 
restricting patents to real world inventions.”); Liivak, supra note 110, at 1373 n.206 (noting “a 
curious, relatively unexplored kinship between many § 101 and § 112 cases”). 
 184 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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positions in the specification.185 In the written description cases, the patents 
failed because the method-of-treatment inventions were claimed in func-
tional terms based on an unknown drug’s effect on a biological target.186 
And in the patentable subject matter cases, the claims were ostensibly so 
broad that they essentially captured a fundamental principle or a natural law 
rather the principle’s or law’s particular application.187 All of these patents 
failed for a common reason: they were drawn to research artifacts that are 
too foundational to be patentable.188 This is the completeness requirement at 
work.189 
Indeed, the policy rhetoric of the three strands of cases is nearly indis-
tinguishable. “[A] patent,” said the Supreme Court in a utility case, “is not a 
hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its 
successful conclusion.”190 For the invention to be patentable, said the Fed-
eral Circuit in a written description case, it is not enough for the patent’s 
specification to describe a mere “wish” or “plan,” for that would be “an at-
tempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”191 And in a patentable 
subject matter case, the Supreme Court invalidated claims that “tie[d] up 
too much future use of laws of nature” by allowing its owner to appropriate 
“basic tools of scientific and technological work.”192 The three lines of cas-
es therefore serve the same policy goal of preventing undue preemption of 
downstream research. 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See supra notes 129–147 and accompanying text. 
 186 See supra notes 148–164 and accompanying text. Here, I refer only to the line of cases 
beginning with Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1997), and exemplified by the University of Rochester and Ariad cases that are extensively dis-
cussed in this article. There is an uncontroversial aspect to the written description requirement—
its use to prevent patentees from introducing during prosecution new or amended claims lacking 
textual support in the specification. See, e.g., In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 991, 994–95 (C.C.P.A. 
1967). This application of the written description requirement ensures that newly added or amend-
ed claims properly receive the benefit of the patent application’s original filing date. See Janis, 
supra note 35, at 59–60 & n.18, 71. The patent applicant is entitled to claim only subject matter 
that was disclosed in the patent specification at the time of the filing, making anything that was 
not disclosed impermissible “new matter.” See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a). “New matter” technically re-
fers to material added to the original specification after filing, which violates § 132, whereas a 
new claim not supported by the specification violates § 112. See Janis, supra note 35, at 64 & 
n.35. 
 187 See supra notes 165–181 and accompanying text. 
 188 See supra notes 96–116 and accompanying text. 
 189 See supra note 16–23 and accompanying text. 
 190 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536. 
 191 See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171. Although Fiers did not involve originally filed claims, it is 
thought to have ushered in the Lilly-University of Rochester-Ariad line of cases that many consid-
er anomalous. See Pitlick, supra note 35, at 209–11. 
 192 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293, 1302 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67). 
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Courts do not like patents on upstream inventions, and, in the absence 
of a statutory prohibition against the patenting of objects of basic re-
search,193 they have used three distinct doctrinal sources to invalidate 
claims that are drawn to them.194 Part III shows that the fit between the ex-
isting statutory provisions and the rules of utility, written description, and 
patentable subject matter195 is an uneasy one. Indeed, the current approach 
has put great pressure on the statutory provisions used to implement com-
pleteness, and, in the views of some, has raised concerns about judicial 
overreach.196 Part III explains these criticisms. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH COURTS’ EXISTING TESTS FOR COMPLETENESS 
This Part surveys critiques of the completeness cases. Part A shows that 
courts have inconsistently applied the utility requirement to exclude patents 
on only some research inputs.197 Part B notes problems with courts’ modern 
applications of the written description requirement.198 Part C surveys argu-
ments that courts have failed to develop coherent tests for patentable subject 
matter exclusions.199 Finally, Part D maintains that these three lines of doc-
trine do not consistently implement the policy that motivates the complete-
ness requirement.200 Although courts in all three types of cases have ex-
pressed a concern about the patenting of upstream, research-input inventions, 
they have addressed this concern in a tentative, unsystematic way. 
                                                                                                                           
 193 It has been argued that this prohibition has constitutional underpinnings. See, e.g., Liivak, 
supra note 73, at 26–28. Although courts sometimes imply a constitutional source for complete-
ness doctrine, they stop short of saying that the prohibition against the patenting of basic research 
is constitutionally required, and instead focus on public policy. See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351–
53. For an argument that intellectual property laws are not subject to strong constitutional limita-
tions under the proper interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause, see Paul M. Schwartz & 
William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Prop-
erty as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2363–414 (2003). 
 194 Cf. Kresh, supra note 35, at 540 (explaining that courts “have looked to the exceptions to 
§ 101 . . . to eliminate claims of which they disapproved”).  
 195 For patentable subject matter in particular, it is the recent, expanded form of the rule man-
dating judicial exclusions from patentability that raises concerns and potentially leads to tensions 
with the language of the statute. See infra notes 243–258, 345–350 and accompanying text. 
 196 See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text; see also infra note 256 and accompanying 
text (canvassing critiques of patentable subject matter cases based on judicial overreach and sub-
jectivity). 
 197 See infra notes 201–227 and accompanying text. 
 198 See infra notes 228–242 and accompanying text. 
 199 See infra notes 243–258 and accompanying text. 
 200 See infra notes 259–266 and accompanying text. 
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A. Utility 
Completeness cases have drawn a great deal of criticism. In utility cas-
es, courts apply the requirement in Section 101 of the Patent Act that inven-
tions be “useful.”201 The leading case is Brenner v. Manson, where the Su-
preme Court held that the claimed method for making chemical compounds 
did not satisfy the utility requirement.202 To say that such an invention is not 
“useful” in the ordinary sense of that word defies common sense, as numer-
ous commentators have observed.203 Furthermore, it seems counterintuitive 
that, although the PTO has been granting patents on silly, ridiculous, and 
useless inventions without issuing utility rejections,204 the utility require-
ment has been enforced relatively vigorously in the serious and generally 
useful fields of chemistry and biotechnology.205 In a recent article that puts 
these concerns into sharp focus, one scholar argues that the utility require-
ment is highly subjective and reflects a “bias against granting patents for 
certain types of inventions.”206 Of course, the outcomes in these utility cas-
es may be defensible as policy judgments that certain inventions in the 
chemical arts are too upstream to be patentable.207 But whether or not these 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 202 See 383 U.S. 517, 520, 534 (1966). 
 203 See Phanesh Koneru, To Promote the Progress of Useful Art[icle]s?: An Analysis of the 
Current Utility Standards of Pharmaceutical Products and Biotechnological Research Tools, 38 
IDEA 625, 658 (1998) (“[T]he law [of utility] produces a result that defies common experiences 
of those in the art.”); Eric P. Mirabel, “Practical Utility” Is a Useless Concept, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 
811, 811–12 (1987) (“In common parlance, a thing ‘having utility’ is, by definition, ‘useful.’ 
When dealing with chemical compounds, however, the judiciary has not equated these expres-
sions.” (citation omitted)); Timothy J. Balts, Note, Substantial Utility, Technology Transfer, and 
Research Utility: It’s Time for a Change, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 105, 108 (2002) (“[B]y excluding 
research discoveries from being ‘useful,’ the substantial utility requirement . . . discourages dis-
closure and research, and thus, does not promote the progress of the useful arts.”). 
 204 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1644 (2003) (explaining that “[t]he PTO has permitted patents on a wide variety of seemingly 
frivolous inventions”) (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,076,262 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 
5,031,161 (filed Feb. 15, 1991); U.S. Patent No. 4,998,724 (filed Aug. 10, 1990)); John F. Duffy, 
Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 453 (2004) (“[P]atent law has 
no aversion to awarding commercially worthless property rights.”); Risch, supra note 19, at 1197–
99 (“[T]he Patent Office continues to issue virtually useless patents like the . . . ‘Feminine Under-
garment with Calendar.’ . . . [M]arginally useful inventions like calendar underwear are patenta-
ble, while some potentially very useful pioneering medical treatments are not . . . .”) (citing U.S. 
Patent No. 5,606,748 (filed Jan. 29, 1996)). 
 205 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 29, at 111 (“The only exceptions to the effective elimi-
nation of the utility requirement in patent law are in the fields of biology and chemistry.”). 
 206 See Seymore, supra note 35, at 1071. 
 207 Cf. Burk, supra note 25, at 580–81 (attempting to find a rationale for Fisher that “is not 
simply a façade for a policy judgment about the desirability of ‘upstream’ patents early in the 
research process” and concluding that the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is “so baffling that it is near-
ly impossible to discern exactly what the court’s rationale might be”). 
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judgments are correct, the distinctions made under the utility doctrine have 
put a great deal of weight on the word “useful.” Accordingly, there are non-
trivial legitimacy costs associated with the way in which courts have im-
plemented the utility requirement.208 
Several scholars have provided policy justifications for the distinctions 
made by the current utility regime.209 For example, John Duffy contends 
that it makes sense to allow patents on research tools such as microscopes, 
which facilitate further research, but reject patents on research intermedi-
ates such as ESTs210 and chemical compounds, which might themselves be 
objects of study.211 In other words, Duffy argues that research tools are pa-
tentable because they have “broad applicability to researchers generally,” 
whereas research intermediates are not because they have a “particular ap-
plicability only in research directed toward understanding the alleged inven-
tion itself or something closely associated with the alleged invention.”212 
Why does this distinction matter? Duffy argues that patents on chemi-
cal intermediates are rejected, while patents on microscopes are allowed, 
because the former, but not the latter, would generate the so-called “mutual-
ly blocking” patents scenario—which he views as undesirable.213 In other 
                                                                                                                           
 208 See Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1211, 1235–36 (2012) (discussing the problem of legitimacy costs even where “judges 
achieve good economic results through . . . extra-legal use of discretion”). 
 209 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Embryonic Inventions and Embryonic Patents: Prospects, Proph-
ecies, and Pedis Possessio, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 234, 245–48 
(F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012); Rai, supra note 21, at 140–41. One scholar would 
go further and give the utility requirement an expanded role. See Risch, supra note 19, at 1234–48 
(proposing a new “commercial utility requirement”); see also Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Use-
ful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 111 (2011) (arguing that “[c]onsidering an inven-
tion’s usefulness can help resolve novelty, obviousness, subject matter, enablement, claim scope, 
and damages questions”). 
 210 See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text. 
 211 See Duffy, supra note 209, at 246–47. 
 212 Id. As Duffy notes, “[r]esearch facilitated by a microscope is not a step in refining the 
microscope.” Id. at 247. But Duffy’s claim might not always hold true for newly discovered spe-
cialized microscopes, like the atomic force microscope. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying 
text. Indeed, attempts to observe objects using atomic force microscopes have sometimes led to 
patents on methods of use of atomic force microscopes or to patented improvements in microsco-
py—a classic blocking patent situation. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,874,668 (filed Oct. 24, 1995). 
And conversely, chemical intermediates can facilitate further research by serving as building 
blocks for larger, more complex molecules (rather than, for example, as objects for further study). 
See Seymore, supra note 30, at 1118–20. 
 213 See Duffy, supra note 209, at 247. Merges and Nelson explain blocking patents as follows: 
Two patents are said to block each other when one patentee has a broad patent on an 
invention and another has a narrower patent on some improved feature of that inven-
tion. The broad patent is said to “dominate” the narrower one. In such a situation, 
the holder of the narrower (“subservient”) patent cannot practice her invention with-
out a license from the holder of the dominant patent. At the same time, the holder of 
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words, Duffy finds it problematic that, if ESTs were patentable, downstream 
researchers who discovered uses for them and patented those uses would 
need a license from the owners of the ESTs to practice their own patents.214 
In contrast, patents on downstream inventions created with the aid of re-
search tools like microscopes—for example, nano-sized objects215—would 
not fall within the scope of patent claims to microscopes.216 As a result, 
there would not be mutually blocking patents in these circumstances.217 
It is not clear, however, why the prospect of mutually blocking patents 
should lead to a radically different treatment of research tools and research 
intermediates.218 Mutually blocking patents are routine in patent law.219 In-
deed, the Patent Act expressly contemplates patents for new uses of known 
things, even when the known thing is itself patented.220 Conversely, even in 
cases where the downstream invention does not fall within the scope of an 
upstream research tool patent, the follow-on researcher who uses the tool 
would need to obtain a license to use it, buy the tool if it happens to be 
commercially available, or risk exposure to a patent infringement lawsuit.221 
The critical policy concern behind the completeness requirement is not the 
presence of mutually blocking patents, but preemption of downstream re-
search and development due to the “bottleneck” of a research tool patent or 
another sort of upstream patent—whether or not the fruits of the follow-on 
work are themselves eventually patented.222 A patent on a broadly applica-
ble new type of a microscope, untethered to a specific downstream use, 
                                                                                                                           
the dominant patent cannot practice the particular improved feature claimed in the 
narrower patent without a license. 
Merges & Nelson, Patent Scope, supra note 99, at 860–61. 
 214 See Duffy, supra note 209, at 247. 
 215 See supra note 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 216 See Duffy, supra note 209, at 247. 
 217 See id. 
 218 Duffy concedes that this justification for treating research tools and intermediates differ-
ently is “not entirely satisfying.” See id. at 245. 
 219 See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technol-
ogy: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 497 (2008). 
 220 See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012) (“The term ‘process’ . . . includes a new use of a known 
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”). 
 221 See supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text. 
 222 Furthermore, cross-licensing of mutually blocking patents is generally contemplated for 
small improvements, not for transformative downstream uses of the dominant patent. See Robert 
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 
62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 78–91 (1994); see also Duffy, supra note 209, at 245 (predicting a bargain-
ing breakdown where “the discoverer of the initial technology could not even prophesy a use”). 
Assuming, as seems likely, that uses of patented basic research artifacts are often transformative, 
one would be concerned about the blockage of downstream research whether or not there are mu-
tually blocking patents. 
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should worry us because it is directed to an invention having uncertain val-
ue and an untold number of applications.223 
Given these policy considerations, it is difficult to explain why the 
completeness cases pick out ESTs over microscopes.224 Patent claims on 
microscope inventions, just like claims on chemical inventions, can be 
complete or incomplete depending on the stage of the invention’s develop-
ment and that invention’s potential to facilitate (and, if patented, to block) 
further research and development activity.225 The utility requirement is on 
the right track in its focus on the “specific and substantial utility”226 of 
claimed inventions because this formulation, at least indirectly, gets at the 
notion of a research input. But the case law has, at the very least, failed to 
capture the full range of such inputs and has stretched to a breaking point 
the meaning of the word “useful.”227 
To sum up, the utility’s requirement’s exclusive application in the 
chemical field has questionable statutory support and might not be justifia-
ble as a matter of patent policy. Although the overarching policy rationale of 
prohibiting patents on research inputs is sound, the utility requirement im-
plements it in ways that are inconsistent and unsatisfying. Thus, a different 
approach may be in order. 
                                                                                                                           
 223 These concerns may be alleviated somewhat if the tool is available on the market so that 
anyone who needs to use it can buy one. Cf. Rai, supra note 21, at 140–41 (arguing that the trans-
action costs for using inventions embodied in analytical tools are low because such tools “will, in 
many circumstances, be licensed not for further improvement but for the comparatively straight-
forward purpose of direct use”). But the issue of over-rewarding the patentee remains, and there 
may still be chilling effects on downstream research if the tool is expensive, or if the patentee does 
not make the tool and refuses to give to anyone the license to make it. Conversely, just like scien-
tific instruments, some chemical intermediates and kits for making them are available for sale. 
See, e.g., Product Catalog, STREM CHEMICALS, INC., http://www.strem.com/catalog, archived at 
http://perma.cc/YRC3-WRW6 (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). And yet the difference in patent law 
treatment of these two types of research aids remains.  
 224 But see Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A 
Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 
323–24 (2002) (criticizing EST patents because ESTs “have no inherent commercial utility,” “are 
naturally occurring substances[,]” and are, “at best, a starting point for further research”); Lopez-
Beverage, supra note 109, at 73–75 (arguing that the utility and written description requirements 
“are not stringent enough to prevent the granting of patents on ESTs”). 
 225 Furthermore, the distinction between “intermediates” and “tools” is not robust in the de-
cided cases. Indeed, Duffy notes that “both the case law and the theory suggest that a general 
technique for identifying ESTs should be patentable—even if there is no use for any of the ESTs 
identified!” Duffy, supra note 209, at 247. But the result of Brenner v. Manson is directly contrary 
to this observation because that case dealt with a process patent for making molecules, which the 
Supreme Court invalidated. See 383 U.S. at 520–22, 534. 
 226 See supra note 143 and accompanying text (explaining the valence of the “specific and 
substantial” prong of the utility requirement). 
 227 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.  
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B. Written Description 
The application of the written description requirement to bar claims 
that amount to research plans has also been criticized by numerous com-
mentators as anomalous.228 Echoing complaints about the utility require-
ment, critics maintain that written description cases exemplified by Univer-
sity of Rochester229 are problematic as a matter of doctrinal development230 
and even statutory interpretation.231 In addition, numerous scholars and 
some judges have argued that these cases have unjustifiably imposed 
heightened disclosure requirements on biotechnology patents.232 Unlike the 
utility requirement, which has been applied only against chemical and bio-
chemical patents, the written description requirement has appeared in other 
                                                                                                                           
 228 See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 153 (4th ed. 2013) (calling the written description 
requirement as applied to biotechnology inventions “anomalous”); Yu, supra note 36, at 898 (call-
ing the written description requirement “an unsatisfactory patchwork of band-aid, ad hoc solu-
tions” for striking down claims that courts deem unacceptable); Jonathan E. Barbee, Note, Innova-
tion on the Cutting Edge of Ariad: Reinventing the Written Description Requirement, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1895, 1907–16 (2011); see also supra note 35 (citing scholarly and judicial critiques of the 
Federal Circuit’s written description jurisprudence). 
 229 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The 
University of Rochester court examined a claim to a method of treatment where the patent did not 
provide an example of a drug. See supra notes 150–157 and accompanying text. 
 230 See, e.g., Pitlick, supra note 35, at 222–26 (explaining how the early written description 
cases invalidating originally filed claims constituted a radical departure from precedent). But cf. 
supra note 186 (discussing uncontroversial aspects of the written description requirement). 
 231 See, e.g., Neal Goldfarb, Judicial Howlers: Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
LAWNLINGUISTICS (July 26, 2012), http://lawnlinguistics.com/2012/07/26/judicial-howlers-ariad-
pharmaceuticals-inc-v-eli-lilly-co, archived at http://perma.cc/PKC9-SCHM (explaining that the 
grammatical structure of what is now § 112(a) cannot support the a written description require-
ment that is separate from enablement). 
 232 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (Linn, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc) (explaining that courts have 
“constru[ed] section 112 to contain a separate written description requirement beyond enablement 
and best mode,” which “disproportionately” affects the biotechnology industry); Enzo Biochem, 
Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 981–83 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from the 
order denying rehearing en banc) (arguing that the heightened disclosure requirements for biotech 
patents “prejudice[] university or small inventors who do not have the . . . resources to process 
every new biotechnological invention to extract its nucleotide sequence”); BURK & LEMLEY, 
supra note 29, at 118 (“[W]ritten description evolved as a highly technology-specific doctrine 
centered in the chemical arts.”); Sasha Blaug et al., Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe: Complying with 
the Written Description Requirement Under US Patent Law, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 97, 99 
(2003) (explaining that written description “appears to [require] an actual reduction to practice of 
a biotechnology or chemical invention before it can be patented”); Holman, supra note 32, at 4 
(describing the written description requirement as “a ‘super-enablement’ requirement specifically 
targeting biotechnology and substantially restricting the patentability of biotechnology-related 
inventions”); Hodges, supra note 156, at 857 (“There seems no principled reason to find such 
[functional] descriptions sufficient in the case of electrical and mechanical inventions but not in 
the case of biotech inventions.”). 
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fields.233 Nevertheless, outside biotechnology, courts and the PTO rarely 
invalidate (or reject) patent claims under the written description require-
ment for being directed to a research plan.234 Although one reason for this 
state of affairs could be that patentees in other fields do not often draft re-
search-plan claims, this does not seem to be the case in practice. For example, 
functionally drafted software claims that are directed to “a problem to be 
solved”235—a deficiency that is arguably similar to that of research-plan bio-
technology claims236—appear to be common, but they have not been elimi-
nated by the written description requirement.237 
To be fair, a large majority of judges on the Federal Circuit has accept-
ed the written description requirement in its modern form, and several 
scholars have provided justifications for the ways in which it is applied.238 
                                                                                                                           
 233 See, e.g., In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1319–20 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the invalidation of claims directed to interactive call processing sys-
tems because some of the steps were not described in the specification); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. 
Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting claims directed to a non-
biotechnology invention for lack of written description because the claims could not be broadened 
to exclude an element designated as an “essential element” in the specification); see also Liz-
ardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissent-
ing from the order denying rehearing en banc) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s inconsistent appli-
cation of the written description requirement to claims that do not involve biotechnology or chem-
istry). 
 234 See Risch, supra note 77 (explaining that the written description requirement has failed to 
eliminate many overbroad software patent claims). Indeed, the specific approach of rejecting 
claims under written description due to lack of disclosed structures for implementing the invention 
seems to be generally limited to biochemical cases. 
 235 See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); 
supra note 77 and accompanying text. For an example of such a claim in the software/business 
method field, see infra note 336 and accompanying text. 
 236 But see Ajeet P. Pai, Note, The Low Written Description Bar for Software Inventions, 94 
VA. L. REV. 457, 486–93 (2008) (arguing that there is a principled distinction that justifies allow-
ing functional claims in the software arts but not in the biotechnological arts). 
 237 Nevertheless, courts have started invalidating such claims under § 101 as directed to un-
patentable subject matter. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. These developments might 
lend further support to the notion that the three doctrines are all facets of the same unwritten re-
quirement of patentability, which courts have developed and applied in an ad hoc manner.  
 238 For defenses of the written description requirement, see Liivak, supra note 73, at 16–20 
(arguing that the written description requirement “corroborate[s] that the inventor invented the 
claimed subject matter”); Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 
119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 127, 133–42 (2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/867_hcenirop.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y8ZS-DDJE (arguing that the written description requirement “en-
sure[s] that the applicant has claimed boundaries that she has actually invented”); Jakas, supra 
note 72, at 1290 (“[T]he written description requirement not only fits into the patent system as a 
whole, but also conforms to Congress’s overall policy goals . . . with regard to biotechnology 
innovation.”). Jeffrey Lefstin argues that the written description requirement is necessary as a 
means of defining what the invention is. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent 
Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1204–07 (2008). But he notes 
that written description doctrine has moved away from this function, and suggests that patent 
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Supporters of the requirement, including the Federal Circuit itself, explain 
that a research-plan claim is not an “actual invention” and that the inventor 
did not demonstrate “possession” of the subject matter of the claim.239 
Nonetheless, the rhetoric of the cases is also consistent with the conclusion 
that words like “invent” or “possess” are labels for the policy judgment that 
the inventions at issue are not sufficiently developed to warrant a claim that 
captures valuable downstream applications made possible by those inven-
tions.240 As with the utility doctrine, that policy judgment may be correct or 
incorrect—or, perhaps, on the right track but applied inconsistently. The 
bottom line, though, is that the results of the written description cases might 
have been less controversial had decisionmakers asked directly whether the 
patents at issue were directed to objects of basic research,241 rather than rely 
on tests that seem to obscure this salient question. Moreover, vigorous 
scholarly critiques of the written description requirement continue unabated 
in spite of its judicial acceptance.242 
C. Patentable Subject Matter 
The jurisprudence of Section 101 patentable subject matter exclusions 
has also been the subject of numerous critiques. Unlike utility and written 
description, the complaints here are not only about questionable doctrinal 
development243 or a disproportionate burden on some particular industry or 
patent type,244 but about the lack of guidance from courts. As a general mat-
                                                                                                                           
law’s requirement of definiteness may more naturally play this role. See id. at 1207–10, 1220–22; 
see also 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (setting forth the statutory requirement of definiteness). 
 239 See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353, 1355. 
 240 See FELDMAN, supra note 93, at 196 (“A court . . . cannot determine what an inventor 
possessed at a given time without making assumptions about how far a particular invention can 
reach.”); cf. Yu, supra note 36, at 910–11 (arguing that the “true purpose [of the written descrip-
tion requirement] is more about the creation of an ad hoc tool for courts to strike down claims that 
courts do not like than about the creation of a tool that advances sound policy”). 
 241 The Ariad case did mention unpatentability of “basic research” as the overarching reason 
for the outcome, but it is not clear what the source of law prohibiting the patenting of basic re-
search might be. See 598 F.3d at 1353; supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text. 
 242 See supra notes 228–231 and accompanying text. 
 243 See infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 244 Commentators have also made arguments about disproportionate burdens—on the diagnos-
tics industry and, lately, the software industry. See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Mayo, Myriad, and 
the Future of Innovation in Molecular Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
639, 673–77 (2014); see also Dennis Crouch, Twenty Thoughts on the Importance of Myriad, PA-
TENTLY-O (June 14, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/06/myriad.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/3LAG-8S6M (“One problem with Supreme Court review of section 101 cases is the risk of 
alienating entire market areas from patent protection.”); Gene Quinn, The Ramifications of Alice: A 
Conversation with Mark Lemley, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2014/09/04/the-ramifications-of-alice-a-conversation-with-mark-lemley/id=51023, archived at https://
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ter, the proposition that exclusions of natural phenomena, abstract ideas, 
formulas, and the like from the realm of patentability serve utilitarian goals 
of patent law is well-established.245 The problem is that the Supreme Court 
has steadfastly refused to provide any clear standards for identifying what 
should be excluded from patentability on this ground—in other words, the 
Court has not explained how to identify patents that belong to these catego-
ries.246 In an article on the abstract idea exclusion, one scholar criticized the 
Court for “an open embrace of an ‘I know it when I see it’ jurisprudence” 
that “offers no prospective guidance for the patent community.”247 Other 
commentators have lodged similar critiques against the Court’s laws-of-
nature and products-of-nature jurisprudence.248 
Even if an abstract idea or law of nature is well-defined, it is difficult 
to know what would render these unpatentable concepts into patentable in-
ventions.249 In particular, the Supreme Court has not clarified the distinction 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/VYP3-MRDZ?type=image (describing the heightened patentability requirements the Court 
imposed on software inventions in Alice v. CLS Bank). For a historical perspective on the patentabil-
ity of software patents, see generally Adam Mossoff, A Brief History of Software Patents (and Why 
They’re Valid), 56 ARIZ. L. REV. SYLLABUS 65, http://www.arizonalawreview.org/pdf/syllabus/56
ArizLRevSyl65.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JS6J-NH3S. 
 245 See Devlin, supra note 19, at 1716–18. 
 246 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014) (declining to “delimit the 
precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category”). 
 247 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “an Unpatentable Abstract 
Idea,” 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37, 39 (2011); see also John M. Golden, Patentable Subject 
Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1100–11 (2011) (describing the “tangled 
state of existing judge-made doctrine”); Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc’ns Inc., No. 2:13-
cv-07245-MRP-JEM, 2014 WL 5661290, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014) (“The Supreme Court 
decisions on § 101 often confuse more than they clarify.”). See generally Chisum, supra note 46 
(criticizing the Supreme Court’s abstract idea jurisprudence). A district court recently echoed 
Collins’s criticism. See Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equip. Corp., No. SACV 14-742-
GW(AJWx), 2014 WL 4407592, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court’s patentable subject matter test is “evocative of Justice Stewart’s most famous phrase” (cit-
ing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today at-
tempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand 
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it 
. . . .”))).  
 248 See Chiang, supra note 20, at 1868, 1872 n.51, 1876–77 (criticizing “the emptiness of [the 
Court’s] reasoning” and observing that the Court “never gives any theory for what constitutes a 
‘law of nature’ or explains why biological correlations fall within the category”); see also Jacob S. 
Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2014) (argu-
ing that “the Supreme Court has struggled to give these ‘natural’ terms any concrete, legal mean-
ing”). 
 249 See Kresh, supra note 35, at 522 (“[T]he [Mayo] Court expanded the definition of [laws] 
of nature, holding that a claim that revolves around a [law] of nature must contain an ‘inventive 
concept.’ The Court, however, declined to determine what would qualify as an ‘inventive con-
cept.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1294–95 (2012))). 
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between an unpatentable “conventional” application of an idea or law and a 
patentable “inventive” application.250 A similar difficulty appears in the 
Court’s product-of-nature jurisprudence in the form of the test that asks 
whether a patent claim is “markedly different” from a natural product.251 
For example, in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., the Court invalidated claims to isolated segments of human genomic 
DNA under the natural products exclusion because of the “focus on the ge-
netic information” encoded in the molecules.252 But the Court upheld claims 
to other types of molecules encoding the same genetic information.253 Alt-
hough the Court may have reached a pragmatic result that offers something 
to both sides in this case, the distinction it drew between the two types of 
molecules is unpersuasive.254 
The Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter jurisprudence is so 
murky that making the doctrine more reasoned and systematic has been the 
goal of many scholarly projects.255 However, in spite of the attention that 
this area of patent law has received, courts continue to struggle with it. Fur-
                                                                                                                           
 250 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics, Nature, and Mathematical 
Algorithms, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 341, 342–43 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1145_
umctkba1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TAJ5-QX4H (criticizing Mayo for its lack of clarity); 
Samantak Ghosh, Prometheus and the Natural Phenomenon Doctrine: Let’s Not Lose Sight of the 
Forest for the Trees, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 330, 349–50 (2012) (calling the Mayo 
doctrine “[u]n-administrable”); Kresh, supra note 35, at 539 (“[T]he Court chose to return to the 
inventive step and did so without clarifying how much must be added to a natural law to make a 
claim eligible.”); Jacob S. Sherkow, And How: Mayo v. Prometheus and the Method of Invention, 
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 351, 351 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1144_obtqyfxe.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/YRL4-EQWH (criticizing the Mayo Court’s “well-understood, rou-
tine, conventional activity” approach (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294)). 
 251 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980); In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 
750 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 252 See 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111, 2118 (2013). 
 253 See id. at 2119. 
 254 See Burk, supra note 31, at 509–10; Peter Lee, The Supreme Court’s Myriad Effects on 
Scientific Research: Definitional Fluidity and the Legal Construction of Nature, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Lee_Peter_IPSC_paper_
2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VPP3-6Z95. 
 255 See, e.g., Chao, supra note 35, at 423, 436–41 (developing “a fuller point-of-novelty 
framework that explains when a claim has added enough to an unpatentable concept to make it 
patent eligible”); Collins, supra note 247, at 44–61 (identifying four distinct concepts that give 
meaning to the otherwise ambiguous phrase “unpatentable abstract idea”); Lemley et al., supra 
note 35, at 1337–46 (arguing that courts and the Patent Office should disallow patent claims that 
“reach too broadly and thereby threaten downstream innovation”); Strandburg, supra note 35, at 
566 (arguing that per se exclusion of abstract ideas and natural phenomena from patentability—
not preemption concerns—grounds the patentable subject matter doctrine); see also Peter S. Men-
ell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s 
Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Moor-
ing, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1307–13 (2011) (proposing a test for evaluating patentable subject mat-
ter questions that would exclude “nontechnological arts”). 
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thermore, similar to utility and written description cases, patentable subject 
matter decisions have been criticized for judicial overreach and subjectivity, 
raising the specter of illegitimacy.256 And even scholars who are generally 
sympathetic to these cases have been critical of courts’ analytical approach-
es and advocated for improvements.257 Although the goal to eliminate pa-
tents on “basic tools” like laws of nature may be well-intentioned, there is 
little satisfaction with the decisional law on patentable subject matter due to 
the lack of clear standards for determining what a patent claim to a basic 
tool looks like. As a result, the current approach runs the risk of invalidating 
patents that are not directed to basic tools at all.258 
D. Summary 
Across doctrines, there is an overarching concern about the patenting of 
upstream, research-input inventions. That concern is justifiable—the patent-
ing of such inventions could have a particularly chilling impact on down-
stream research.259 Moreover, some have argued that many such inventions 
would have been created even without the patent incentive.260 Given these 
rationales, the general goal of eliminating socially harmful patents by prohib-
iting claims that qualify as foundational research inputs is sensible.261 
Courts, however, address policy concerns with the patenting of up-
stream inventions in a somewhat tentative and unsystematic way. Despite 
judicial efforts to develop tests for identifying patent claims on research tools 
and intermediates, research plans, and fundamental principles, and exten-
sive scholarly work in this area, the current state of affairs remains less than 
satisfying. Commentators have criticized the utility and written description 
requirements as anomalous and unsupported by statute, and pointed out that 
courts have invalidated some patents but not others using controversial jus-
                                                                                                                           
 256 See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 37, at 961; Kresh, supra note 35, at 522; Oppenheimer, su-
pra note 36, at 2–5; see also Ted Sichelman, Funk Forward, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE 
EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 361, 370 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Gins-
burg eds., 2014) (“[O]ne need not eliminate conventional applications of laws of nature from pa-
tentability to ensure that future innovation involving those laws is not unduly retarded.”). But see 
Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 224, at 360 (arguing that the patentable subject matter require-
ment is coherent and rooted in historical case law); Sarnoff, supra note 49, at 106–24 (arguing that 
the patentable subject matter requirement generates three efficiencies: “reduced costs of admin-
istration, reduced overall burdens on the patent system, and clearer signals that direct investment 
and innovation to activities that most need patent-system incentives”). 
 257 See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 49, at 90–106. 
 258 See Kresh, supra note 35, at 540; Oppenheimer, supra note 36, at 5. This concern appears 
to be borne out in recent case law. See infra notes 371–372 and accompanying text. 
 259 See supra notes 96–116 and accompanying text. 
 260 See infra notes 383–384 and accompanying text. 
 261 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
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tifications.262 And patentable subject matter jurisprudence fails to provide 
any clear tests altogether, making it difficult for the doctrine to vindicate the 
policy goals behind completeness. 
The unwritten completeness requirement pervades patent law and has 
real force, but its implementation has faltered. The current approach has led 
to a supervening requirement of patentability that has been difficult to de-
fine apart from the facts of the specific cases in which it is applied.263 A 
more coherent framework for implementing the completeness requirement 
should replace the current approach, which relies on ad hoc tests drawn 
from three different doctrinal sources.264 Proceeding on the assumption that 
claims directed to artifacts of basic research should be unpatentable, Part IV 
considers what a unified completeness requirement of patentability might 
look like.265 Then, Part V challenges this assumption and introduces the 
concept of a limited Research Patent right for inventions that pass the exist-
ing requirements of patentability, but fail the proposed form of the com-
pleteness requirement.266 
IV. TOWARD A UNIFIED COMPLETENESS REQUIREMENT 
This Part offers a new approach that aims to address to the failure of 
the unwritten completeness requirement to clearly and consistently imple-
ment the policy against the patenting of basic research inputs. Section A 
proposes a new test to unify the completeness requirement.267 To determine 
whether a patent claim satisfies completeness, this test focuses on the gen-
erality and unpredictability of the claimed invention’s applications. Section 
B then identifies the substantive and procedural obstacles that could inter-
fere with the test’s implementation, and addresses these concerns.268 Next, 
using known and hypothetical inventions as examples, Section C illustrates 
how courts could apply the proposed test.269 Finally, Section D explains that 
                                                                                                                           
 262 See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 263 See Collins, supra note 247, at 39 (criticizing the Bilski Court for making “a bald and 
unreasoned assertion” that the claims at issue, directed to a process of hedging, were patent-
ineligible abstract ideas because they were like the algorithms at issue in Benson); cf. Alice, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2357 (holding claims invalid under § 101 because “there is no meaningful distinction be-
tween the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue 
here”). 
 264 See supra notes 119–123 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of a unified 
completeness requirement). 
 265 See infra notes 267–378 and accompanying text. 
 266 See infra notes 379–460 and accompanying text. 
 267 See infra notes 271–288 and accompanying text. 
 268 See infra notes 289–319 and accompanying text. 
 269 See infra notes 320–350 and accompanying text. 
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codifying the requirement of completeness is likely the most effective way 
to implement the proposal.270 
A. The Completeness Test 
The proposed test reflects the policy behind the cases that underlie the 
completeness requirement. But the suggested implementation of this policy 
differs in significant ways from that of the current doctrine. Most important-
ly, the test is designed to prompt courts to face the question of whether a 
claim has the potential to unduly preempt downstream research squarely, 
rather than through tests like “possession” or labels like “law of nature,” 
“natural product,” or “abstract idea.”271 Given that the completeness re-
quirement is concerned with foundational research inputs, which can also 
be characterized as artifacts of basic research, this Article’s approach is to 
look to how inventors and policymakers understand “basic research,” and to 
attempt to fashion from this definition a test courts can use. Decisionmakers 
might reasonably look to such sources to operationalize the completeness 
requirement.272 
Unsurprisingly, “basic research” has been difficult to define,273 and the 
term can mean different things to different audiences.274 Furthermore, alt-
hough the concept of basic research is pervasive, few scholars have ana-
lyzed in detail what this concept means to various stakeholders.275 The work 
                                                                                                                           
 270 See infra notes 351–378 and accompanying text. 
 271 Cf. Yu, supra note 36, at 913 (discussing “a nebulous notion of ‘possession’”); Yu, supra 
note 35, at 418 (criticizing courts’ “legalistic and semantics-based posturing” in patentable subject 
matter cases). 
 272 Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Tech-
nology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1715–26 (1996) (dis-
cussing the sources Congress consulted in the years leading up to the passage of the Bayh-Dole 
Act). To be sure, different stakeholders may have divergent interests in terms of what sort of legis-
lation, if any, they want to see passed. Cf. id. (describing the “competing interests of universities 
and innovating firms under the Bayh-Dole Act”). Thus, one would expect a great deal of debate 
over the definition of basic research. 
 273 See Calvert, supra note 44, at 199 (explaining that “‘basic research’ is a term that is often 
heard in science policy without much apparent consensus on what is meant by it”). 
 274 See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 272.3 (2014) (national defense regulations defining “basic research” 
as “systematic study directed toward greater knowledge or understanding of the fundamental as-
pects of phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications towards processes or 
products in mind,” which “includes all scientific study and experimentation directed toward in-
creasing fundamental knowledge and understanding in those fields of the physical, engineering, 
environmental, and life sciences related to long-term national security needs”); cf. NAT’L SCI. 
FOUND., What Is Basic Research?, in THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE 
FOUNDATION 38, 38 (1953) (“Basic research is performed without thought of practical ends. It 
results in general knowledge and understanding of nature and its laws.”). 
 275 See, e.g., BENOÎT GODIN, MEASUREMENT AND STATISTICS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLO-
GY: 1920 TO THE PRESENT 262–86 (2005); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., FRASCATI 
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of one scholar, Jane Calvert, represents a significant attempt to develop a 
comprehensive definition of basic research in recent literature.276 Calvert 
surveyed scientists and policymakers and identified two major ways in 
which they understand the term: epistemologically and intentionally.277 The 
intentional definition, which holds “that it is the motivation that drives the 
research that distinguishes basic research from other types of research,” is 
not suitable for a legal definition of basic research because adopting it “can 
mean that if the same research is done with different intentions, it is classi-
fied differently.”278 The intentional definition is simply too subjective and 
malleable to serve as a basis for a legal test. 
In contrast, the epistemological definition of basic research is more 
stable and more capable of objective evaluation. According to Calvert, the 
epistemological features associated with basic research are generality and 
unpredictability.279 Both of these factors can be useful as markers of possi-
ble effects of an upstream patent claim on future innovation. Specifically, 
the generality factor captures the notion that “solving a general problem 
will potentially help solve a wide range of other problems,” and unpredicta-
bility relates to the kind of research that has the potential to result in “para-
digm shifts” and “produce radical innovations.”280 This definition of basic 
research is unsurprising—it is consistent with courts’ intuitions that certain 
upstream inventions have the potential to preempt broad areas of down-
stream inventive activity.281 Furthermore, the generality and unpredictabil-
ity factors are closely related. Inventions that have unpredictable applica-
tions might point the way to many new areas of downstream research, al-
                                                                                                                           
MANUAL: PROPOSED STANDARD PRACTICE FOR SURVEYS ON RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL 
DEVELOPMENT 77–78 (6th ed. 2002) [hereinafter FRASCATI MANUAL] (“Basic research is exper-
imental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying 
foundations of phenomena and observable facts, without any particular application or use in 
view.”); Calvert, supra note 44, at 203–05; Charles V. Kidd, Basic Research—Description Versus 
Definition, 129 SCI. 368, 368–71 (1959). 
 276 See generally Calvert, supra note 44 (surveying scientists and policymakers in an attempt 
to formulate an accurate definition of “basic research”). 
 277 See id. at 204. 
 278 See id. Interestingly, the unhelpful intentional definition appears to have been dominant in 
the literature, at least until recently. See, e.g., GODIN, supra note 275, at 262, 280; NAT’L SCI. 
FOUND., supra note 274, at 38; FRASCATI MANUAL, supra note 275, at 77. But cf. Kidd, supra 
note 275, at 369 (discussing “substance-centered definitions” of basic research that focus on the 
generality of the underlying inventions). 
 279 Calvert, supra note 44, at 204. 
 280 See id. 
 281 See supra notes 182–196 and accompanying text. 
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lowing owners of patents on such inventions to control those areas or even 
shut them down.282 
The proposed test for completeness takes into account these character-
istics of basic research and addresses in a comprehensive way the policy 
concerns behind the completeness cases.283 The test asks, based on claim 
scope and the disclosures in the specification: (1) whether the claim at issue 
is directed primarily to an invention that sets the foundation for future re-
search and development—the generality factor; and (2) whether the claim 
has the potential to cover many unforeseeable, transformative applica-
tions—the unpredictability factor. The test would foster a fact-intensive in-
quiry of the sort that courts and the PTO undertake to evaluate patent claims 
for enablement and nonobviousness, which are ultimate questions of law 
that are resolved based on subsidiary facts.284 Applying these factors, the 
PTO (or a court, when a claim’s compliance with the completeness re-
quirement is tested in litigation) would decide whether a claim is complete 
and should therefore be allowed, assuming the claim meets the other re-
quirements of patentability. As with enablement and nonobviousness, and as 
is generally the case with patent validity doctrines, completeness would be 
assessed at the time of patent filing.285 
Although broad claims would be a frequent target of the proposed test, 
narrowness of the claim would not always provide a way of escaping in-
completeness. In this respect, the test borrows from the collective wisdom 
of the completeness cases; in some of these cases, courts have invalidated 
seemingly narrow claims due to their upstream nature.286 To help under-
stand whether patent claims, narrow or broad, comply with the requirement, 
the test contemplates a larger role for the disclosures in the patent specifica-
tion. For example, if the specification explains what sorts of research and 
                                                                                                                           
 282 See supra notes 110–116 and accompanying text. For illustrations of how the two factors 
might work in practice, see infra notes 320–350 and accompanying text. 
 283 See infra notes 371–378 and accompanying text (explaining that the proposed test is best 
implemented through statutory change). 
 284 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–22 (2007) (explaining that nonobvi-
ousness is a question of law based on subsidiary facts); Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 
707 F.3d 1330, 1336–40 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (explaining that enablement is a question of law based 
on subsidiary facts). 
 285 See Yu, supra note 36, at 959–60 (“One of the key tenets of enablement is that contribu-
tion to the art be evaluated at the time of filing.”). 
 286 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) 
(rejecting the argument that “because the particular laws of nature that [the] patent claims embody 
are narrow and specific, the patents should be upheld”). Claims targeted by the utility requirement 
can also be quite narrow. See Chisum, supra note 46, at 22 (“[T]he lack of utility depends on the 
facts, including the prior art and the content of the inventor’s disclosure, not merely the abstract 
scope of the claim.”). 
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development pathways associated with the invention are outside the scope 
of the patent,287 the claims are more likely to satisfy the test because such 
disclosure would tend to favor the applicant with regard to the generality 
factor. Furthermore, if the specification shows that the invention works in 
predictable ways—perhaps by providing examples of well-defined approach-
es to implementing and applying the subject matter of the claim—the claim 
would likely satisfy completeness based on the unpredictability factor.288 
The test’s use of the generality and unpredictability factors sharpens 
the intuitions developed in the completeness cases and bolsters an important 
information-forcing function of patents. The specification material that 
might make it easier for claims to pass the completeness requirement would 
also apprise the public of the invention’s benefits, thereby promoting licens-
ing and technology transfer. Moreover, because the proposed approach 
would encourage patent applicants to reveal in the specification what areas 
of research the patent has left open, the patent disclosures would encourage 
productive design-arounds. Inventors who provide such informative disclo-
sures would help mitigate potential harms of claims that might be unaccept-
ably upstream and, in exchange, increase their chances of receiving a pa-
tent. 
B. Implementation Issues 
There are several substantive and procedural obstacles that could inter-
fere with the implementation of the completeness test, but none are likely to 
be insurmountable.289 One general objection to the proposed scheme is that 
patent examiners and courts will make mistakes in the application of the 
proposed test. Specifically, failures to predict broad downstream applicabil-
ity of the claimed technology would produce erroneous completeness de-
terminations.290 And history provides some examples of inability (often of 
                                                                                                                           
 287 Cf. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, 
Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1361 (2011) 
(“[T]here is much to recommend ‘inventing around’ as a clue to patentability.”). 
 288 The theory behind this information-forcing approach and an explanation of how it relates 
to the current disclosure doctrines will be the subject of a future article. 
 289 See infra notes 290–319 and accompanying text. 
 290 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 989, 1050 (1997) (“Economic history provides some striking examples of inventors who 
grossly understated the market value of their own inventions.” (citing Kathleen O’Toole, The Future 
Was “Obviously Not Obvious,” STAN. OBSERVER, June 1, 1994, at 13, available at http://news.
stanford.edu/pr/94/940601Arc4231.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7UQE-82NG)). The prediction 
step is required because completeness would be measured at the time the patent application is filed. 
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the inventors themselves) to foresee that an invention would be transforma-
tive.291  
But difficulties with identifying incomplete patents under the proposed 
test may not be pervasive—at least when compared to difficulties with im-
plementing extant requirements of patentability.292 Consider, for example, 
the inventions discussed in this Article—the identification of selective 
COX-2 inhibition that led to a new generation of painkillers,293 the devel-
opment of the PCR technique,294 the isolation of human embryonic stem 
cells,295 and the construction of the atomic force microscope.296 For all of 
these inventions, the potential for numerous downstream applications was 
immediately clear to those in the field.297 And there is no reason to believe 
                                                                                                                           
 291 See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 209, at 239–40 (discussing the failure to patent Georges 
Kohler and César Milstein’s technique for producing monoclonal antibodies due to a government 
agency’s inability to recognize the commercial potential of this technology). Even so, these re-
searchers themselves apparently recognized the transformative nature of their invention. See id. 
 292 Yu argues that, for many technologies, it would be impossible for anyone to foresee signifi-
cant future applications. See Yu, supra note 36, at 959–60. Accordingly, he suggests that the time-of-
filing rule be relaxed and, in the context of the enablement inquiry, post-filing facts be given greater 
weight than they have now. See id. at 961–62. Nonetheless, although specific applications might not 
be foreseeable, ordinary artisans may nonetheless understand that the invention may be broadly and 
unpredictably applicable in general, which is all that the proposed test requires. See id. at 960. More-
over, Yu’s proposed approach might present other difficulties. See infra notes 409–414 and accom-
panying text (noting problems associated with ex post limitations on patent rights); cf. Robin C. 
Feldman, The Inventor’s Contribution, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6, ¶¶ 99–107, http://www.lawtech
journal.com/articles/2005/06_051223_Feldman.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2NQ8-MTYK (ar-
guing that the problems associated with hindsight interpretation are “endemic to patent law” and 
sometimes cannot be overcome). 
 293 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 917–19 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
University Awarded Historic Drug Patent, ROCHESTER REV. (Spring–Summer 2000), http://www.
rochester.edu/pr/Review/V62N3/inrev06.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VH5K-HLT9. 
 294 See DENNIS W. ROSS, INTRODUCTION TO MOLECULAR MEDICINE 39–42 (3d ed. 2002); 
Mueller, supra note 63, at 13. 
 295 See James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blasto-
cysts, 282 SCI. 1145, 1145–47 (1998). 
 296 See Binnig et al., supra note 69, at 930–33; B. Ohler, Perspectives on Over Twenty Years 
of Life Science Research with Atomic Force Microscopy and a Look Toward the Future, 16 MI-
CROSCOPY & MICROANALYSIS 1034, 1034 (2010) (noting that the atomic force microscope was 
“immediately recognized as a valuable new technique”). 
 297 See PAUL RABINOW, MAKING PCR: A STORY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 126–27 (1996) 
(“There was an overwhelming response [to an early presentation on the PCR technique]. There 
were a lot of people who wanted to know how to do it. There were all kinds of people who were 
very excited about it.”); Ohler, supra note 296, at 1034 (noting that experts predicted the atomic 
force microscope’s “application to a wide variety of questions in the life sciences”); Thomson et 
al., supra note 295, at 1146 (explaining that human embryonic stem cells “should offer insights 
into developmental events [including] . . . birth defects, infertility, and pregnancy loss”); ROCHES-
TER REV., supra note 293 (predicting that the COX-2 inhibitor class of drugs “will replace aspirin 
and ibuprofen in the next century”). Incidentally, patents were obtained on all of these technolo-
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that these four inventions are unrepresentative of others that decisionmakers 
may wish to prohibit patenting for reasons of incompleteness.298 The first 
ESTs, for example, may not have been immediately recognized as fodder 
for patent “bottlenecks,” but by the time the “gold rush” to patent newly 
discovered ESTs began, the potential for EST patents to chill downstream 
research became clear.299 For software patents, a claim having broad func-
tional language may, on its face, provide a clue that the claim is directed to 
a foundational input into further development and is therefore incom-
plete.300 It is, of course, inevitable that the PTO and courts would make mis-
takes in the application of the proposed test, leading to erroneous results. 
Nonetheless, the contemplated completeness inquiries would probably be 
no more difficult for the PTO and courts to administer than the tests under 
other patentability requirements, like enablement and nonobviousness.301 
Furthermore, as already discussed at length, the approach that this test is 
intended to replace has a host of its own problems. 
To avoid rejections based on incompleteness, patent applicants may be 
tempted to downplay the potentially transformative or widely applicable 
nature of their inventions, and patent examiners may fail to recognize these 
characteristics.302 But the potential for PTO errors due to information asym-
                                                                                                                           
gies, though the University of Rochester court later invalidated the patent related to the discovery 
of COX-2 inhibition. See 358 F.3d at 929. 
 298 To be sure, some patents might become widely applicable ex post. This may, for example, 
occur when a patent is denominated as standard-essential. See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Standard-
Essential Patents 5–6 (Institut d’Économie Industrielle, Working Paper No. 803, 2014), available at 
http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2014/wp_idei_803_v3.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R43C-RQ5K. There are, 
however, specific mechanisms—including those antitrust law provides—for dealing with these 
kinds of situations. In addition, contingencies related to standard-essential patents can sometimes 
be resolved through private ordering. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to 
Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 
1138–39, 1164–66 (2013). In other cases, ex post measures driven by the need for access may 
limit the enforceability of such patents, but I generally disfavor such measures. See infra notes 
312–313 and accompanying text (explaining that, if the completeness requirement is adopted, 
decisionmakers should uphold patents on inventions that unexpectedly turn out to be foundational 
or transformative). 
 299 See Robert Cook-Deegan & Christopher Heaney, Patents in Genomics and Human Genet-
ics, 11 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 383, 400 (2010) (explaining that, although the 
EST patent controversy did not erupt immediately, companies rushed to the Patent Office once 
they had “incorporated [ESTs] into their business strategies”). 
 300 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Expert testimony can also help identify and 
confirm the preemptive potential of broad functional claims. 
 301 See infra notes 305–311 and accompanying text (outlining various causes of PTO errors 
that arise in the patent prosecution process and discussing doctrines that exist to remedy such 
errors when necessary). 
 302 The patent applicant’s duty to disclose to the PTO information that is relevant to patenta-
bility may somewhat alleviate the potential difficulties in the PTO’s assessments of completeness. 
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2014) (“[An applicant] has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with 
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metries and other challenges is a systemic issue in the ex parte patent prose-
cution process that affects all of the patentability requirements.303 For ex-
ample, to overcome an obviousness rejection, an applicant might submit 
self-serving “evidence” of unexpected results, and a PTO examiner might 
err by viewing that evidence as persuasive.304 Furthermore, PTO errors are 
not without remedies. For example, if the PTO improvidently grants a claim 
in spite of incompleteness, that claim could be invalidated during post-grant 
review,305 inter partes review,306 or in district court litigation.307 In cases of 
serious misconduct, a charge of inequitable conduct, if successful, would 
render the entire patent unenforceable.308 These prospects might deter self-
serving behavior and induce applicants to draft claims that would comply 
with the requirement. Additionally, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer 
applies in litigation to applicants who asserted to the PTO that their inven-
tions did not cover certain embodiments,309 and courts may hold these ap-
plicants to their statements during claim construction and narrow their 
claims accordingly.310 Finally, the costs of error may be small in situations 
where the PTO improvidently grants a patent that is incomplete, but down-
                                                                                                                           
the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual 
to be material to patentability . . . .”). Industry praise and predictions of broad applicability from 
those in the relevant field would be the kind of information that patent applicants would have to 
disclose as relevant to the completeness of the pending claims. Interestingly, patent applicants 
might be incentivized to reveal this sort of information in some cases in order to satisfy the re-
quirement of nonobviousness. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 725 F.3d 1356, 1365–
67 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (explaining that industry praise can be evidence of nonobviousness). 
 303 See generally Sean B. Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2574977, archived at http://perma.cc/NUT7-D6C8 (ar-
guing that proof, information, and legal asymmetries in the patent examination process favor patent 
applicants). 
 304 Cf. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 
F.3d 1063, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing the evidentiary value of unexpected results for prov-
ing nonobviousness). 
 305 See 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012). 
 306 See id. § 311. 
 307 See id. § 282(b)(2) (providing that patent invalidity is a defense to a suit for patent in-
fringement). 
 308 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (“Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if proved, bars 
enforcement of a patent.”). 
 309 See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323–28 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 310 See id. at 1327 (narrowing claim scope where “the patentee offered a narrower construc-
tion of the verb ‘to visibly outline,’” and therefore “has clearly and unmistakably disclaimed the 
territory between the full ordinary meaning of the claim language and the asserted new meaning”). 
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stream researchers do not rely on the underlying invention during the life of 
the patent.311 
Measuring completeness at the time of patent filing presents its own 
set of challenges. For example, a patented invention could, contrary to ex-
pectations, turn out to be surprisingly foundational and transformative at 
some point after filing. Although some decisionmakers and commentators 
might argue that patents on such inventions should be invalidated or nar-
rowed, letting the inventor reap the windfall from a patent on what unex-
pectedly turns out to be a basic research input is a result contemplated under 
the proposed scheme.312 Upholding such a patent appears more equitable 
and more conducive to stable transacting and investment than ex post inval-
idation of the patent, which would punish the inventor for the patent’s un-
expectedly broad applicability.313 Moreover, even if an invention’s future 
success could not have been predicted at the time of patent filing, its trans-
formative nature as determined at the time of litigation can serve as a post-
filing “book of wisdom”314 that might cast doubt on patent owners’ argu-
ments that the underlying patent’s “bottleneck” quality could not have been 
foreseen.315  
Although the proposed test would add administrative costs associated 
with the factual inquiries into whether claims at issue are directed to arti-
facts of basic research, these costs may be more than offset if the approach 
produces a greater number of outcomes consistent with the policy against 
the patenting of basic research inputs. In addition, there is independent val-
ue in the increased legitimacy and decreased controversy that the integrated 
completeness requirement might foster.316 Indeed, the proposed test’s key 
advance over the current approach is that it supplements judicial intui-
tions—some of which may well evince “foresight bias” and over-pessimism 
                                                                                                                           
 311 Cf. Lemley, supra note 290, at 1050 (explaining that even inventors sometimes underesti-
mate the value of their own inventions); O’Toole, supra note 290 (listing examples of researchers’ 
failures to predict markets for their inventions). 
 312 Unless, of course, the patent has taken on this role because the patentee violated some 
other law, breached a contract, or behaved inequitably.  
 313 Interestingly, courts sometimes give such claims particularly broad scope through claim 
construction and the doctrine of equivalents. See Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention 
Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 386–94 (2012); John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent 
Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 44–45 (1995); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the Future: Part II (1870–1952), 
87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441, 454–56 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court’s ex-
pansion of claim scope for pioneering inventions).  
 314 Cf. Dmitry Karshtedt, Damages for Indirect Patent Infringement, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 
911, 933–37 (2014) (discussing the “book of wisdom” concept in the context of patent damages). 
 315 Cf. id. at 934–35 (explaining that “post-negotiation” information can help courts assess 
damages in infringement cases, especially when an invention’s market value is unknown). 
 316 See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
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about the impact of certain patents on downstream research317—with a 
structured framework for evaluating claim completeness that can be in-
formed with expert input. Accordingly, the completeness test would provide 
for comprehensive and transparent evaluations of patentability based on a 
variety of evidence. To be sure, some cases may present circumstances in 
which a decisionmaker could determine that a patent claim is incomplete 
based only on the information in the patent itself.318 As a general matter, 
however, evidence extrinsic to the patent—such as whether ordinary arti-
sans319 would expect the claimed invention to be broadly applicable—would 
be necessary to determine whether a patent claim is directed to a complete 
invention. 
C. Representative Examples 
Many of the claims that now fail utility, written description, and pa-
tentable subject matter requirements would be found invalid under the pro-
posed completeness test.320 After all, the policy concerns behind the results 
in the cases and the standalone requirement I propose are fundamentally the 
same. Nonetheless, besides providing a framework that may be more trans-
parent and consistent, the completeness test would supply a more textured 
and principled analysis than the unsystematic approach manifested by the 
existing three lines of completeness cases. In this Section, I evaluate how 
the patents at issue in some utility, written description, and patentable sub-
ject matter cases might fare under the requirement.321 I also examine wheth-
er some hypothetical patents might satisfy (or fail) the proposed test. 
For example, a chemical compound whose only asserted utility is that 
of an object of unspecified future research would likely fail under the gen-
                                                                                                                           
 317 See Seymore, supra note 30, at 1122. Relevant to this point, Timothy Holbrook has criti-
cized the Federal Circuit’s enforcement of the written description requirement based on the per-
spective of a judge rather than an ordinary artisan. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presump-
tions, and Public Notice, 96 IND. L.J. 779, 792–96 (2011) (“[T]he court has removed the [ordinary 
artisan] from the inquiry, notwithstanding its statements that one determines whether the written 
description requirement is satisfied from the perspective of [that person].”). 
 318 See infra note 336–337 and accompanying text (explaining that some functionally claimed 
biotechnology, software, and business method patents might fail the completeness test based on 
the broad language of the claim alone). 
 319 An ordinary artisan, also referred to as a “person having ordinary skill in the art,” is a 
theoretical construct, like “the reasonable person” in tort law, from whose perspective factual 
questions are evaluated. See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 72, 90, 93–100 (2012).  
 320 See infra notes 322–350 and accompanying text. 
 321 It is important to keep in mind, of course, that patent applicants would have probably 
drafted their claims and specifications differently had an integrated completeness requirement 
existed. 
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erality/unpredictability framework.322 Let us consider each factor in turn. 
First, without knowing anything about the compound’s utility, one would 
likely conclude that it would be widely applicable; the compound could be-
come a cancer drug, a lubricant, or a fuel, or it could function as an inter-
mediate for making other chemicals.323 In other words, the claim to the 
compound is likely to be directed to an invention that could help solve a 
number of downstream problems, leading to an inference that such a claim 
would set the foundation for future research and development. These facts 
would tend to support the conclusion of incompleteness under the generality 
factor. Second, under the unpredictability factor, a compound whose utility 
is completely unknown might in the future play a role in applications that 
cannot be foreseen, also supporting the conclusion of incompleteness. Thus, 
the composition claims to chemical compounds in this hypothetical patent 
are likely to be found incomplete. 
In contrast, a method for forming a new chemical bond in a specific 
structural setting might be entitled to a regular patent. A patent claim on a 
catalyst for coupling carbon and nitrogen atoms using a very limited set of 
nitrogen-containing compounds might not be incomplete because the claimed 
method would probably not lead to transformative and unpredictable down-
stream applications. Rather, the method would only lead to uses of the com-
pounds as intermediates in connection with a particular, known class of 
drugs.324 Although such an invention might set the foundation for some 
amount of future research, the research area to which it is drawn is so nar-
rowly circumscribed that an ordinary artisan325 would probably not view the 
claim as directed to a fundamental research input or as a major impediment 
to future work.  
                                                                                                                           
 322 See supra notes 1, 11–12 and accompanying text (providing an example of a method of 
making such a compound). 
 323 This observation might suggest that many “product” claims, such as claims to chemical 
compositions, may not be patentable—they would have to be limited to methods of use. Neverthe-
less, the proposed inquiry is fact-specific, and a fact-finder may conclude that certain chemical 
structures would not have many significant downstream applications. Although this concern in 
theory applies to all claims because the scope of any patent claim may expand over time, an inven-
tion’s broad applicability must, under my proposed scheme, be identified with particularity and 
specificity for the particular claim at issue to support the conclusion of incompleteness. I thank 
Joshua Sarnoff for a discussion that helped clarify this point. 
 324 My own graduate research might be an example of such a method. See Dmitry Karshtedt 
et al., Platinum-Based Catalysts for the Hydroamination of Olefins with Sulfonamides and Weakly 
Basic Anilines, 127 J. AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y 12640, 12644–45 (2005) (discussing the uses of 
certain platinum catalysts for forming carbon-nitrogen bonds in a specific structural setting). 
 325 For a discussion of the concept of an “ordinary artisan,” see supra note 319 and accompa-
nying text. 
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Of course, there will be closer cases between these two examples at the 
extremes. For example, where a patent reveals a utility for a chemical com-
pound that is “specific and substantial”326 within the meaning of the current 
law, but it is also known that the compound would have significant applica-
tions in other fields because of its uniquely valuable, functional structure, 
the underlying claim might fail the completeness requirement. But the inva-
lidity outcome in such a case is not a given; if two different tribunals 
reached opposite conclusions on such a claim, courts might sustain both 
decisions on appeal because of the fact-specific nature of the generality and 
unpredictability inquiries.327 
The claims at issue in some of the written description cases—for ex-
ample, those dealing with method-of-treatment claims in patents that pro-
vide no (or very few) drug examples—are likely to be invalid under the 
proposed regime just as under the current one. These claims are drafted in 
functional terms—based on the effect of a hypothetical drug on a biological 
target—and thus leave open a large number of avenues for implementa-
tion.328 Indeed, in the representative University of Rochester case, the “non-
steroidal” limitation in the claims is not much of a constraint, and one might 
predict that future researchers would find chemicals falling within the scope 
of the claim that have completely unexpected structures.329 Because they 
threaten research and development pathways involving the synthesis and 
study of various drug candidates, such claims would likely fail under the 
completeness test absent a contrary showing of predictability of what types 
of drugs might work in the patent’s specification.330 The proposed test also 
disfavors some claims on methods of manipulating genetic material, like 
PCR, because an ordinary artisan would probably recognize this invention’s 
value as a research input and could attest to its broad and transformative 
                                                                                                                           
 326 See supra note 143 and accompanying text (defining the “specific and substantial” prong 
of the utility requirement). 
 327 See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 328 See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text; see also AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & 
Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“When a patent claims a genus 
using functional language to define a desired result, ‘the specification must demonstrate that the 
applicant has made a generic invention that achieves the claimed result and do so by showing that 
the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-defined genus.’” 
(quoting Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc))).  
 329 358 F.3d at 918, 929. 
 330 See supra notes 148–164 and accompanying text (explaining that the rhetoric in many 
written description cases signals that courts are focused on excluding unacceptably upstream in-
ventions from patentability). 
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applicability.331 Isolated human embryonic stem cells would be subject to 
completeness scrutiny for similar reasons.332 
Moreover, the proposed form of the completeness requirement would di-
rect decisionmakers to look outside the chemistry and biotechnology fields 
for potentially problematic claims. One possible area of application in-
volves software (and business method) patents. As discussed above, one 
commentator argues that many software and business method claims are 
directed to a problem to be solved rather than to a solution.333 Because of 
these characteristics, which resemble those of functionally drafted claims in 
the area of biotechnology,334 certain software and business method claims 
should also be scrutinized for completeness.335 Claims to general concepts 
such as the hedging of risk, unconstrained by any methods of implementa-
tion, are problematic for reasons similar to functional biotechnology claims: 
they cover a large number of avenues of further development, including some 
that might be unforeseeable and quite transformative.336 Indeed, some claims 
                                                                                                                           
 331 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (describing the PCR technique). There is, how-
ever, a level-of-generality problem in the background. On the one hand, PCR can be described as 
a method or a system for amplifying DNA. See Mueller, supra note 63, at 13. On the other hand, 
PCR can serve as a method of determining paternity, of finding a crime suspect to a crime scene, 
or of detecting a virus. See id. at 2. Because we are concerned with preemption of downstream 
applications, the completeness analysis would take into account the latter set of uses. 
 332 See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also John M. Golden, WARF’s Stem Cell 
Patents and Tensions Between Public and Private Sector Approaches to Research, 38 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 314, 315 (2010) (explaining that patents on embryonic stem cells can “restrict use of ma-
terials that can serve as platforms for a whole spectrum of subsequent research”); Christopher D. 
Hazuka, Supporting the Work of Lesser Geniuses: An Argument for Removing Obstructions to 
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 157–58 (2002) (explaining that 
“broad property rights covering” human embryonic stem cells “will limit exploration of the prop-
erties and potential uses” of such cells). 
 333 See Lemley, supra note 26, at 907–08, 923; supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 334 See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353 (invalidating claims that “merely recite a description of the 
problem to be solved while claiming all solutions to it”); supra notes 228–232 and accompanying 
text. 
 335 But cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing recent decisions invalidating 
software and business method patents under the patentable subject matter requirement); Robert 
Hunt & James Bessen, The Software Patent Experiment, BUS. REV., Q3 2004, at 27–30 (arguing 
that proliferation of patents in the software industry has harmed research and development). 
 336 Mark Lemley provides examples of such claims in a recent article. See Lemley, supra note 
26, at 920–22. In Walker Digital, LLC v. Google, Inc., for example, a district court invalidated 
claims directed to “[a] method for operating a computer system to facilitate an exchange of identi-
ties between two anonymous parties,” comprising steps such as “receiving from a first party . . . an 
identity for said first party; receiving from said first party . . . a rule for releasing said identity of 
said first party . . . [and] releasing said identity of said first party” based on whether the rule is 
satisfied. See No. 11-318-LPS, 2014 WL 4365245, at *4 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (quoting U.S. 
Patent No. 5,884,270 col. 23 l. 60—col. 24 l. 7 (filed Sept. 6, 1996)). The accused technologies 
included LinkedIn and Facebook social networking sites, which make search results available 
based on users’ privacy settings. See Complaint at 7, 9, Walker Digital, 2014 WL 4365245 (No. 
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in these fields are so facially broad that they might fail the completeness 
requirement no matter what the specification (or an expert) might say.337  
Scientific instruments provide another illustration of how courts and 
the PTO might apply the completeness requirement outside the realms of 
chemistry and biotechnology. Claims to some apparatus inventions, like the 
atomic force microscope—which would be expected to be used primarily in 
further research, and to have many unforeseeable downstream applications—
might fail the completeness requirement.338 Conversely, claims to apparatus 
inventions with narrowly defined utility, such as gold metal detectors, would 
probably satisfy the requirement. 
Two final illustrations of how decisionmakers might apply the pro-
posed completeness requirement are based on recent, controversial Supreme 
Court cases dealing with patents in life sciences fields. In one case, Associa-
tion for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Supreme Court 
held that claims to molecules excised from naturally occurring DNA were 
invalid.339 The Court invalidated these claims because of their “focus on the 
genetic information encoded in the [molecules],” but, somewhat inexplica-
bly,340 upheld the validity of claims to non-naturally occurring DNA encod-
ing the same information.341 Under the proposed framework, however, both 
types of molecules would likely fail the completeness requirement due to 
the large number, variety, and unpredictability of downstream applications 
of the claimed genetic material.342 The completeness analysis is agnostic 
                                                                                                                           
11-318-LPS). Although the different social networking sites might have completely different algo-
rithms for carrying out these functions, functionally drafted claims of this sort would cover all of 
the sites. See Lemley, supra note 26, at 923 (“[T]the point is that the claims are effectively unlim-
ited as a matter of structure. The function they perform may be simple or complex, broad or nar-
row, but in the modern world the patent claims listed above effectively cover any device that per-
forms that function in any way.”). 
 337 Cf. Lemley, supra note 26, at 905 (“Software patent lawyers are increasingly writing pa-
tent claims in broad functional terms. Put another way, patentees claim to own not a particular 
machine, or even a particular series of steps for achieving a goal, but the goal itself. The resulting 
overbroad patents overlap and create patent thickets.”). 
 338 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text; see also supra note 212 (arguing that 
atomic force microscopes have broad applicability in downstream research). 
 339 See 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
 340 See supra notes 253–254 and accompanying text. 
 341 See 133 S. Ct. at 2111, 2118–19; supra notes 252–254 and accompanying text; see also 
Sichelman, supra note 256, at 378 (arguing that if “a claim to a gene could very well foreclose 
many avenues of research not embodied in one type of diagnostic test designed to measure the 
likelihood of breast cancer,” then “the Supreme Court’s distinction in Myriad between unpatenta-
ble, ‘naturally occurring’ genomic DNA and patentable, ‘synthetic’ complementary DNA seems 
one without much of a meaningful difference”). 
 342 See, e.g., Andrew Chin, Research in the Shadow of DNA Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. SOC’Y 846, 847–48 (2005). But cf. Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human 
Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. 
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with regard to whether the previously unknown material is “natural” or 
not,343 for a focus on natural-ness would threaten to undermine the utilitari-
an grounding of the test.344 Rather, the inquiry focuses on the invention’s 
developmental stage and applicability through the lens of the generali-
ty/unpredictability framework. 
In contrast, the patent at issue in another recent case would probably 
pass the completeness test.345 In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prome-
theus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a method enabling 
doctors to optimize the dosage of a drug used to treat gastrointestinal disor-
ders was unpatentable.346 The claims at issue were directed to administering 
a probe molecule along with the drug to a patient and deciding, based on the 
concentration of the molecule measured after the administration, whether to 
increase or decrease the dosage of the drug.347 Although the Court feared 
that these claims would preempt all uses of the correlation between the 
measured concentration and the need to increase or decrease the drug’s dos-
age, an ordinary artisan would probably disagree.348 Indeed, it is not clear 
                                                                                                                           
REV. 295, 300–03 (2007) (attempting to “dispel any perception that a patent claim reciting a hu-
man genetic sequence is equivalent to ‘ownership’ of a human gene”); Christopher M. Holman, 
Will Gene Patents Derail the Next Generation of Genetic Technologies?: A Reassessment of the 
Evidence Suggests Not, 80 UMKC L. REV. 563, 596–98 (2012) (maintaining that gene patents will 
not substantially impede innovation); W. Nicholson Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Pa-
tents Won’t Hinder Whole Genome Sequencing and Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1601, 1631 (2012) (“[I]nfringement of intellectual property is far less of a systematic and perva-
sive barrier to [whole genome sequencing] and personalized medicine than is generally as-
sumed.”). 
 343 There is a caveat: long-standing precedent prohibits the patenting of artifacts that are iden-
tical to natural products, such as plant species discovered in the wild. See, e.g., Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 
U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). The proposed completeness scheme would retain that foundational prece-
dent, but would discard recent extensions of that precedent prohibiting isolated materials that are 
not “markedly different” from their natural counterparts. See, e.g., In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-
Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755, 760–61 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also infra 
notes 378, 447–452 and accompanying text (explaining how the proposed completeness require-
ment and research patent right would handle these types of patent claims). 
 344 See Yu, supra note 35, at 430 (arguing that “instead of focusing on legally construed no-
tions of what is nature and what is man-made, [the proposed] requirement focuses on articulating 
the costs of patents”); see also Devlin, supra note 19, at 1716–18 (arguing that patentable subject 
matter exclusions can be justified in utilitarian terms); cf. Sherkow, supra note 248, at 1143 (argu-
ing for the abandonment of terms like “natural” and proposing a different test); Sichelman, supra 
note 256, at 371–72 (calling into question the Court’s “ill-formed views of what constitute ‘natural 
laws’ and ‘products of nature’”). But cf. Chiang, supra note 20, at 1873–76 (arguing that the justi-
fication for the result in Myriad might be non-utilitarian). 
 345 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94. 
 346 See id. at 1295, 1305. 
 347 See id. at 1295–97. 
 348 See Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 287, at 1360–61 (“[T]here are arguably other ways to 
achieve the goals of the [Mayo] patent.”); Sichelman, supra note 256, at 376–78. 
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that the Mayo invention has many significant downstream applications, or 
that the claims at issue preempted all or even most of them. A downstream 
researcher could, for example, make use of the correlation in a study re-
viewing outcomes for patients to whom the drug and the probe molecule 
were administered without infringing the claims.349 Furthermore, it is diffi-
cult to think of applications of the correlation that are unforeseeable and 
transformative. Thus, the proposed framework would likely produce a dif-
ferent result than the one the Court reached under its patentable subject mat-
ter test, which prohibits claims on “conventional” applications of abstract 
ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena.350 In short, Prometheus’s 
claim would be patentable under the proposed completeness test. 
D. The Need for Implementation Through Statutory Change 
1. Why a New Statutory Section? 
Proposals for reforming the law’s treatment of problematic upstream 
patents tend to suggest an expanded role for the existing requirements of 
patentability. For example, one group of scholars argues that Congress 
should reconceive Section 101 of the Patent Act as a backstop against over-
broad claims that survive scope restrictions imposed by the enablement re-
quirement, which is set forth in Section 112.351 Another commentator ar-
gues that Section 101 should have the capacious role of prohibiting various 
types of problematic patents through one of three possible mechanisms: (1) 
expanding the definition of “basic tools of scientific and technological 
work”; (2) serving as a basis for distinguishing inventions and discoveries; 
and (3) serving as a basis for distinguishing technological from non-
technological innovations.352 And yet another scholar proposes that the con-
cern about research preemption that courts currently address under the utili-
ty requirement should be dealt with through the enablement and nonobvi-
ousness requirements.353 Similarly, it may be possible to implement the 
completeness requirement under one of the extant patentability require-
                                                                                                                           
 349 Cf. Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 287, at 1361 (explaining that future researchers could 
“invent around” the patented method in Mayo with relative ease). But see Note, supra note 109, at 
1386–87 (arguing that the patent at issue in Mayo was harmful to downstream innovation). 
 350 See supra notes 249–250 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court for failing to clarify 
where the line falls between “conventional” and “inventive” applications). 
 351 See Lemley et al., supra note 35, 1337–46. 
 352 See Yu, supra note 35, at 427–37. 
 353 See Seymore, supra note 30, at 1122. 
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ments—for example, enablement or patentable subject matter. Nonetheless, 
such an approach might have significant drawbacks.354 
Despite the enablement requirement’s focus on overclaiming,355 sever-
al factors make it a less than ideal fit for enforcing completeness. The ena-
blement requirement attempts to answer, based on a number of factors, 
whether an ordinary artisan could practice the full scope of the claim based 
on the disclosures in the specification without undue experimentation at the 
time of patent filing.356 The timing aspect of the requirement generally 
means that claims can cover after-arising technology without an enablement 
violation.357 Thus, although the enablement requirement helps ensure that 
there is a reasonable correlation between what is disclosed and claimed,358 it 
is not explicitly concerned with the research-input nature of patent claims 
and their impact on downstream research—a concern shared by utility, writ-
                                                                                                                           
 354 See infra notes 355–366 and accompanying text. In addition to the drawbacks discussed in 
the paragraphs that follow, attempts at course correction by courts themselves might challenge the 
institutional competence of the judiciary, and therefore might be better left for Congress. See John 
R. Thomas, Statutory Subject Matter in Context: Lessons in Patent Governance from Bilski v. 
Kappos, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 133, 151 (2011) (arguing that Congress is better positioned 
to change the contours of patentable subject matter than courts because, among other reasons, 
“[t]he legislative decision-making process may better reflect the views of a wide range of stake-
holders and offers the advantage of enhanced democratic accountability,” and because “Congress 
is . . . better able to address patent law reform holistically, rather than in a piecemeal fashion by 
raising questions in rehearing orders”). John Thomas concludes: 
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court . . . [said] as little as possible about the pa-
tent law doctrine of statutory subject matter. The Court’s opinions offer more signif-
icant lessons concerning patent law institutions and the process of law reform. Bilski 
v. Kappos refutes claims that the preferred course is for Congress to defer to the ju-
diciary to address longstanding concerns about the operation of the U.S. patent sys-
tem. Although proposed reforms to the U.S. law of statutory subject matter have not 
yet taken center stage in congressional deliberations to date, they may in days soon 
to come—and ultimately may prove the driver of a long-deferred overhaul of the 
U.S. Patent Act of 1952. 
Id. But see Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 
102–03 (2010) (arguing that the judiciary is better positioned than Congress to address patentable 
subject matter issues in part because of the threat of industry capture). 
 355 See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that the enablement require-
ment mandates a “reasonable correlation” between what is claimed and what is disclosed in the 
patent). See generally Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 
1083 (2009) (contending that three rules guide the Federal Circuit’s application of the enablement 
doctrine, and that all three rules help restrict claim scope with respect to some types of after-
arising technologies). 
 356 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In contrast, the completeness 
requirement in the form that I propose focuses in part on predicting at the time of filing whether a 
large number of after-arising technologies will fall within the scope of the claim. 
 357 See Collins, supra note 355, at 1086; Collins, supra note 219, at 510 n.65; Lemley et al., 
supra note 35, at 1330–32. 
 358 See Collins, supra note 355, at 1089. 
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ten description, and patentable subject matter cases. Moreover, these three 
doctrines exist in part because, even if the claims at issue were enabled un-
der the undue experimentation test, there is still a problem because of the 
upstream, basic-research nature of the claimed inventions.359 In contrast, a 
claim might be invalidated or rejected for lack of enablement even when the 
claimed invention is not so upstream and transformative as to be considered 
an artifact of basic research.360 The enablement requirement is best left 
alone to play its current role. 
Giving an expanded role to Section 101 may not effectively implement 
the goals of completeness either. Patentable subject matter jurisprudence is 
already highly controversial and carries with it a great deal of baggage that 
would be challenging for courts to leave behind. In addition, it would be dif-
ficult to square the language of the statute, which allows a patent on any 
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof,”361 with a prohibition of patents on tangible enti-
ties such as an atomic force microscope or a chemical compound, which are 
probable outcomes under the proposed scheme.362 Two other potential textual 
hooks for completeness in Section 101 are the words “new” and “useful.”363 
Neither term, however, would be an adequate source of the prohibition 
against the patenting of basic research. Although some scholars have relied on 
the word “new” to support a distinction between patentable “inventions” and 
unpatentable “discoveries,”364 I have already rejected this distinction in this 
Article in favor of a general utilitarian test for basic research.365 And, as al-
ready discussed in the context of the utility requirement, reliance on the word 
                                                                                                                           
 359 Cf. Lemley et al., supra note 35, at 1330–32 (explaining that because the enablement re-
quirement does not bar patent claims that “will foreclose later-developed technology,” courts must 
rely on § 101 to exclude patents on broadly claimed inventions). 
 360 See, e.g., Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1002–03 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (invalidat-
ing claims directed to integrating a user’s audio signal or visual image into a pre-existing video 
game or movie for lack of enablement). 
 361 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 362 Cf. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) 
(Moore, J., dissenting in part) (“How can [a] system, with its first party device, data storage unit, 
second party device, computer, and communications controller, be an ‘abstract idea’?”), aff’d, 134 
S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 363 See id. 
 364 See, e.g., Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 224, at 346–49 (arguing that “courts have in-
terpreted the requirement of newness as excluding from patentable subject matter certain discover-
ies that lack invention”); Yu, supra note 35, at 431–33 (suggesting that “Ariad’s method” is an 
unpatentable discovery because it “provides no new biochemical pathways . . . and produces no 
new effects in the human body” (emphasis added)). 
 365 To be sure, certain discoveries that are pure natural phenomena and products of nature will 
remain unpatentable even under the proposed approach. See infra notes 447–452 and accompany-
ing text. 
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“useful” comes with its own problems. In particular, a prohibition on patents 
on inventions that have research utility reflects a highly controversial inter-
pretation of “useful.”366 Thus, an approach that attempts to leverage this word 
would not resolve legitimacy problems associated with the current implemen-
tation of the completeness requirement. 
More fundamentally, it would not be appropriate to anchor the pro-
posed completeness requirement in an existing requirement of patentability 
because completeness draws its doctrinal and intellectual parentage from 
three distinct statutory sources. None of them is more important than the 
other two, and, although all three lines of cases answer to the same policy 
justifications, none by itself fully captures the overarching notion of com-
pleteness. Instead, the proposed requirement is a blend that incorporates the 
concerns animating these cases—claim overbreadth, the sense that basic 
research should be unpatentable, and the policy of unfettered access to cer-
tain fundamental ideas and tools. 
The completeness insight, to be sure, helps explain why requirements 
as seemingly different as patentable subject matter and utility are drawn 
from the same section of the Patent Act,367 and why certain written descrip-
tion cases call to mind Section 101’s concern about natural phenomena and 
cite a case on utility.368 But Section 101 as it currently stands has already 
been stretched to (and perhaps past) its limit and, in any event, the Supreme 
Court has recently declined to implement a scholarly suggestion to reorient 
its patentable subject matter jurisprudence so that it more clearly serves util-
itarian goals.369 A codified completeness requirement may stand a better 
chance of providing a sensible, vigorous, and legitimate mechanism for deal-
ing with patents on basic research inputs. 
2. The Plausibility and Form of Codification 
The proposal for a statutory completeness requirement brings with it 
its own difficulties. An obvious one is the challenge of getting the proposal 
through Congress. Given the current focus on procedural rather than sub-
                                                                                                                           
 366 See supra notes 201–227 and accompanying text. 
 367 Cf. John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for Houseclean-
ing in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2014) (arguing 
that the Federal Circuit’s patentable subject matter jurisprudence between 1998 and 2008 centered 
on “an inquiry that could be hard to distinguish from the requirement that a patentable invention 
be useful”). 
 368 See supra notes 93, 157–164 and accompanying text. 
 369 Sichelman, supra note 256, at 374–77 (arguing that the Mayo Court attempted, but ulti-
mately failed, to ground its opinion in the scope theory of patentable subject matter developed by 
Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, and Wagner) (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301–02 (citing Lemley et al., 
supra note 35)). 
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stantive patent reform, this sort of a change seems unlikely in the near fu-
ture.370 Nevertheless, recent developments in the completeness doctrine—
particularly patentable subject matter cases—have become a cause for con-
cern.371 Depending upon how they are applied by the lower courts and the 
PTO, these cases might effectively eliminate certain types of diagnostic pa-
tents, patents on chemicals isolated from natural sources, and software and 
business method patents on inventions that might not necessarily be di-
rected to foundational research inputs.372 If a consensus develops that these 
developments are unsatisfactory—but a rule barring patents that are harmful 
from the research preemption perspective is still required—codification of 
the completeness requirement may become a possibility.373 Indeed, alt-
hough completeness reflects crucially important policies, courts’ current 
implementation of this requirement may be nearing its “flash of genius” 
moment,374 and codification and course correction might be in order. In ad-
dition, as already suggested, codification would help reduce legitimacy 
costs associated with the current implementation of the completeness re-
quirement.375 
                                                                                                                           
 370 See ANDREW S. BALUCH, PATENT REFORM 2015: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO CUR-
RENT PATENT REFORM DEVELOPMENTS IN CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, THE COURTS 
AND THE STATES 3–33 (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2414306, archived at http://
perma.cc/4XZS-N497. 
 371 See, e.g., Holman, supra note 244, at 677–78 (warning that “a stringent application of 
Mayo . . . could substantially impact the availability of effective patent protection for molecular 
diagnostics and personalized medicine”); Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: 
A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1812–23 
(2014); Laura W. Smalley, Will Nanotechnology Products Be Impacted by the Federal Courts’ 
“Product of Nature” Exception to Subject-Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. 101?, 13 J. MAR-
SHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 397, 437–43 (2014) (explaining that the Mayo and Myriad cases 
may weaken “patent protections for biotechnology inventions” and threaten companies’ ability to 
secure venture capital financing). 
 372 Cf. Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (invali-
dating patents for managing the game of bingo); In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting patent claims to a cloned animal); PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema 
Ltd., 496 F. App’x 65, 73 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (invalidating a patent on screening methods for estimat-
ing the risk of fetal Down syndrome); McRO, Inc. v. Activision Pub., Inc., No. CV 14-336-
GW(FFMx), 2014 WL 4759953, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (invalidating claims to methods 
of automatically animating lip synchronization of cartoon characters), appeal docketed, No. 2015-
1080 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2014); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 3d 938, 
954 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (invalidating claims to methods of performing prenatal diagnoses), appeal 
docketed, No. 2014-1139 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 2013); Sichelman, supra note 256, at 372 (arguing that 
“gatekeeping rules often take on a life of their own, continually removing themselves with each 
additional judicial opinion or agency interpretation from their fundamental purposes”). 
 373 See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, The Supreme Court Saps Patent Certainty, 82 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1751, 1756 (2014) (“Maybe there will be Congressional intervention on § 101.”). 
 374 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 375 See supra notes 208, 256 and accompanying text. For other suggestions for statutory 
changes in response to the developing law of § 101, see generally Robert R. Sachs, Twenty-Two 
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The completeness requirement, as codified, could provide in a new 
section (or subsection, say, 35 U.S.C. § 112(g)(1)) that “basic research shall 
be unpatentable.” The generality/unpredictability framework introduced in 
Section A of this Part provides one way to implement the requirement and 
might itself be codified. Alternatively, policymakers might develop a differ-
ent test that evaluates whether a claim is directed to a foundational research 
input. In addition, just as the codified nonobviousness requirement abrogat-
ed the “flash of genius” test with the statement that “[p]atentability shall not 
be negated by the manner in which the invention was made,”376 the pro-
posed statutory change could include abrogation of the holdings of cases 
that gave rise to the current completeness doctrine. Thus, subsection (g)(2) 
could provide: 
A patent claim shall not be denied solely on the basis that the 
claimed invention has only general research utility. A patent claim 
shall not be denied solely on the basis that the specification does 
not provide a sufficient number of structures for carrying out the 
claimed result, unless drafted in means-plus-function format.377 A 
patent claim should not be denied solely on the basis that it is not 
directed to an inventive application of, or is not markedly differ-
ent from, a law or a product of nature, a natural phenomenon, or 
an abstract idea.378 
                                                                                                                           
Ways Congress Can Save Section 101, BILSKI BLOG (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/
blog/2015/02/twenty-two-ways-congress-can-save-section-101.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
MG7J-ECAG. 
 376 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 377 This proviso excludes claims that are governed by § 112(f). For these so-called “means-
plus-function” claims, unlike regular claims, the statute explicitly requires structural disclosures, 
such as algorithms, in the specification. See id. § 112(f); Lemley, supra note 26, at 907–08. I do 
not propose to change this aspect of patent law. 
 378 It is important to note that this language would not completely eliminate the utility, written 
description, and patentable subject matter requirements. The utility requirement would still bar 
patents on inventions lacking in operable or credible utility. See infra note 143. The written de-
scription requirement would continue to play the so-called “priority-policing” function. See infra 
note 186. And the patentable subject matter requirement would still bar patents on pure laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas—though this issue can present difficult line-
drawing problems. See infra notes 447–452 and accompanying text (discussing some difficulties 
with this approach); see also supra notes 246–248 (discussing courts’ struggles with defining 
standards for determining what claims are directed to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas). The proposed approach deals with some of these challenges by eliminating the 
“inventive application” and “markedly different” tests and, more importantly, by reducing the 
pressure on the patentable subject matter doctrine to do the work of trying to eliminate large num-
bers of unduly preemptive patents. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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The purpose of this statutory structure is to help replace current ap-
proaches to completeness with a unified solution to the problem of undue 
preemption of downstream research. It is of course possible that, in the 
course of implementing the new completeness requirement, courts might 
revert to some of the discarded tests as they attempt to determine what qual-
ifies as a foundational research input. Furthermore, the proposed require-
ment leaves room for technology-specific standards developed by the cases, 
which may be appropriate in some scenarios. Nonetheless, the new statutory 
sections, along with the generality/unpredictability framework suggested for 
their implementation, would lead to fresh approaches. In addition, with the 
completeness requirement having been unified under a single statutory pro-
vision, precedent would apply to all types of upstream patents. As a result, a 
more coherent body of law governing these sorts of patent claims would 
likely develop. 
V. THE RESEARCH PATENT PROPOSAL 
This Part explores the possibility of awarding a limited patent right to 
certain upstream inventions. Section A challenges the assumption underlying 
Part IV: that artifacts of basic research should be unpatentable.379 It also 
weighs the competing policies of preventing undue preemption of down-
stream innovation and incentivizing basic research. Next, Section B examines 
prior proposals for limiting patent rights in upstream inventions.380 Finally, 
Section C proposes a limited bundle of rights for patents that pass the extant 
requirements of patentability, but fail completeness.381 This suggestion stems 
from the intuition that if owners of certain upstream patents wield an undue 
degree of preemption, then the logical solution appears to be to weaken the 
available remedy until the patentee receives some smaller amount of preemp-
tion. 
A. Do Limited Rights for Incomplete Patents Make Sense? 
The undue preemption concern arises for many reasons. First, as dis-
cussed extensively in the Article, upstream patents might chill downstream 
innovation.382 Second, non-patent mechanisms may incentivize creation and 
commercialization of upstream inventions.383 These mechanisms include 
                                                                                                                           
 379 See infra notes 382–400 and accompanying text. 
 380 See infra notes 402–417 and accompanying text. 
 381 See infra notes 418–460 and accompanying text. 
 382 See supra notes 96–116 and accompanying text. 
 383 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Non-Patent Innovation Incen-
tives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2499204, 
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professional advancement and reputational gains, governmental and non-
governmental support for basic research in the form of grants, tax incen-
tives, regulatory exclusivities, and others.384 Yet it is difficult to make the 
case that the right amount of intellectual property protection for such inven-
tions is zero.385 And even though narrower patent claims can provide ade-
quate patent protection for some inventions,386 there are circumstances 
where such claims would not be of much value.387 
Given the concern with granting full patent rights to upstream inven-
tions, another logical alternative is a limited right in such inventions. None-
theless, for a given patent claim, the PTO (or a court) can either allow a full 
patent right or entirely reject (or invalidate) the claim; there is no middle 
ground under the current regime.388 The absence of ex ante mechanisms for 
modulating remedies for successful enforcement of patents generates uni-
                                                                                                                           
archived at http://perma.cc/MCP3-848U. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouel-
lette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (evaluating the use of non-
patent-based mechanisms, such as prizes, government grants, and tax incentives, to facilitate the 
production of new knowledge). 
 384 See Ouellette, supra note 383.  
 385 Cf. Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 
RAND J. ECON. 34, 48 (1995) (arguing for patent protection of an invention that may be “a tech-
nological breakthrough in that it generates great spillovers in the form of improvements likely to 
be far more valuable than the basic invention itself”); Devlin, supra note 19, at 1718 (“Given that 
vast rates of intellectual and pecuniary capital may be required to successfully discover rules of 
nature that bear great potential value for society, the utilitarian case for patent protection would 
appear to be strong.”). 
 386 In particular, the so-called means-plus-function claim format can provide a route for nar-
rowing some of the broader functionally drafted claims. See supra notes 28, 377 and accompany-
ing text. In other cases, method-of-use or apparatus claims might provide appropriately narrow 
claim formats. 
 387 Indeed, narrow claims often have little commercial value, and do not allow the inventor to 
capture any significant monetary reward from a path-breaking contribution. See, e.g., Mueller, 
supra note 35, at 651 (arguing that the rule prohibiting research-plan patents “reduces incentives 
to invest in innovation by depriving potential patentees of the opportunity to fully benefit from 
their research”); Plimier, supra note 74, at 161 (“The written description requirement only allows 
very narrow patents, so narrow and easily dodged as to be almost worthless.”); cf. Rai, supra note 
21, at 141 (“[F]or some research tools—laboratory machines, analytical and purification methods, 
certain types of genetically engineered mice—the costs of invention may be fairly high. Equally 
important, because these research tools will, in many circumstances, be licensed not for further 
improvement but for the comparatively straightforward purpose of direct use, the transaction and 
creativity costs associated with licensing will be relatively low. Where transaction and creativity 
costs are low relative to invention costs, patent protection is probably desirable.” (citation omit-
ted)); Benjamin N. Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses (Sept. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/assets/publications/Roin_Solving_the_Problem_of_
New_Uses.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XE47-B5UT (describing a particular type of patenta-
ble but often effectively valueless claim). 
 388 To be sure, patent law does permit tailoring of rights during patent prosecution by allow-
ing the inventor to vary the scope of patent claims. For a discussion of the option of narrowing 
claim scope, see supra note 386. 
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formity costs and is thus one of the patent system’s imperfections.389 A lim-
ited right would help reduce these costs. Thus, although full patents on up-
stream inventions can be socially harmful, some form of patent incentive—
one that is less threatening to downstream research—might be appropriate 
for inducing their creation and commercialization.390 
The proposition that some sort of a patent right is necessary to incen-
tivize basic research is reasonable. For example, the absence of patent pro-
tection for upstream inventions in certain fields, such as biotechnology, is 
inconsistent with the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act, which Congress enacted 
to incentivize the technology transfer and commercialization of university 
inventions through patenting.391 One of the arguments advanced in favor of 
Bayh-Dole was that, even if university researchers’ need to publish and 
drive for prestige would induce the creation of upstream inventions in the 
absence of patent protection, firms would be uninterested in commercializ-
ing these inventions without patent coverage.392 The Bayh-Dole regime has 
not, of course, escaped criticism.393 But the theory underlying this law 
makes some sense for commercialization of upstream inventions in the bio-
                                                                                                                           
 389 See Carroll, supra note 51, at 871–74; cf. LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 
145–51 (2011) (contrasting all-or-nothing results in law with intermediate or “continuized” re-
sults). 
 390 See supra note 385 and accompanying text; cf. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 395–411 (2010) (discussing the role of patents in promoting commerciali-
zation and proposing a new “commercialization” patent to incentivize the manufacture and com-
mercial distribution of embodiments of inventions). 
 391 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2012); see also id. § 200 (“It is the policy and objective of the 
Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
supported research or development . . . [and] to promote collaboration between commercial con-
cerns and . . . universities . . . .”). The Federal Circuit in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & 
Co. rejected the argument that patent protection for basic research incentivizes research at univer-
sities on the basis that the policy of bringing pioneering innovations to the public does not trump 
the statutory requirements. See 358 F.3d 916, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2004). But the court’s reasoning is 
questionable because the Federal Circuit’s modern written description requirement itself appears 
to be an expression of public policy. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (stating that basic research cannot be patented without identifying 
a clear source of law for this proposition); infra notes 160–164, 238–242 and accompanying text 
(explaining the Federal Circuit’s policy against the patenting of research inputs and other up-
stream inventions). 
 392 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Comment, Addressing the Green Patent Global Deadlock 
Through Bayh-Dole Reform, 119 YALE L.J. 1727, 1731 (2010) (“Patents are not needed to moti-
vate university researchers to innovate; instead, the justification for Bayh-Dole patents is that they 
provide the incentive to commercialize.”). 
 393 See, e.g., DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNI-
VERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 183–84 (Martin Kenney & Bruce Kogut eds., 2004) (calling into question claims 
that the Bayh-Dole Act substantially increased the contributions of university research to the 
economy in the 1990s). 
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technology industry394—the very sorts of inventions that often fall victim to 
the completeness requirement. Finally, concerns that drive early patent fil-
ings are not limited to technologies invented in universities. The certainty a 
patent right provides is also a draw for commercial researchers who would 
like to enter into licensing agreements and otherwise disclose their inven-
tions to potential partners.395 
Relatedly, a limited patent right would serve as a mechanism for induc-
ing disclosure of widely applicable inventions, which would be particularly 
valuable in settings where other such mechanisms, like the publication of 
scientific articles, are not present. Indeed, one justification for allowing up-
stream patents is that they “speed[] up disclosure with consequent facilita-
tion of research.”396 Adherents of this view argue that patents on inventions 
early in the development chain would encourage scientists to “invent and 
disseminate new processes and products [that] may be vital to progress” and 
aid in “achieving and publicizing basic research.”397 Although patents may 
not always be widely read,398 the patenting might still facilitate so-called 
                                                                                                                           
 394 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 611, 622–23 (2008) (“[V]alidity of commercialization theory depends a great deal on 
the industry in question and the particular nature of the technology. In the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries, where coming up with an invention is only the first step down a very 
long road of regulatory process that can take hundreds of millions of dollars and several years, the 
commercialization argument makes some sense. . . . We give the right to the university, but we do 
so expecting that they will transfer or exclusively license that right to a private company that will 
recoup the hundreds of millions of dollars they spend in clinical trials, product development, and 
marketing. . . . In these industries, Bayh-Dole is probably a good thing.” (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 395 See Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 27 (2012) (“Govern-
ment or academy-funded researchers may traditionally have been willing to publish their inven-
tions even in the absence of patents, but industry-funded researchers may be less willing or unable 
to do so without that security.”). But cf. Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without 
Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 274–82 (2012) (arguing that intellectual property 
rights are not always necessary for facilitating the exchange of information). 
 396 See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting). 
 397 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 539 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Several scholars have argued that patents fail at their teaching function. See, e.g., 
Holbrook, supra note 35, at 136–46 (“The patent system has a number of structural flaws that 
inhibit the ability of a patent to perform its teaching function.”); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching 
Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 641–46 (2010) (proposing reforms to improve 
the teaching function of patents). But patents can more readily aid in disseminating information by 
facilitating other disclosures, such as academic publications and sales of products embodying 
patented inventions. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 561–65 (2012) (concluding that many researchers use patents as a source 
of technical information); Rantanen, supra note 395, at 21–37 (providing examples of disclosures 
that would not occur in the absence of a patent system). 
 398 See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22 (explaining 
that patent lawyers often advise their clients not to read patents when they begin their research 
process). 
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“peripheral” disclosures, such as communications of the underlying inven-
tions to potential investors.399 In addition, if the completeness test incorpo-
rates information-forcing mechanisms that would induce patentees to in-
form the public about the applicability of the underlying invention and sug-
gest approaches to designing around the claims, the disclosures supporting 
upstream patent claims might become quite socially valuable.400 
B. Prior Proposals for Limited Rights in Upstream Inventions 
1. Ex Post Approaches 
The intuition that upstream patents should be allowed—but cabined in 
some form—might explain proposals for ex post limitations on rights that 
are triggered at the point of enforcement of these patents.401 One solution 
preserves the validity of upstream patents but provides for a revival of a 
personal “experimental use” exemption to patent infringement.402 This ap-
proach would shield the accused infringer from liability when the claimed 
invention is used for certain kinds of research purposes.403 Conceptually 
                                                                                                                           
 399 See Rantanen, supra note 395, at 16–21 (setting forth the peripheral disclosure theory); cf. 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE 
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (1962) (“In 
the absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot . . . sell information on the open market. 
Any one purchaser can destroy the monopoly, since he can reproduce the information at little or 
no cost. Thus the only effective monopoly would be the use of the information by the original 
possessor. This, however, will not only be socially inefficient, but also may not be of much use to 
the owner of the information either, since he may not be able to exploit it as effectively as oth-
ers.”); supra note 395 and accompanying text (explaining that patents facilitate the licensing of 
inventions). 
 400 See supra notes 286–288 and accompanying text. 
 401 For a general discussion of this issue, see generally Maureen E. Boyle, Leaving Room for 
Research: The Historical Treatment of the Common Law Research Exemption in Congress and 
the Courts, and Its Relationship to Biotech Law and Policy, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH. 269 (2010). 
 402 The experimental use exemption is practically defunct. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 
F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is 
engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged 
infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for 
strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited ex-
perimental use defense.”). But see 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012) (providing a form of experimental 
use defense under narrow circumstances). 
 403 See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 63, at 36–37; Strandburg, supra note 62, at 96–100. In addi-
tion, Katherine Strandburg suggests that there is a distinction between an accused infringer’s “ex-
perimenting on” a research tool invention (i.e., figuring out how the invention works) and “exper-
imenting with” it (i.e., using a research tool invention for further inventive development). See 
Strandburg, supra note 62, at 100–46. Strandburg argues that “experimenting on” should be ex-
empt from infringement, and proposes a specialized scheme for “experimenting with” research 
tool patents. See id. at 119–21, 142–46. Strandburg’s proposal entails several years of complete 
exclusivity for the research tool patent, followed by a period of compulsory licensing for the re-
mainder of the patent term. See id. at 142–46. 
1018 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:949 
related to the experimental use exemption are proposals that entail expand-
ing the reverse doctrine of equivalents, which shields “radical improve-
ments” of the patented technology from infringement liability,404 and the 
doctrine of patent misuse, which could be deployed to render patents unen-
forceable when the patent owner attempts to extract “reach-through” royal-
ties.405 Generalizing from these proposals, one scholar argues that contextu-
al infringement determinations based on a flexible, multifactor test inspired 
by the statutory fair use factors in copyright law can account for implica-
tions of technological unpredictability—such as uncertain value and ap-
plicability of upstream inventions.406 And there is yet another existing “ex 
post policy lever” for curtailing patent rights that is available in patent law: 
courts’ flexibility to award damages rather than injunctions based on wheth-
er the patent owner itself uses the technology and on the nature of the 
downstream use of the patent.407 
The difficulty with ex post approaches, however, is that the rights of 
the parties might not be clearly established until after litigation concludes.408 
                                                                                                                           
 404 See Koneru, supra note 203, at 663–65 (explaining that the reverse doctrine of equivalents 
can “confine the scope of ESTs claimed so that other ESTs to be discovered . . . can remain pa-
tentable”); Lemley, supra note 290, at 1010–13 (“Where the value of the improvement greatly 
exceeds the value of the original invention, application of the reverse doctrine of equivalents 
seems most likely.”); Merges & Nelson, Patent Scope, supra note 99, at 865–68 (“The reverse 
doctrine of equivalents solves the [holdup] problem by, in effect, excusing the improver from 
infringement liability . . . .”); see also Chisum, supra note 46, at 24–28 (discussing deploying the 
doctrine of equivalents, the reverse doctrine of equivalents, and claim construction to limit the 
reach of some upstream patents). See generally Merges, supra note 222 (arguing that courts 
should expand the role of the reverse doctrine of equivalents). Although academic literature often 
discusses the reverse doctrine of equivalents in the context of “mutually blocking” patents, the 
application of the doctrine is theoretically not limited to those circumstances. See supra notes 
213–223 and accompanying text. 
 405 See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, 469 (D. Del. 2002) (“Patent 
misuse is an equitable defense to a charge of patent infringement. The basic allegation is that the 
patentee has ‘extend[ed] the economic benefit beyond the scope of the patent grant.’” (quoting 
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Feldman, supra note 
111, at 439–49 (criticizing courts for applying antitrust rules to test for patent misuse and propos-
ing changes to the doctrine). 
 406 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265, 292–304 
(2011). See generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (proposing a fair use defense to patent infringement). 
 407 See Strandburg, supra note 406, at 277–78 (“[L]ower courts have relied on the [eBay] case 
to provide leeway to take account of the effects that patent injunctions can have on complex, inter-
related technologies, particularly in dealing with nonpracticing entities.”); see also eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (reasoning that “the decision whether to 
grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts”). For a 
recent proposal for tailoring damages based on patent disclosures, see Bernard Chao, The In-
fringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1404–12 (2014). 
 408 Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 99 (2004) (“The fuzzy lines of the 
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And the costs of figuring out ex post whether the accused infringer should 
be shielded by a personal defense, whether the patentee is entitled to an in-
junction, and what the amount of damages should be can be very high.409 
Indeed, expenses associated with patent litigation can distort patent val-
ue.410 Although the parties can settle or choose arbitration,411 the very threat 
of a patent lawsuit creates opportunities for holdup, and this affects the val-
ue of settlements and the decision whether or not to go to arbitration. Added 
to the mix is the unpredictability of juries, which makes the ex post ap-
proach even more unattractive.412 And in general, as argued by one com-
                                                                                                                           
law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means that the effective fair use for 
many types of creators is slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.”); id. 
(discussing the ineffectiveness of the copyright fair use doctrine in protecting downstream users). 
For an illustration of the difficulties encountered in applying the narrow statutory experimental 
use provision in patent law under § 271(e)(1), compare Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen 
IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding no statutory experimental use), with Mo-
menta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding 
statutory experimental use under factually similar circumstances). 
 409 Cf., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 387, 388, 404–05 (2014) (reporting the significant costs associated with patent liti-
gation initiated by nonpracticing entities); Colleen V. Chien & Michael J. Guo, Does the US Pa-
tent System Need a Patent Small Claims Proceeding? (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, Working 
Paper No. 10-13, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249896, archived at http://perma.
cc/ZX3Q-UL6N (explaining that rising patent litigation costs have made it increasingly difficult 
for small companies to bring meritorious defenses). But see Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform 
and Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2568443, archived at http://perma.cc/MVP5-XF78?type=live (proposing reforms that 
could make patent litigation less expensive).  
 410 See Judge T.S. Ellis, III, Distortion of Patent Economics by Litigation Costs, Presentation 
at the 1999 CASRIP Summit Conference, in 5 CASRIP SYMP. PUB. SER.: STREAMLINING INTL’L 
INTELL. PROP. 22, 23 (2000) (“[B]urgeoning litigation costs have distorted patent markets by sig-
nificantly discouraging potential patent challenges, hence distorting competition to a degree be-
yond that justified by the intrinsic strength or merit of the patent.”); see also J. Jonas Anderson, 
Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 952 (2011) (explaining that patent litigation 
“costs upwards of $15 billion per year to patentees and accused infringers”). Although patent 
validity can, with some restrictions, also be adjudicated under various forms of post-grant review 
in the PTO, this forum is not available for determining infringement liability and remedies. Cf. 
Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1448 (2014) 
(describing the limited scope of inter partes review). 
 411 See 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2012). 
 412 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 161–62 (2011), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2011/
03/110307patentreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4LUE-ALCB; cf. LESSIG, supra note 408, 
at 98–99 (citing unpredictability of the doctrine and potential exposure to a large amount of dam-
ages as reasons why filmmakers rarely rely on fair use defenses). But see Michael J. Mazzeo et al., 
Explaining the “Unpredictable”: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Patent Infringement Awards, 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON., Aug. 2013, at 58, 69 (concluding that “observable factors explain[] a 
large portion of the variation in actual patent infringement awards” and rejecting arguments that 
damages are unpredictable); cf. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power 
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive 
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mentator, “[i]ndeterminate ex post interference in proprietary rights by 
courts tends to inject further uncertainty into an already flawed system, to 
undermine efficient contractual exchange, and to endanger ex ante techno-
logical research.”413 In contrast, the proposed framework largely avoids the 
ex post determination of patent value of certain types of patents during liti-
gation.414 
2. Sui Generis Approaches 
A few other approaches to limiting upstream inventions are worth not-
ing. In particular, some commentators have proposed to deal with uniformi-
ty costs generated by the all-or-nothing nature of the patent right by propos-
ing sui generis intellectual property protection regimes for particular subject 
matter. Some have suggested a shortened term for patents on upstream in-
ventions in fields ranging from biotechnology to software,415 while others 
have advocated compulsory licensing for patents on certain types of tech-
nology416 and proposed other limits on remedies for successful enforcement 
                                                                                                                           
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 994–1013 (1999) (arguing that uncertainty in the type of remedy 
for patent infringement may be socially beneficial). 
 413 Alan Devlin, Restricting Experimental Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 599, 635 (2009); 
see Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, in PERSPECTIVES 
ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 153, 168–79 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (high-
lighting problems with forced transfers of patent rights, such as compulsory licenses); see also 
Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 97, at 225 (“[T]he case for allowing the [experimental 
use] defense appears weakest where the research user is essentially consuming a patented inven-
tion in an unrelated research effort—for example, by using a patented laboratory machine. To 
allow such a user to avoid infringement liability on the ground that the machine was used in re-
search would eviscerate patent protection for technologies used primarily in research laborato-
ries.”); Rai, supra note 21, at 140–41. 
 414 Cf. J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatenta-
ble Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1746 (2000) (proposing a “regime built on compensatory 
liability principles [that] could stimulate investment without chilling follow-on innovation”); J.H. 
Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself: Informal Remarks Concerning the Systemic Prob-
lems Afflicting Developed Intellectual Property Regimes, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF 
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 413, at 289, 289–303 (advocating liability rules for 
protecting certain classes of “subpatentable” innovations). 
 415 See Julian David Forman, A Timing Perspective on the Utility Requirement in Biotechnol-
ogy Patent Applications, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 647, 681–82 (2002) (proposing a shortened 
patent term for ESTs); Holman & Munzer, supra note 98, at 810–21 (proposing a shortened patent 
term and registration system for ESTs); cf. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copy-
right, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 546 n.194 (2004) (listing proposals for sui generis forms of intellectual 
property protection for software). For an approach to software patent scope that can, in principle, 
be implemented under existing law, see Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and 
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 37–56 (2001). 
 416 See Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the 
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use 
Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 2678–90 (2001) (proposing a system of compulsory licens-
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of certain types of patents.417 Implicitly or explicitly, these proposals appear 
to respond to the concern that the completeness requirement in its current 
form may not be entirely effective at balancing the considerations in the 
debate over the patenting of upstream inventions. These proposals are im-
portant, but they tend by their nature to be technology-specific and limited 
in scope. My goal here is to sketch out a more comprehensive alternative. 
C. Toward a Research Patent Right 
1. Features of the Research Patent 
This Section provides suggestions for the structure of a partial patent 
right to protect inventions that satisfy the current requirements of patenta-
bility, but fail to comply with the proposed form of the completeness re-
quirement.418 As one scholar explained: 
If one considers patent protection to be excessively generous in 
over-incentivizing ex ante innovation and imposing costly imped-
iments to follow-on innovation, then the superior solution [to ex 
post limitations on patent rights] is to reduce the scope and dura-
tion of that protection ex ante through legislative fiat.419 
The Research Patent (“RP”) proposal adopts a form of this ap-
proach.420 Assuming that limited patent protection for upstream, basic-
research inventions is justified, the proposed completeness requirement 
could provide a vehicle for a comprehensive ex ante approach toward set-
ting forth patent rights for such inventions. Rather than invalidate claims to 
these inventions, the PTO would grant a limited patent right in the form of 
                                                                                                                           
ing for patents on DNA sequences); Lopez-Beverage, supra note 109, at 90–91 (proposing a sys-
tem of compulsory licensing for patents on ESTs). 
 417 See Cara Koss, Note, Oysters & Oligonucleotides: Concerns and Proposals for Patenting 
Research Tools, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 747, 767–72 (2007) (proposing various sui generis 
solutions for patenting research tools); see also J.H. Reichman, A Compensatory Liability Regime to 
Promote the Exchange of Microbial Genetic Resources for Research and Benefit Sharing, in DE-
SIGNING THE MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS: PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 
43, 45–48 (Paul F. Uhlir ed., 2011) (proposing various sui generis solutions for patenting microbial 
materials and other research inputs); Michael J. Stimson, Damages for Infringement of Research Tool 
Patents: The Reasonableness of Reach Through Royalties, 2003 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, at ¶¶ 23–53, 
available at https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-review/online/
stimson-damages-for-infringement.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/75E7-2UNR (proposing an 
approach to damages for infringement of research tool patents within the statutory reasonable royalty 
framework). 
 418 See infra notes 419–460 and accompanying text. 
 419 Devlin, supra note 413, at 634–35. 
 420 The shortened patent term suggestion would be unsuitable here because the holdup prob-
lem would remain. See supra notes 409–414 and accompanying text. 
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an RP to any patent claim that meets the extant requirements of patentabil-
ity, but fails the completeness requirement. 
The key features of the RP right would be liability-rule protection and 
enforcement in a specialized tribunal, such as a patent small claims court.421 
Liability-rule protection of upstream patents makes sense because full rights 
in such patents appear to be associated with a high rate of market failure.422 
Because of their uncertain valuation, negotiations over upstream, basic-
research patents are thought to impose high transaction costs—a classic jus-
tification for a liability-rule regime.423 
One potential feature of the proposed system is a cap on past and fu-
ture damages associated with an RP patent portfolio asserted against a given 
accused infringer.424 Damages caps are a familiar feature of tort reform ef-
forts; for example, a number of states instituted caps on compensation for 
pain and suffering damages (and sometimes even economic losses) due to 
medical malpractice.425 Because legislatures already cap damages for phys-
                                                                                                                           
 421 Thus, the RP is distinguishable from so-called “petty” or utility-model patents in foreign 
jurisdictions, which are easier to obtain but generally have shorter terms than regular patents. 
These patents are enforceable in the same tribunals (i.e., regular courts) where parties enforce 
normal utility patents. Cf. Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151, 
218 (1999) (“[C]urrent property rights regimes are not the answer for protecting subpatentable 
innovation.”). 
 422 See FELDMAN, supra note 93, at 126 (explaining that upstream patents may cause bargain-
ing problems that “can affect the development of other inventions”); see also Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: A Counter-Proposal to Richard 
Epstein’s Steady Course, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, 
supra note 413, at 195, 200 (“[A]s long as patenting continues to move upstream, it behooves us 
to consider interventions, such as the compulsory licensing patents of social significance, to re-
duce the costs associated with blocked innovation markets.”); Liivak, supra note 110, at 1372 
(explaining that research plans and abstract ideas “are too hard to price because it is too difficult to 
later separate out the relative contributions that produced the actual invention”). See generally Ben 
Depoorter, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Patent Market Failure, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 59, 59 
(2008) (arguing that liability rules can help correct patent market failures). 
 423 See Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 270 (2009); see also 
Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 783, 793–97 (2007) (identifying the holdup and scope concerns that justify the use of 
a liability rule). 
 424 This approach, of course, does not eliminate attorney’s fees and costs of filing the suit in 
the small claims court. But because the stakes are lower and the procedure is more streamlined, 
these costs would probably be much lower that the costs of litigating a regular patent in district 
courts. 
 425 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2014) (limiting noneconomic damages from 
medical malpractice to $250,000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2014) (limiting noneconomic 
damages from medical malpractice to $300,000). Colorado also has an “umbrella” cap of 
$1,000,000 on the total amount of compensation that a medical malpractice plaintiff can receive in 
a tort suit. Id. § 13-64-302(b). For a summary, analysis, and criticism of malpractice cap statutes, 
see generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages 
Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005). 
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ical injury, damages caps or scheduled damages for patent infringement also 
appear to be reasonable,426 and would likely mitigate holdup problems 
stemming from unpredictable jury verdicts.427 The fact that most private 
arrangements such as patent pools have not succeeded for many of the up-
stream patent types discussed in this Article underscores the potential value 
of a government-mandated liability-rule solution.428 
In addition to damages caps, a specialized tribunal would be needed to 
reduce the threat of holdup associated with the costs of patent litigation in 
federal district courts.429 One possibility is a specialized patent small claims 
court.430 Supporters of recent proposals to reform the Patent Act by adding 
small claims proceedings maintain that this kind of a tribunal could help re-
duce the incidence of lawsuits intended to extract nuisance-value settle-
ments.431 Critics of this aspect of patent litigation reform argue that small 
claims court proceedings could dilute patent rights, and that requiring liti-
gants to make use of these tribunals would violate their Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial.432 In contrast, if a statute specifically provides for a liabil-
ity rule regime that applies only to a specific set of patents at the time of their 
issuance, the first concern is diminished and the second is not present. 
In keeping with the goal of facilitating low-cost resolutions of disputes 
over RPs, the tribunal would evaluate only ordinary infringement and limit 
                                                                                                                           
 426 Cf. Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753, 774–81 (2012) 
(arguing that scheduled damages reduce administrative costs and foster greater faith in the legal 
system by preventing major variations in damages that the public may perceive to be due to jury 
biases regarding the entity involved in litigation, variations among venues, and other factors that 
open the legal system to manipulation). On scheduled damages for physical injury, see generally 
Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 
NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989). 
 427 Cf. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 298, at 1156, 1165–66 (proposing a royalty arbitration 
system to avoid the holdup problem associated with unpredictable damages awards). 
 428 See Scott Iyama, Comment, The USPTO’s Proposal of a Biological Research Tool Patent 
Doesn’t Hold Water, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1223, 1230–35 (2005) (arguing that patent pools cannot 
solve the problem of research tool patent thickets); Bradley J. Levang, Comment, Evaluating the 
Use of Patent Pools for Biotechnology: A Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning Bio-
technology Patent Pools, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 229, 249–50 (2002) 
(explaining that difficulties associated with the valuation of biotechnology patents can hinder a 
patent pool’s formation). In contrast, parties have formed patent pools and made related private 
arrangements, such as standard-setting organizations, in order to reduce holdup problems with 
standard-essential patents in fields such as telecommunications. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 
298, at 1136. 
 429 See supra notes 409–414 and accompanying text (describing the holdup problem). 
 430 The PTO has issued a request for comments on a patent small claims court. See Request 
for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,830, 
74,830–31 (Dec. 18, 2012). 
 431 See Chien & Guo, supra note 409. 
 432 See, e.g., Robert P. Greenspoon, Is the United States Finally Ready for a Patent Small 
Claims Court?, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 549, 554–57 (2009). 
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invalidity theories to those based on patents and printed publications.433 
This approach avoids costly, discovery-intensive subjects like inequitable 
conduct and willfulness,434 as well as non-prior-art invalidity.435 Reflecting 
the limited nature of the RP right, the specialized tribunal would not allow 
claims for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,436 which might 
also add significant costs to resolution of RP disputes.437 
2. Challenges of the Approach 
The tentative RP proposal described herein is open to numerous objec-
tions.438 One potential challenge is that the RP game is not worth the can-
dle—that the “coarse-grained filter” solution of invalidating all incomplete 
patents is more effective from the utilitarian perspective.439 Two possible 
difficulties associated with the RP right include determining the damages 
cap (or the amount of scheduled damages to be awarded) and drawing the 
line between inventions that would remain completely unpatentable and 
those that should be the subject of an RP. I briefly address these objections 
in the remainder of this Section.440 
Because each patent—and each patent infringement case—is unique, 
scheduled damages will seldom reflect the actual value of a patent in a par-
ticular case. Differences in value among patents on various technologies, 
and the degree to which infringers use the technologies, are just two exam-
ples of why scheduled damages are likely to be inaccurate. Nonetheless, the 
scheduling approach has the advantage of sidestepping the notoriously dif-
                                                                                                                           
 433 Moreover, to encourage the limited validity challenges, tribunals would not allow claim 
amendments. 
 434 See Letter from Michael Risch, Professor, Villanova Law Sch., to the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (Mar. 9, 2013), (available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/patents/comments/
comments_to_us_pto_re_patent_small_claims.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/87BB-XLU8?type
=pdf). 
 435 Notably, patent validity challenges not based on patents or printed publications are already 
disallowed in inter partes review of issued patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
 436 Cf. generally Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (con-
firming the existence of the doctrine of equivalents, but placing limits on this doctrine). 
 437 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) (“It 
may be difficult to determine what is, or is not, an equivalent to a particular element of an inven-
tion.”). 
 438 The RP proposal will be worked out further, and objections examined in greater detail, in a 
separate article. Besides the objections discussed here, litigants may challenge such a system on 
constitutional grounds. Cf. Liivak, supra note 73, at 26–28 (arguing that there is a constitutional 
basis for prohibiting patents on objects of basic research). But see generally Schwartz & Treanor, 
supra note 193 (arguing that constitutional arguments are unlikely to prevail in the intellectual 
property arena).  
 439 Cf. Golden, supra note 247, at 1058–74. 
 440 See infra notes 441–460 and accompanying text. 
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ficult problem of litigation-forced valuation of patents by courts, which 
have often questioned their own competence to gauge patent damages.441 
In addition, at least the extent of infringement might be taken into ac-
count in some way under the scheduling approach.442 For example, damages 
owed for a successful claim of infringement of an RP might be limited to 
some amount X for a “micro entity” infringer, amount 2X for a “small entity,” 
and 4X for a “large entity.” Within these categories, the small claims adjudi-
cator might be allowed to further adjust the amount of the award based on 
whether the infringer’s use of the claimed invention is “maximum,” “medi-
um,” or “small” according to some preset schedule.443 
Moreover, capping or scheduling approaches shift the focus from 
measuring the damages for infringement by some specific defendant to re-
warding the RP owner for how broadly others use the technology. And it is 
                                                                                                                           
 441 See, e.g., Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(measuring patent damages requires “more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge”). The 
valuation problem is one of the common objections to ex post compulsory licensing of issued 
patents. See Epstein, supra note 413, at 169–71; Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Proper-
ty: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1775 (2007) (“Compulsory 
licenses . . . require courts or other officials to engage in costly and context-dependent evalua-
tion.”).  
 442 Relatedly, RP suits would follow the rules of res judicata—that is, all the available claims 
should be brought at once. Moreover, the plaintiff would be able to recover only once from a giv-
en user for a particular portfolio (i.e., a group of patents that are part of the same patent family or 
are directed to closely similar technologies). 
 443 The overall approach resembles the determination of copyright royalties for song covers, 
but with more rigid “scheduling” awards. Cf. Sandra Schmieder, Scope of Biotechnology Inven-
tions in the United States and in Europe—Compulsory Licensing, Experimental Use and Arbitra-
tion: A Study of Patentability of DNA-Related Inventions with Special Emphasis on the Establish-
ment of an Arbitration Based Compulsory Licensing System, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 163, 226–27 (2004) (discussing the Copyright Royalty Board). Indeed, if the 
scheduling approach proves unsatisfactory, the small claims court could be empowered to set the 
royalty for each particular invention, as is done for covers of copyrighted songs. As the experience 
with copyright royalty panels has shown, this system has generally functioned well and has even 
promoted private negotiation. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Breaking Patents, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 461, 
498–99 (2011) (“The system has been widely criticized as unwieldy and argued to be an inappro-
priate conversion of a property regime to a liability-focused one. But there are some positive les-
sons to be learned. First, the system ensures that the rights are available for use without the prob-
lem of holdouts. Further, the existence of a defined licensing fee has enabled private negotiation to 
exist concurrently. The U.S. copyright office, in consultation with interested parties, determines 
the fee. It is actually a functional system in many respects.” (citations omitted)). For a recent criti-
cism of this regime, see Aloe Blacc, Irina D. Manta & David S. Olson, Music Streaming Demands 
New Wave of Licensing Rules, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 3, 2015), available at http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-jay-z-pandora-songwriters-compensation-copyright-justice-perspec-
0402-20150403-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GH9Y-M4V6. Whatever one thinks of the 
Copyright Royalty Board and the underlying licensing scheme, the market failure problem with 
upstream patents is probably more acute than that with cover songs. See supra notes 422–428 and 
accompanying text. Also, patents will likely present greater valuation difficulties, which may 
support the sensibility of the capped (or scheduled) damages approach. 
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easier to quantify the number of infringers than the value of any particular 
infringement.444 Indeed, the relatively small amount of recoverable damages 
from any individual infringer would encourage the RP owner to search out 
as many downstream users as possible to obtain adequate compensation.445 
This approach results in the spreading of liability as opposed to a focus on a 
few infringers with “deep pockets” in an effort to obtain a large amount of 
damages or an injunction, which is a strategy that is sometimes pursued 
with regular utility patents.446 Thus, if the subject matter of the RP is broad-
ly applicable, RP owners may recoup their research and development costs 
in spite of relatively low capped or scheduled damages. Finally, although 
investigating potential infringers before bringing an RP claim can be costly, 
the RP owner can likely obtain economies of scale for its pre-claim investi-
gations after identifying the first few suspected downstream infringers and 
proving that they infringed. 
Line-drawing between completely unpatentable inventions and those 
that qualify for an RP also presents difficult questions. As an initial matter, 
Section 101 limits patentable subject matter categories to “any new and use-
ful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof.”447 Thus, claims directed to subject matter 
outside of these prohibited categories would not be entitled even to an RP. 
In addition, even if a claim nominally fits into an allowable statutory cate-
gory, long-standing precedent prohibits patents that are manifestly directed 
to448 abstract ideas, natural laws, formulae, or natural phenomena.449 But it 
                                                                                                                           
 444 To ensure that users of RPs do not game the system, this approach would prohibit subli-
censing of the right to use the RP subject matter by the infringer to another party. 
 445 Indeed, “[i]f you create enough certainty in the commercial and regulatory landscape, a 
private market will fill in the spaces unless impeded by some other barrier.” Cahoy, supra note 
443, at 506; see Dreyfuss, supra note 422, at 202 (“Knowing that arrangements will be imposed if 
they do not act voluntarily, patentees are pushed to the bargaining table.”). See generally Mark A. 
Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463 (2012) (explaining that, like 
property rules, liability rules also induce private bargaining in some circumstances). 
 446 For one example, see Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd, No. 09–290, 
2014 WL 1320154, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014) (verdict of $1,169,140,271.00), appeal dock-
eted, No. 2014-1492 (Fed. Cir. May 20, 2014). To be sure, this is not always the patent owner’s 
strategy; some choose to go after numerous smaller targets and collect settlements. Nevertheless, a 
sophisticated patent owner with substantial resources for litigation will likely choose a target with 
deep pockets. 
 447 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 448 Claims that are directed to these artifacts are distinct from claims that are “inventive appli-
cation[s]” of, or “markedly different” from, such artifacts—the tests elaborated in recent cases 
expanding the scope of the patentable subjectable matter exclusions. See supra notes 250–251 and 
accompanying text. 
 449 An example of a claim that would fall into one of these categories is a method of calculat-
ing energy from mass—the hypothetical claim to “a method of multiplying mass by the square of 
the speed of light.” Cf. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978) (“[I]f a claim is directed essen-
 
2015] The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law 1027 
would be difficult to decide whether a claim falls within this prohibition and 
should thus be excluded from patentability completely, or whether the claim 
is sufficiently limited so that it should qualify for an RP. To answer this 
question, a decisionmaker would have to identify claims to “relatively 
‘pure’ abstract ideas, natural laws, and natural phenomena”450—claims that 
simply state a fundamental discovery and do not purport to apply it outside 
the realm of basic science—and differentiate them from claims that come 
close to appropriating such subject matter but are not actually directed to 
any excluded category. Although this distinction can be very challenging to 
make,451 scholars have suggested approaches to identifying “embryonic” in-
ventions that might be distinguishable from pure ideas and laws of nature.452 
Perhaps, one way that embryonic inventions can be distinguished from 
pure ideas is that the former, as claimed, provide a clear roadmap for useful 
and specific applications in the hands of downstream researchers. Thus, 
some of the upstream inventions discussed in this article can: (1) be used to 
make new chemical compounds; (2) guide experiments for discovering val-
uable drugs; and (3) stimulate the development of algorithms or structures 
for carrying out the claimed functions. Applications of this sort should per-
                                                                                                                           
tially to a method of calculating, using a mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a specif-
ic purpose, the claimed method is nonstatutory.” (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 
(C.C.P.A. 1977)) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
309 (1980) (“[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not pa-
tentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor 
could Newton have patented the law of gravity.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party at 12, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4040414, at *12 (“[A] patent that expressly claims a law of 
nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea is invalid, no matter how important the discov-
ery.”); supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing unpatentable “scientific property” in 
early international patent regimes). 
 450 See Sichelman, supra note 256, at 370. 
 451 See id. at 363 (“[D]iscerning the line between a law of nature and an ‘application’ of such 
can be tricky in practice.”). 
 452 See id. at 370 (“Although there would be gray areas in determining what is ‘pure,’ since 
relatively few claims under such a test would possibly constitute unpatentable subject matter, there 
would be few ‘hard cases’ to resolve.”); cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Market-
place for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 395, 402 (2005) (distinguishing between “ideas” and “embryon-
ic inventions”). These authors do suggest treating ideas and embryonic inventions the same way—
via ex post liability rule protection or an auction. See Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra, at 403–12. 
Others have argued that different limiting principles—perhaps a prohibition on patents on “organ-
izing human activity”—should distinguish patentable from unpatentable subject matter. See Col-
lins, supra note 247, at 68 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 617 (2010) (Stevens, J., con-
curring)) (describing this approach); cf. Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra, at 426 (arguing that the 
“make love not war” idea should not be entitled to any intellectual property protection). But this 
latter approach might have its own problems. See Robert Stoll, Methods of Organizing Human 
Activities, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/03/10/methods-of-
organizing-human-activities/id=55607, archived at https://perma.cc/ERB5-6SJQ?type=source. 
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haps be sufficient to allow the invention to pass the initial hurdle of patent 
eligibility. Although all of these invention types may be validly viewed as 
upstream in the research process, they involve more than mere ideas or 
statements of a scientific principle. 
In contrast, true hypotheses (those without any roadmap for implemen-
tation) and conjectures without a credible scientific basis should continue to 
be ineligible for intellectual property protection even under the proposed 
scheme.453 For example, the PTO and courts can disallow such claims for 
lack of credible or operable utility under Section 101.454 I do not purport to 
propose any changes to this area of patent law; inventions that are com-
pletely inoperative should not qualify even for limited patent protection.455 
And other requirements of patentability,456 such as enablement,457 novel-
ty,458 and nonobviousness459 will continue to serve as backstops against 
                                                                                                                           
 453 This is in contrast to claims invalidated in University of Rochester, for example, where the 
claimed invention surely had a credible scientific basis. See 358 F.3d at 919. Indeed, the disclo-
sure in the Rochester patent by hypothesis provided a roadmap for finding compounds that would 
perform the claimed methods of treatment; without that roadmap, the claims would not have been 
enabled and the court would not have needed to resort to the written description doctrine. See 
supra notes 150–157 and accompanying text. 
 454 See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming the PTO’s finding 
that the claimed process of “cold fusion” lacked operable utility); Seymore, supra note 143, at 
1493–94. 
 455 To be sure, courts may at times deploy the enablement requirement as a completeness 
requirement. I focus on the other three doctrines, however, because they tend to concentrate more 
squarely on the developmental stage of the invention rather than on an ordinary artisan’s ability to 
practice the invention’s full scope. 
 456 I refer here to requirements in addition to those prohibiting the patenting of pure abstract 
ideas, natural laws, formulae, or natural phenomena. See supra notes 448–449 and accompanying 
text. 
 457 See supra notes 355–360 and accompanying text. 
 458 See Dan L. Burk, Anticipating Patentable Subject Matter, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 109, 
111 (2013), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/Burk_
65_SLRO_109.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J52H-7UW7; see also Schering Corp. v. Geneva 
Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377–81 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying the doctrine of anticipation by 
inherency); In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (same). 
 459 See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
that obviousness would have been the correct ground on which to reject claims to ESTs). Argua-
bly, ESTs would have been adjudged to be obvious under the reasoning of In re Kubin—which, 
however, was decided four years after Fisher. See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); Mark D. Janis, Tuning the Obviousness Inquiry After KSR, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 
335, 339–40 (2012) (“[T]he PTO [in Fisher] had elaborated a more robust form of the utility doc-
trine as a counterbalance to a toothless obviousness requirement—but, as Judge Rader recognized, 
this was an inferior solution. The problem, as Judge Rader saw it, was potential obviousness, and 
the obviousness doctrine should supply the solution. . . . In . . . In re Kubin, Judge Rader dealt with 
the obviousness standard directly, as he had been unable to do in Fisher.” (citation omitted)); 
Anna Bartow Laakmann, Restoring the Genetic Commons: A “Common Sense” Approach to 
Biotechnology Patents in the Wake of KSR v. Teleflex, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
43, 69–76 (2007) (explaining how the nonobviousness requirement could be used to limit up-
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many socially harmful patents.460 These requirements would ensure that 
RPs are awarded only to inventions that have some demonstrable technical 
merit and improve sufficiently upon the prior art. 
CONCLUSION 
Patents on upstream, basic-research inventions have created problems 
for the law. Courts have had difficulty developing a coherent body of doc-
trine for curbing such unduly preemptive patents. Concerns over upstream 
patenting have produced many controversial cases under the rubrics of the 
utility, written description, and patentable subject matter requirements—a 
controversy that has become particularly acute of late in patentable subject 
matter jurisprudence. I argue that these cases are best explained by a super-
vening, unwritten requirement of patentability that I call “completeness,” 
and maintain that an explicit recognition and codification of this require-
ment might improve the state of patent law. In addition, I suggest the possi-
bility of a limited patent right for inventions that pass the current require-
ments of patentability, but fail completeness. I justify these proposals on 
utilitarian grounds. 
 
                                                                                                                           
stream patents in the biotechnology field); cf. Janis, supra, at 340–42 (explaining that the Federal 
Circuit’s holding in Kubin “demonstrates that by refining the obviousness inquiry, courts can 
reduce the need to rely on the written description requirement”). 
 460 Cf. Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 609–35 (2008) (argu-
ing that the patentable subject matter requirement is unnecessary because other conditions of pa-
tentability, if properly applied, can help eliminate many of the socially harmful patents targeted by 
that requirement). 
   
 
